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SUMMARY 
Financial constraints are one of the most important obstacles for businesses 
particularly in less–developed and developing economies. Collateral requirements 
are frequently addressed as one the most important obstacles to starting and 
running a business especially for small and medium enterprises (SMEs), in these 
countries. This thesis consists of four empirical papers each corresponding to a 
chapter on loan markets in less-developed economies. After the introduction 
chapter, the second chapter investigates both the presence of collateral and the 
collateral to loan ratios on loans extended to SMEs are examined. 
The informal credit mostly serves credit-constrained borrowers (mostly SMEs, 
poor households, informal businesses, borrowers in rural areas that are located far 
from formal creditors, and people who are not able to meet collateral requirements 
of formal creditors) in the formal financial markets. The third chapter aims to 
understand why and to what extend SMEs use informal credit from various 
sources, moneylenders and family/friends and suppliers/customers as forms of 
informal credit.  
The fourth chapter examines the financial constraints faced by female 
entrepreneurs. The primary data source in these second, third and fourth chapters 
is the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Surveys which are  
mainly based on Eastern European and Central Asian countries. These surveys 
are joint projects of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and 
the World Bank. 
Chapter five of this thesis takes a different strand and focuses on the effect of 
banks’ market power on banks’ risk. The empirical analysis is based on data from 
Turkish banks and helps to shed light on the relation between market power and 
financial stability. Finally chapter six highlights the main conclusions and 
addresses potential future research directions. 
 
Keywords: Collateral, Informal Credit, Financial Constraints, Gender, Market 
Power, Banking Concentration.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
Financial constraints are one of the most important obstacles to starting and 
running a business for small and medium enterprises (SMEs), particularly in less–
developed and transition economies. As theoretical models acknowledge, financial 
constraints are stringent in these countries because the financial environment in 
these economies typically involves opaque information and weak enforcement 
(Hainz, 2003; Menkhoff et al. 2006 and 2012). Results of Business Environment 
and Enterprise Performance Surveys (BEEPS) indicate that high collateral 
requirements are the fourth most important reason that firms do not apply for 
external loans; with respect to importance, this factor ranked immediately below 
the issues of complexity of application processes and high interest rates. In less-
developed economies, borrowers have relatively low probabilities of holding 
collateralisable assets and collateral requirements are relatively high as compared 
to developed economies; thus, firms in less-developed countries are more likely to 
experience difficulties in obtaining access to external financing. Therefore, 
collateralisation appears to be a crucial aspect of a firm’s access to external 
financing; this access can determine the eventual disappearance or survival of a 
firm especially in less-developed and transition economies.  
To this end, in this the second chapter we examine the collateral requirements 
on loans extended to SMEs in less-developed and transition economies by using 
BEEPS dataset. Chapter two aims to understand the determinants of both (i) the 
presence of collateral and (ii) the collateral to loan ratios in loans that are 
extended to SMEs in less–developed countries, investigates the importance of 
various firm– and country–specific factors are by testing (i) whether higher 
borrower quality reduces the collateralisation; (ii) whether information sharing 
among lenders can decrease collateralisation; and (iii) to what extent lending 
market and macroeconomic conditions affect the presence and the degree of 
collateral in loan contracts. Since the incidence of collateral in loan contracts and 
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the collateral to loan ratios come from two different decision processes, 
collarelisation is modelled in two different parts. First, the presence of collateral is 
modelled by using probit models for the binary dependent variable, i.e. a dummy 
which equals to one if the loan contract includes collateral, zero otherwise. Second 
the collateral to loan value ratios are estimated by excluding the zero collateral. 
Predictive powers of this two-part model are found to be higher than the 
alternative tobit model which take into account both zero and positive values 
simultaneously.  
The main result of the empirical analysis indicates that country–specific 
variables are more important than firm–specific variables for determining both the 
presence and the degree of collateral for a loan. Accordingly, we find that not all 
of the borrower’s characteristics explain the collateral requirements; collateral 
requirements appear to represent a tool for resolving the problem of asymmetric 
information about a borrower’s quality. 
This chapter contributes to the existing literature in two ways. First, it has a 
cross–country sample; which allows us to obtain detailed information about 
borrower firms from different countries. There have been few empirical studies 
that use this type of survey data; moreover, most of the studies on collateral in 
the context of less–developed and transition economies have been conducted for a 
single country. Consequently, there is a paucity of empirical research on this topic 
and addresses this deficiency by presenting a wide range of cross–country data 
from less–developed countries, including transition economies from Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia. This chapter yields new results and important insights for 
businesses and policy makers that operate in these countries. Second, it 
contributes to the literature by investigating not only the presence of collateral in 
lending but also the volume of collateral in loan contracts. Most of the extant 
empirical studies employ discrete choice models that do not distinguish among 
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different levels of collateral. To the best of our knowledge, few other studies of 
SMEs in less–developed markets focus on the collateral to loan ratio1. 
The informal credit mostly serves these people who are excluded from the 
formal financial services or credit-constrained borrowers (mostly SMEs, poor 
households, informal businesses, borrowers in rural areas that are located far from 
formal creditors, and people who are not able to meet collateral requirements). 
Many studies consider informal credit as a last resort for credit-constrained 
borrowers (Bell, 1990; Ghosh et al., 2000) where the informal creditors serve to a 
residual class of borrowers. On the other hand, firms that have easy access to 
formal financial services can also use informal credit. Less stringent interest rate 
and collateral requirements in informal credit makes it attractive for borrowers. In 
particular, less educated and “finance literate” women participate more in 
informal financial transactions compared to men, especially with regard to savings 
(Baydas et al., 1995).  
Previous empirical studies show that despite financial liberalisation efforts and 
regulations, informal credits still constitute a large share of credits, especially of 
those provided to poor households and SMEs. Tsai (2004) notes that the limited 
supply of bank credits, limits in the governmental capacity to implement its 
policies, the political and economic segmentation of local markets, and the 
institutional weaknesses of many microfinance programs are the factors that 
contribute to the persistence of the informal financial transactions in China and 
India. Despite its inefficient banking system and poor legal infrastructure and 
institutional quality, China is one of the fastest growing economies in the world. 
Allen et al. (2005) and Molnar and Tanaka (2007) explain this anomaly by the 
existence of alternative informal financing channels in the private sector, which 
are based on reputation and relationships.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Most of the previous studies on collateralisation depend on the use of collateral in loan contracts 
and have used logit or probit regressions on a binary dependent variable. However, these discrete 
choice models do not describe the volume of collateral; for example, loan contracts with 1% or 
1000% collateral to loan ratios are considered to be the same and are typically identically coded.   
! )!
The third chapter of this thesis examines the informal credit extended to SMEs 
by mainly using the 2005 wave of the BEEPS, as this wave provides more detailed 
information on percentages of working capital/fixed assets financed by informal 
credit, i.e. family/friends, moneylenders, suppliers/customers. The effect of both 
country- and firm-level factors (such as perceived difficulty of access to finance, 
gender of the firm owners, location of firms, the financial development and legal 
quality level in the country) on the percentages of working capital/fixed assets 
financed by informal credit are examined. Since the dependent variables are 
expressed as fractions of working capital/fixed assets, i.e. they vary between zero 
and one, we use a generalised linear model (GLM) with a logit link and the 
binomial family, as suggested by Papke and Wooldridge (1996) which is also 
suitable for dependent variables that contain a large number of zeroes. 
The main results of this chapter show that SMEs mostly use informal credit to 
finance their working capital expenses, whereas only a small share of fixed assets 
is financed by informal credit. SMEs that report access to credit as an obstacle for 
their business use informal credit more extensively. Moreover, the age and size of 
SMEs, the gender of their owners and the financial development of the country 
are factors affecting the reliance of SMEs on informal credit. Female owned SMEs 
rely less on credit from moneylender as compared to their male counterparts. 
Finally, the determinants of borrowing from family/friends and from 
moneylenders are similar, whereas the determinants of using trade credits are 
different.  
This third chapter contributes to the existing literature in several ways. As 
there is no formal registration of transactions in informal financial transactions, it 
is difficult to obtain data on the real size of these activities. To our knowledge, 
this chapter uses one of the largest data set used in the informal credit literature. 
Previous empirical literature concentrates on the use of informal credits by 
households, whereas only a few studies focus on the informal credit use of firms. 
Many studies concentrate on the individual characteristics of subjects and/or on 
the institutional environment as determinants of informal finance in developing 
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countries, whereas only a couple of studies use cross-country data. Despite the 
importance of firms for economic growth and development, a gap exists regarding 
the role of formal financial development and, in particular, the role of banking 
concentration in the informal credit use of firms, and there are only a few studies 
on informal finance in transition economies and Eastern European and Central 
Asian countries. To our knowledge, there are no studies on informal finance in 
developed economies. Empirical studies on informal finance focus mostly on single 
developing countries, rather than on several countries, because informal finance is 
more prevalent in developing countries2. These studies on informal finance are 
based on survey data of households or enterprises and mostly investigate 
individual characteristics of subjects and/or the institutional and legal 
environment of the country.  
Gender is one of the primary drivers of economic disparities between people. 
Although females become more and more visible in business and financial 
environments in the last decades, there are still only few female examples of the 
“richest” people or the “biggest businesses” in all around the world. This situation 
is a call for research for the systematical differences between the male and females. 
Women are stereotyped differently from men in general e.g. women have more 
emotional and cautious image as compared to men. Previous literature shows that 
female owned enterprises are more likely to be smaller, they operate in labour 
intensive and service sectors as compared to their male counterparts (Carter and 
Rosa, 1998). Female owned businesses are more likely to use retained earnings and 
have lower percentage of debt finance (Haines et al., 1999). These differences may 
have three different explanations: First female firm owners do not prefer to borrow 
due to their preferences. Second discriminatory lenders do not prefer to extend 
loans to female owned businesses. Third, market and cultural structures are not 
suitable enough to allow female owners to get loans.   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 China is one of the countries that is examined extensively due to the importance of informal 
finance in the financing of the private sector (see Park et al., 2003; Tsai, 2004; Zhang, 2008; 
Turvey and Kong, 2010; Ayyagari et al., 2010). Ghosh et al. (2000) and Pagura and Kirsten 
(2006) are based on other developing economies.  
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The fourth chapter of this thesis aims to enrich the first and second chapters 
by examining the role of female ownership on the financial constraint faced by 
firms. Financial constraints are defined as the probability of a sole proprietorship 
firm’s getting credit and being discouraged from loan application.   
The main findings of this chapter indicates only little evidence in favour of 
financial constraints faced by female firm owners in loan markets by using probit 
models and taking selection bias into account by Heckman selection models. Some 
evidence show that female firm owners are more likely to be discouraged from loan 
applications as compared to their male counterparts. On the other hand firms’ 
perception of suffering from access to finance do not vary by gender of the owner 
moreover female ownership do not have a statistically significant effect on the 
probability of a credit application to be rejected.  
As there are only a couple of studies that use data from outside the US and 
developed economies, this chapter contributes to the limited literature by 
providing empirical evidence on the issue of gender-based discrimination against 
female entrepreneurs and risk averse nature of female entrepreneurs in 27 
countries from Eastern Europe and Central Asia from 2002 to 2009. 
Chapter five of this thesis takes a different strand and focuses on the effect of 
banks’ market power on banks’ risk. The aim of this chapter is to examine the 
role of market power on risk-taking behaviours of banks in Turkey from 2001 to 
2011. Testing for this issue is important for the Turkish banking system, which 
experienced an intense regulation process after 2000 leading to a sharp decrease in 
the number of banks, and thereby to possible changes in the market powers of 
banks. Although many banks in developed economies were affected negatively in 
the recent global financial crisis, Turkish banks remained nearly unaffected as 
Bredenkamp et al. (2009), BRSA (2009), and Afsar (2011) report.  
To put in a nutshell, this chapter contributes to the extensive literature on the 
relationship between competition and banking stability using a less-developed 
country example: Turkey. To approximate the each bank’s market power Lerner 
index and the ratio of total profits to total revenues are used. Nonperforming 
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loans, loan loss provisions, Z-index are used as proxies of banks’ financial fragility. 
The data of this chapter are manually collected from banks’ balance sheets and 
income statements as reported to Banks Association of Turkey. In addition to 
OLS estimations, since non-performing loans and loan loss provisions are 
expressed as percentages of total assets, they vary between zero and one we run 
GLM regressions with a logit link and the binomial family, as suggested by Papke 
and Wooldridge (1996) for these two variables. Empirical results indicate that 
Turkish banking became less competitive and more concentrated from 2001 to 
2011. Moreover banks with higher market power are found to have less loan risk 
and to be sounder.  
The rest of this thesis is structured as follows. Each chapter starts with an 
introduction and literature review. Then the data and methodology used in the 
chapter are presented. Hypotheses are developed to address the research question. 
These are followed by the empirical results and conclusions. Each chapter contains 
its own appendices and its own list of references.  
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Chapter 2    
Collateral Requirements of SMEs: The Evidence from Less–Developed 
Countries3 
 
2.1 Introduction  
Financial constraints are one of the most important obstacles to starting and 
running a business for small and medium enterprises (SMEs), particularly in less–
developed and transition economies. Both the information asymmetry between the 
bank and the firm (Berger and Udell, 1998; Baas and Schrooten, 2006), and the 
overall banking market structure (Petersen and Rajan, 2002; Berger and Udell, 
2006) can influence the borrower–bank relationship. As theoretical models 
acknowledge, collateral requirements are stringent in these countries because the 
financial environment in less-developed and transition economies typically involves 
opaque information and weak enforcement (Hainz, 2003; Menkhoff et al. 2006 and 
2012). However, little evidence is available with respect to the determinants of 
collateral for loans that are extended to SMEs in transition and less-developed 
markets. Beck et al. (2006) use the World Business Environment Survey (WBES) 
to examine 12 financing obstacles and report that collateral requirements are the 
third most important of these obstacles. The Business Environment and 
Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) results for firms in Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia indicate that high collateral requirements are the fourth most 
important reason that firms do not apply for external loans; with respect to 
importance, this factor ranked immediately below the issues of complex 
application processes and high interest rates4. Therefore, collateralisation appears 
to be a crucial aspect of a firm’s access to external financing; this access can 
determine the eventual disappearance or survival of a firm. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 This paper is coauthored with Eleonora Broccardo and Flavio Bazzana. An earlier version of this 
paper was presented at International Finance and Banking Society (IFABS) 2012 conference, in 
Valencia Spain, 7th Porteguese Finance Network (PFN) 2012 conference, in Aveiro, Portugal and 
Associazione Docenti di Economie degli Intermediari Mercati Finanziari (ADEIMF) 2012 Annual 
Meeting Capri, Italy and received the second best paper award. 
4 See Table 2.A of the Appendix for a detailed depiction of these results. 
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An extensive body of literature refers to collateral requirements as a tool that 
can both reduce the cost of external funds for firms in the presence of agency 
problems and decrease credit rationing (Besanko and Thakor 1987a; Bester 1987; 
Coco 1999; Berger et al. 2011b; Jiménez et al. 2011)5. In less-developed economies, 
borrowers have relatively low probabilities of holding collateralisable assets and 
collateral requirements are relatively high; thus, firms in these countries are more 
likely to experience difficulties in obtaining access to external financing (Menkhoff 
et al. 2006 and 2012). The empirical literature on collateralisation has largely 
focused on developed countries, whereas only a few studies have examined this 
issue in the context of less–developed and transition economies. One example of 
the rare examples of these studies on less–developed economies is Feder et al. 
(1988) that emphasises the role of collateral in decreasing the cost of 
creditworthiness assessments for lenders in rural Thailand; these decreased costs 
increase the credit supply of the examined region. Using data from Thailand, 
Menkhoff et al. (2012) reveal that a lack of collateral is resolved through the use 
of substitutes for collateral, such as relationship lending, the modification of loan 
terms (e.g., reductions in loan size), and the inclusion of third-party guarantees. 
Using firm–level data from Mexico, Gelos and Werner (2002) address the 
importance of collateral in the form of real estate for investments by firms, 
particularly following the financial liberalisation of that Mexico. 
The objective of our paper is to understand the determinants of both (i) the 
presence of collateral and (ii) the collateral to loan ratios in loans that are 
extended to SMEs in less–developed countries. Using pooled cross–section data, we 
seek to investigate the importance of various firm– and country–specific factors 
are by testing (i) whether higher borrower quality reduces the collateral to loan 
ratio; (ii) whether information sharing among lenders can decrease 
collateralisation; and (iii) to what extent lending market and macroeconomic 
conditions affect the presence of collateral in loan contracts. Our main result 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 For a review of the previous empirical research that addresses collateral as a remedy for credit 
rationing, see Steijvers and Voordeckers (2009). 
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indicates that country–specific variables are more important than firm–specific 
variables for determining both the presence and the degree of collateral for a loan. 
Accordingly, we find that not all of the borrower’s characteristics explain the 
collateral requirements; collateral requirements appear to represent a tool for 
resolving the problem of asymmetric information about a borrower’s quality. 
Our paper contributes to the existing literature in two ways. First, we have a 
cross–country sample from BEEPS; which allows us to obtain deep and detailed 
information about on borrower firms. There have been few empirical studies that 
use this type of survey data; moreover, most of the researches on collateral in the 
context of less–developed and transition economies have been conducted for a 
single country. Consequently, there is a paucity of empirical research on this topic. 
To address this deficiency, our paper presents a wide range of cross–country data 
from less–developed countries, including transition economies from Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia, and yields new results and important insights for businesses and 
policy makers that operate in these countries. Second, we contribute to the 
literature by investigating not only the presence of collateral but also the volume 
of collateral in loan contracts. Most of the extant empirical studies employ 
discrete choice models that do not distinguish among different levels of collateral. 
To the best of our knowledge, few other studies of SMEs in less–developed 
markets focus on the collateral to loan ratio6. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the 
theoretical and empirical literature that addresses collateral requirements. Section 
2.3 introduces the hypotheses and the methodology of this chapter. Section 2.4 
presents data and descriptive statistics. The estimation results are discussed in 
section 2.5, and section 2.6 concludes the paper. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 Most of the previous studies on collateralisation depend on the use of collateral in loan contracts 
and have used logit or probit regressions on a binary dependent variable. However, these discrete 
choice models do not describe the volume of collateral; for example, loan contracts with 1% or 
1000% collateral to loan ratios are considered to be the same and are typically identically coded. 
For a review of empirical research that addresses the degree of collateral for loan contracts, see 
Menkhoff et al. (2006). 
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2.2 Literature review 
An extensive body of theoretical literature addresses collateral as a tool for 
resolving informational asymmetry problems regarding the borrower’s quality in 
the context of either adverse selection or moral hazards. According to the adverse 
selection hypothesis, collateral acts as an indicator of the borrower’s 
creditworthiness (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Bester, 1987; Besanko and Thakor, 
1987a; Chan and Kanatas, 1985; Chan and Thakor, 1987; Boot et al., 1991). The 
bank screens firms by offering both loan contracts with higher collateral and lower 
interest rates and loan contracts with lower collateral and higher interest rates. 
Although risk factors may not be readily observable, lower–risk borrowers will 
nonetheless pledge more and better collateral than riskier borrowers because this 
pledge is less costly for borrowers who have lower likelihoods of losing the 
proffered collateral. According to the moral hazard hypothesis, the probability of 
losing collateral acts as a disciplinary tool for the borrower. Thus, the pledge of 
collateral leads to a higher level of effort to satisfy loan conditions, reducing a 
borrower’s default probability. Collateral therefore serves as a tool for resolving 
moral hazard problems (Aghion and Bolton, 1992, Boot et al., 1991; Boot and 
Thakor, 1994; Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997). To support these two divergent 
hypotheses regarding the role of collateral, empirical studies have investigated 
whether a reduction in asymmetric information impacts collateral decisions. As 
noted by Godlewski and Weill (2011), there is a clear dearth of substantial 
empirical support for the adverse selection hypothesis with respect to the use of 
collateral. Although several studies support the role of collateral as a tool for 
mitigating adverse selection problems (Jiménez et al., 2006; Berger et al. 2011b), 
other investigations (Cressy and Toivanen, 2001) find evidence that risk and 
collateral are not significantly correlated. Instead, a positive relationship between 
collateral and loan spread is consistently demonstrated: in other words, because 
banks are able to distinguish among borrowers of different quality, these financial 
institutions charge higher interest rates and require higher collateral for riskier 
borrowers, confirming the observed–risk hypothesis (Berger and Udell, 1990; 
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Berger and Udell, 1995; Jiménez and Saurina, 2004; Gonas et al., 2004; Chen, 
2006; Menkhoff et al., 2006; Chakraborty and Hu, 2006; Brick and Palia, 2007)7. 
Within this debate, several authors indicate that both hypotheses might be 
empirically validated and reconciled by examining the degree of information 
asymmetries that are present in a country. Empirical evidence indicates that the 
observed–risk hypothesis tends to dominate in contexts that involve low levels of 
asymmetric information (Berger et al., 2011a; Godlewski and Weill, 2011). A 
recent study by Steijvers and Voordeckers (2011) suggests several explanations for 
why the observed results regarding this topic may differ across various empirical 
studies8. 
Several studies assume that the strength of the lender–borrower relationship is 
an inverse proxy for the degree of asymmetric information (for an overview, see, 
e.g., Boot, 2000). In particular, these investigations suggest that if this 
relationship is stronger, then the borrower’s risk information will be more reliable 
and therefore the borrower will be able to obtain a loan contract with more 
favourable terms (Boot and Thakor, 1994; Petersen and Rajan, 1995)9. However, 
another stream of literature predicts that a strong relationship may induce banks 
to exploit their information monopoly and extract a rent by requiring more 
collateral (Sharpe, 1990). Research investigations indicate that the variables that 
are employed as proxies for the strength of the relationship can affect the 
empirical results that are observed. For instance, although several studies either 
find no significant correlation between the duration of the bank–borrower 
relationship and the pledging of collateral (Menkhoff et al., 2006) or report a 
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7 A recent study by Niinimäki (2011) yields a new insight regarding the decision to pledge 
collateral. This study reveals that for high-risk borrowers, the choice between unsecured and 
secured lending depends on their expectations for changes in value of the collateral that they plan 
to pledge for their loans. In particular, borrowers are more likely to choose secured loan contracts 
if they expect the value of their collateral to depreciate. 
8 They argue that the most relevant limitations in empirical research consist of not only (i) the 
exclusion of other tools for reducing information opaqueness, such as the strength of the borrower-
lender relationship, loan maturity, and loan covenants, but also (ii) the ignoring of the moderating 
or interaction effects among the different tools that mitigate informational asymmetries. 
9 However, it must be noted that if the lender obtains access to private information of the 
borrower, the required collateral for a loan may either decrease or increase, given that private 
information about borrower quality can be either favourable or unfavourable. 
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positive correlation between these two factors (Machauer and Weber, 1998; Ono 
and Uesegi, 2009, Uchida, 2011), the majority of the extant empirical studies 
demonstrate a negative relationship between these two variables (Berger and 
Udell, 1995; Harhoff and Körting, 1998; Degryse and Van Cayseele, 2000; 
Chakraborty and Hu, 2006; Jiménez et al., 2006; Brick and Palia, 2007). Empirical 
studies have also related the strength of the bank–borrower relationship to the 
number of banks with which the borrower has transactions, assuming that more 
exclusive relationships will also be stronger in nature; however, the results from 
these studies are conflicting. Investigations by Harhoff and Körting (1998), 
Chakraborty and Hu (2006), and Jiménez et al. (2006) find a negative relationship 
between borrower exclusivity and collateral, as these studies reveal that 
relationships with multiple banks increase the probability of pledging collateral for 
a loan. By contrast, studies by Machauer and Weber (1998), Menkhoff et al. 
(2006), Voordeckers and Steijvers (2006) and Hernández-Cánovas and Martínez-
Solano (2006) report a positive relationship between these two considerations, 
suggesting that relationships with multiple banks lower the probability of pledging 
collateral for a loan. 
The “lender–based” theory of collateral assesses the presence of collateral in 
loans by considering two different banks in the credit market: one local bank that 
benefits from possessing an information advantage on the borrower and another 
bank that is distant from the borrower but introduces competition in the local 
market (Inderst and Mueller, 2007). Investigations of these types of situations 
have revealed that the presence of collateral allows local lenders to profit from 
their superior information advantage; for instance, empirical research by Jiménez 
et al. (2009) indicates that the use of collateral is higher for loans that are granted 
by local lenders. Other researchers have examined the relationship between 
different types of lenders or loans and the pledging of collateral. The results from 
all of these studies have relevance for asymmetric information theories and/or the 
relationship issue. Chakraborty and Hu (2006) indicate that loans that are not 
lines of credit are less likely to be collateralised if borrowers use more of a bank’s 
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services. Jiménez and Saurina (2004) conclude that for savings banks, which are 
the types of financial institutions that face the greatest adverse selection, 
collateral appears to be an effective device for decreasing borrower risk. Uchida 
(2011) finds that compared with large banks, small banks place greater emphasis 
on both the ability to pledge collateral and the lending relationship. However, 
Voordeckers and Steijvers (2006) conclude that compared with loan and lender 
characteristics, firm and relationship characteristics are more important 
determinants of collateral. 
Another stream of literature investigates the role of market competition in 
collateralisation. An initial theoretical view argues that as bank competition 
increases, the bank’s incentive to invest in information collection diminishes 
because the probability that borrowers will switch to other banks will rise; thus, 
under increasingly competitive conditions, a bank’s power to extract rent will be 
reduced, increasing the likelihood of the use of collateral (Besanko and Thakor, 
1987a; Petersen and Rajan, 1995). From an empirical perspective, by assuming a 
negative relationship between competition and loan market concentration, 
Jiménez et al. (2006) find support for a negative relationship between the use of 
collateral and loan market concentration10, thus suggesting that collateral and a 
bank’s market power appear to be substitutes. A second theoretical view asserts 
that bank competition may induce banks to focus even more deeply on 
relationship–based lending; this focus can alleviate price competition pressures 
because a client–driven lending system can help a bank become more unique 
relative to its competitors (Boot and Thakor, 2000; Berlin and Butler, 2002). 
Voordeckers and Steijvers (2006) empirically demonstrate that if a company 
submits a credit request to more banks, the likelihood that the company will 
pledge any type of collateral as an aspect of its eventual loan diminishes. Finally, 
in Berger et al. (2011b), lending market concentration does not appear to have a 
significant effect on the use of collateral. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 However, these authors find that credit market concentration does not change the effect that the 
relationship duration has on the likelihood of collateral use. 
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Moreover, the existing literature also explores whether collateral requirements 
help reduce the cost of external funds and the level of credit rationing11. In 
addition, many published studies analyse whether collateral requirements improve 
a bank’s monitoring activity12 . Recent empirical research supports these two 
theories13. To conclude, the theoretical literature also analyses (i) the existence of 
a ‘‘collateral channel’’ through which a large decline in asset markets decreases the 
value of collateralisable assets and adversely affects the real economy14; and (ii) 
the ways in which collateral affects recovery rates within the Basel II framework15. 
2.3 Hypotheses and methodology 
We investigate how collateral requirements are related to characteristics of the 
borrower and/or features of the credit market. We measure the collateral 
requirement not only by the presence of collateral but also by the collateral to 
loan value ratio. With respect to borrower characteristics, we analyse whether the 
risk profile of the borrower positively affects the collateral requirement (hypothesis 
1). With respect to market features, we investigate how information sharing 
(hypothesis 2) and the concentration of the bank market (hypothesis 3) affect 
collateral requirements. Thus, in accordance with the literature surveyed above, 
the following hypotheses are tested. 
2.3.1 Hypotheses 
H1a As the default risk of borrowers increases, the presence of collateral in 
SME loan contracts becomes more likely, and collateral to loan ratios will be 
higher for these high–risk borrowers. 
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11 See Bester (1987), Besanko and Thakor (1987a), Feder et al. (1988), La Porta et al. (1997), Coco 
(1999), Gelos and Werner (2002), Jiminez and Saurina (2004), Berger et al. (2011b), and Menkhoff 
et al. (2012). For a review of recent empirical research on collateral as a remedy for credit 
rationing, see Steijvers and Voordeckers (2011). 
12 Berglöf and von Thadden (1994), Rajan and Winton (1995), Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), 
Repullo and Suarez (1998), Gorton and Kahn (2000), Longhofer and Santos (2000), Park (2000), 
Manove et al. (2001). 
13 Voordeckers and Steijvers (2006), Cerqueiro et al. (2011), Ono and Uesugi (2009). 
14  Mattesini (1990), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Feder et al. (1988), Krishnamurthy (2003), 
Niinimäki (2009), Benmelech and Bergman (2011). 
15 Hui et al. (2006), Chalupka and Kopecsni (2009), Grunert and Weber (2009). 
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According to the observed–risk hypothesis, borrowers with observably higher 
risk are more likely be required to provide collateral for loans to defray the costs 
of the lender in the event of a default (Leeth and Scott, 1989; Berger and Udell, 
1990; Jiménez and Saurina, 2004; Chen, 2006; Niinimäki, 2011). In a situation 
that involves hidden actions, collateral can serve as a means of aligning the 
interests of the lender and the borrower, acting as a deterrent that discourages the 
borrower from adopting opportunistic, risk–shifting behaviours that can hinder the 
success of the project that uses the borrowed funds (Boot et al., 1991; Boot and 
Thakor, 1994; Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997).  
We expect to find evidence of a positive relationship between the risks of the 
SMEs and the collateral requirements in our sample, particularly given that small 
and medium businesses typically display even higher perceived levels of risk in 
less–developed countries than in developed economies. 
H1b Low risk borrowers are more likely to pledge collateral in their loan 
contracts and more likely to have high collateral to loan values to signal their 
quality.  
The credible threat of losing the pledged collateral (Aghion and Bolton, 1992) 
disciplines the borrower’s actions by producing a higher level of effort to satisfy 
loan requirements and therefore reducing the borrower’s default probability. 
Accordingly low risk borrowers might be more likely to pledge collateral to signal 
their creditworthiness (Bester 1985; Bester 1987; Besanko and Thakor 1987a; 
Chan and Kanatas 1985). These studies usually concentrate on private 
information about risk known only to borrowers (Berger and Udell, 1990). Manove 
et al (2001) imply that high quality borrowers are more likely to pledge collateral 
to distinguish themselves from low quality borrowers especially when the banking 
competition is intense. Bester (1985) and Bester (1987) address collateral 
requirements as a signalling tool and imply that only low risk borrowers accept 
secured contracts at lower interest premiums. If this hypothesis is valid for our 
sample we should observe a positive relationship between borrower’s quality and 
collateral requirements. The previous empirical evidence doesnt support this 
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hypothesis, indeed H1a seems to be the conventional wisdom in the literature. 
Ono and Uesegi (2009), on the other hand, find that the firms’ riskiness doesn’t 
have a significant effect on the use of collateral.  
H2 The collateral requirements in SME loan contracts are less stringent in 
countries that feature more intensive information sharing among lenders. 
Information sharing among lenders allows banks to inexpensively obtain 
information on the repayment histories and current debt exposure of loan 
applicants. Thus, information sharing is an important tool for reducing 
informational asymmetries and eventually decreasing adverse selection problems. 
Pagano and Jappelli (1993) demonstrate that information sharing increases the 
volume of lending by easing loan conditions, particularly for situations involving 
severe adverse selection problems in the financial markets. From an empirical 
perspective, Brown et al. (2009) reveal that information sharing is associated with 
credit that is both more available and less expensive for firms; this effect is 
especially pronounced for informationally opaque SMEs 16 . In countries with 
weaker information–sharing mechanisms, lenders may experience difficulties with 
respect to credit risk measurement, particularly if they are unfamiliar with the 
loan applicant prior to the loan application. As a consequence, greater opaqueness 
regarding borrowers’ characteristics produces an increased probability of collateral 
requirements and a higher degree of collateral for any given loan. Therefore, we 
expect to find negative relationships between information sharing and both the 
presence of collateral in loans and the collateral to loan ratio. 
H3a Both the likelihood of the presence of collateral and the degree of collateral 
in SME loan contracts are positively associated with banking concentration. 
Boot and Thakor (2000) argue that banks attempt to build closer relationships 
with their clients in more competitive banking environments. Therefore, banking 
competition is expected to decrease the collateral requirements. Berlin and Butler 
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16 Brown et al. (2009) use BEEPS data from 2002 and 2005. In particular, data regarding the 
cost/availability of funds is obtained from the answers of the responding firms to the following 
question: “Can you tell me how problematic is access to finance (e.g., collateral requirement) or 
financing not available from banks for the operation and growth of your business?” (1 = major 
obstacle, 2 = moderate obstacle, 3 = minor obstacle, 4 = no obstacle).!
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(2002) demonstrate that as the competitive pressure in loan markets increases, 
lenders must relax the contract terms, i.e., lower their collateral ratios; thus, loan 
contracts become less stringent as competition increases. Based on a sample of 
bank loans in 70 countries, Hainz et al. (2008) indicate that the presence of 
collateral in loan contracts is more likely in less competitive loan markets. 
Assuming that a negative association exists between competition and 
concentration, we expect to find a positive relationship between the concentration 
of the credit markets and both the presence of collateral in loans and the 
magnitude of the collateral to loan ratio. We furthermore postulate that because 
the banking sector is less-developed and less competitive in less–developed 
countries than in developed countries, oligopolistic banks in these less–developed 
countries may extract rents by frequently requiring collateral and mandating 
higher collateral to loan ratios. 
H3b Both the likelihood of the presence of collateral and the degree of collateral 
in SME loan contracts are negatively associated with banking concentration. 
There is also another group of studies that address a positive association 
between competition in banking and the presence of collateral (e.g., Besanko and 
Thakor, 1987a; Voordeckers and Steijvers, 2006). Assuming a negative 
relationship between competition and concentration, the use of collateral is 
expected to be less likely in concentrated lending markets. In concentrated 
banking environments, lenders possess an informational advantage over borrowers; 
this advantage produces collateral requirements that are less stringent, as 
predicted by the “lender–based” theory of collateral (Inderst and Mueller, 2007; 
Jiménez et al., 2006; 2009). Jiménez et al. (2006 and 2009) provide empirical 
evidence for the negative relationship between the presence of collateral in loan 
contracts and lender market concentration. By contrast, Berger et al. (2011b, 
2011c) demonstrate that lending market concentration—which these researchers 
use as a control variable—does not have a significant effect on the presence of 
collateral in loan contracts. 
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2.3.2 Methodology 
Using probit and logit models, most of the previously published studies that 
examine the presence of collateral in loan contracts use a binary dependent 
variable17. However, these binary dependent variable models do not describe the 
volume of collateral; for example, loan contracts with 1% or 1000% collateral to 
loan ratios are considered to be the same and are coded identically. Only a few 
studies have examined collateral to loan ratios, and these investigations primarily 
utilise tobit models18. However, tobit is a restrictive model due to its assumptions. 
First, the maximum likelihood estimation for the tobit model assumes that errors 
are homoskedastic and possess a normal distribution; if these assumptions are 
violated, the maximum likelihood estimator becomes inconsistent. Although 
several modified tobit models exist (e.g., the heteroskedasticity–robust tobit 
estimator), Ramalho and Vidigal da Silva (2009) argue that none of these 
modifications produce a single modified tobit model that addresses all of the issues 
with the tobit approach. Second, the tobit model assumes that the same data–
generating process determines both the binary and the continuous dependent 
variables, which in this instance are the presence of collateral and the collateral to 
loan ratio, respectively. 
As originally formulated by Cragg (1971), double–hurdle or two–part models 
generalise the tobit model in a manner that overcomes this restrictive 
assumption19. As the name “double–hurdle” suggests, Cragg’s (1971) model is 
based on the assumption that households make two separate decisions about 
buying a durable good; in particular, in this model, each household first decides 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 Berger and Udell (1995), Degryse and van Cayseele (2000), Jiménez et al. (2009), Menkhoff et al. 
(2012). 
18 Menkhoff et al. (2006),!Peltoniemi (2007). 
19 Goldberger (1964) may be regarded as the first author who addresses the two-part models. 
However, Cragg (1971) is the first paper to use the term ‘two-part model’. These models have been 
extensively used in consumption studies and health economics research, particularly for situations 
involving cigarette/alcohol consumption (Cragg, 1971; Jones, 1989; Yen and Jensen, 1996; 
Labeaga, 1999; Newman et al., 2003; Aristei et al., 2008; Madden, 2008). Two-part models are 
rarely used in empirical finance studies. Dionne et al. (1996) use this model for credit scoring, and 
Moffatt (2005) employs this model for loan defaults. To the best of our knowledge, two-part 
models have not yet been implemented in the empirical literature of collateralisation. 
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whether to buy a durable good and subsequently determines how much to spend 
on the purchase of the good. Thus, these decisions are determined by different 
data–generating processes. As explained in Cragg (1971), to observe a positive 
level of expenditure on a durable good, two separate hurdles must be passed: the 
first hurdle is the participation decision (i.e., deciding whether to buy the item), 
and the second hurdle is the consumption decision (i.e., deciding how much to 
spend on the item). Adopting this assumption to our model, because the incidence 
of collateral in loan contracts and the collateral to loan ratios stem from two 
different processes, two separate hurdles must be passed to observe a positive 
collateral to loan ratio. In contrast to Heckman models, two–part models depend 
on the assumption of independence between the errors of the two equations. The 
sample selection model is first and foremost used for wage estimation equations 
(Heckman, 1979). In these types of applications, the wages of individuals who do 
not work are not observed, and the population of interest includes not only the 
workers who are in the labour force but also persons who are out of the labour 
force. This model allows for the simultaneous estimation of the effects of 
independent variables on both actual and potential workers. 
Another important point regarding the choice between the sample selection and 
two–part models is the “exclusion restriction”. In most instances, the presence of 
collateral and the collateral to loan ratios are determined by the same set of 
variables. In the case of the selection model, it is necessary to use variables that 
explain the presence of collateral but not the collateral to loan ratio for a loan; 
these variables are nearly impossible to find. 
Menkhoff et al. (2012) and Chakraborty and Hu (2006) use the Heckman 
selection model to model the presence of collateral in loan contracts for which the 
selection equation is a loan approval equation. Our paper differs from Menkhoff et 
al. (2012) and Chakraborty and Hu (2006) in two respects in terms of 
methodology. First, we are interested in not only the presence of collateralisation 
in loan contracts but also the degree of this collateralisation. Second, our 
population of interest are SMEs with loans rather than SMEs without loans 
! #(!
because we are interested in actual collateralisation and not in potential, latent 
collateralisation. Under these circumstances, the two-part models become more 
appropriate for the purposes of our study. We also use a standard likelihood ratio 
test to compare the performances of the two–part model with the performances of 
the tobit approach. 
In the first part of this study’s model, we use probit model to explain the 
presence of collateral in loan contracts, which is expressed by COLL1. The 
information for this dependent variable is extracted from the following question: 
“Referring only to this most recent line of credit or loan, what was the 
approximate value of the collateral required, as a percentage of the value of the 
loan or line of credit?”. The variable takes the value of one if the firm reported a 
positive number and zero otherwise. In the second part of the model in this study, 
we use a truncated regression model to explain the positive values of collateral to 
loan ratios. 
We model the firm–level dependent variables on collateralization as functions of 
firm–specific and country–specific variables. To test our hypotheses, we grouped 
the determinants of the presence of collateral in loan contracts and the collateral 
to loan value ratios for these loan contracts into four categories. The first category 
refers to the firm level determinants: these variables include two proxies for 
borrower risk and allow us to test the first hypothesis of this study. The second 
category relates to the availability of information on borrowers and permits the 
testing of this study’s second hypothesis. The third category refers to the banking 
sector characteristics. Because the majority of loans are borrowed from banks in 
the sample countries, we consider banking sector characteristics to be a proxy for 
lending market characteristics. This group of variables may be used to test the 
third hypothesis. Finally, the fourth category includes the LNGDPPC as a 
country–level macroeconomic control variable. The precise definitions and sources 
of each variable in these four categories are provided in Table 2.1. 
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Table 2.1 Variable definitions and sources 
Variable Definition Source 
LHS variables   
COLL1 
Dummy=1 if the firm has pledged collateral to obtain an 
external loan and zero otherwise. 
BEEPS 
COLL2 
The ratio of collateral value to loan size (%), including 
zeros. 
BEEPS 
COLL3 The ratio of collateral value to loan size (%) if COLL1=1. BEEPS 
RHS variables 
Borrower characteristics 
OVERDUE 
Dummy=1 if the firm has utility payments that are 
overdue by more than 90 days and zero otherwise. 
BEEPS 
 
CRIME 
Dummy=1 if the SME has experienced any losses as a 
result of theft, robbery, vandalism or arson and zero 
otherwise. 
BEEPS 
AGE The number of years that the firm has been operating. BEEPS 
SIZE 
The size of the firm, as measured by the number of full–
time employees. 
BEEPS 
SOLEOWN 
Dummy=1 if the firm is owned by a sole owner and zero 
otherwise. 
BEEPS 
FEMALEOWN 
Dummy=1 if the firm is owned by a sole female owner and 
zero otherwise. 
BEEPS 
QUALITY 
Dummy=1 if the firm has an internationally recognised 
quality certification, such as ISO 9000 or ISO 9002, and 
zero otherwise. 
BEEPS 
CITY 
Dummy=1 if the firm is located in the capital or in a city 
with a population over one million and zero otherwise. 
BEEPS 
 
Information sharing 
PRVTBR 
The number of individuals or firms in a country (as a 
percentage of the adult population of the nation) that are 
included in a private credit bureau’s up–to–date records 
that track information regarding repayment history, 
unpaid debts, and outstanding credit. 
WB 
PUBREG  
The number of individuals or firms in a country (as a 
percentage of the adult population of the nation) that are 
included in a public credit registry’s up–to–date records 
that track information regarding repayment history, 
unpaid debts, and outstanding credit. 
WB 
Lending market characteristics 
CR 
The asset share of the three largest commercial banks 
within the commercial banking sector of the country as a 
measure of concentration in the banking sector (%). 
Bankscope 
FOREIGN 
The asset share of foreign banks in total banking system 
assets (%). 
EBRD 
STATE 
The asset share of state–owned banks in total banking 
system assets (%).  
EBRD 
Macroeconomic variable 
LNGDPPC 
The natural logarithm of the GDP per capita in US 
dollars. 
EBRD 
Notes: BEEPS stands for Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey, WB 
stands for the World Bank, and EBRD stands for the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development. 
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The rest of the control variables that we use are as follows. SIZE stands for the 
firm size and is measured by the number of full–time employees of that firm. AGE 
is the number of years that the firm has been operating. Older firms are more 
likely to have longer relationship with lenders, as shown by Berger and Udell 
(1995); thus, these more established firms can obtain loans with better conditions, 
i.e., lower interest rates and less collateral. Thus, in our model, we expect to 
observe a negative coefficient for AGE. QUALITY is a dummy variable that is set 
equal to one if the firm has an internationally recognised quality certification, such 
as ISO 9000 or ISO 9002, and zero otherwise. Because higher values of this 
variable are reflective of higher borrower quality, we expect to find negative 
coefficients for this variable in our model. SOLEOWN is a dummy variable that 
becomes one if the SME is a sole proprietorship firm. 
FEMALEOWN is a dummy variable that is set equal to one if the SME is a 
sole proprietorship that is owned by a female entrepreneur and zero otherwise. 
Some studies reveal that because women generally form weaker relationships with 
bankers due to sexual stereotyping and discrimination, higher interest rates and 
stricter conditions are likely to apply to loans to women than to men, even if there 
is no difference in the objective riskiness or the business situation of the male and 
female borrowers in question (Carter and Rosa, 1998; Alesina et al. 2009; Beck et 
al. 2011). Thus, we can expect higher collateral requirements for female 
entrepreneurs, i.e, positive coefficient estimate for FEMALEOWN. Another body 
of literature exists that considers women to be better borrowers than men in terms 
of lower default rates; however, this result is largely attributed to women’s 
difficulties with respect to accessing credit; these difficulties reduce their risk of 
moral hazard20. There is also another type of studies that address females to be 
more risk averse as compared to males21. So they are less likely to agree with loan 
contracts that have strict collateral requirements. Relying on the fact that females 
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20 See D’Espallier et al. (2011) for a review of the literature regarding the gender effect on default 
rates in micro-finance institutions. 
21 See Croson and Gneezy (2009) for a review of the experimental studies on gender based 
preference differences. 
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are more risk averse, and they have lower default rates, we can also expect to 
observe a negative coefficient for estimate FEMALEOWN.   
Finally, due to the existence of transaction (for the borrowers) and enforcement 
costs (for the bank), locations of SMEs are important for determining the cost of 
loans as well as the various terms of the loan contract, such as collateral. CITY is 
a dummy variable that is set equal to one if the firm is located in a national 
capital or in a city with a population over one million and zero otherwise. We 
expect loan contract conditions to be less stringent in larger cities because 
financial centres are primarily located in these cities. Thus, we expect to find a 
negative association between this variable and the dependent variables22. 
To test the effect of information sharing among lenders, we use two country–
level variables: PRVTBR and PUBREG. Private credit bureaus in various 
countries attempt to collect current information regarding repayment history, 
unpaid debts, and outstanding credit for individuals and firms, and PRVTBR 
represents the number of individuals or firms in a country (as a percentage of the 
adult population in a country) that are included in the up–to–date records of a 
private credit bureau. Similarly, public credit registries also attempt to gather 
current information on repayment history, unpaid debts, and credit outstanding 
for individuals and firms, and PUBREG is a measure of public credit registry 
coverage (as a percentage of the adult population in a country) that represents the 
number of individuals and firms that are included in the up–to–date records of a 
public registry. A public registry is a database that is owned by public authorities, 
such as a nation’s central bank or banking supervisory authority, collects 
information regarding the standing of borrowers in the financial system, and 
furnishes this information to financial institutions. Because lenders are less strict 
with borrowers if they possess better information about the borrowers in question, 
we expect to find negative coefficients for both PRVTBR and PUBREG in the 
model. 
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22 See Jiménez et al. (2009) for a discussion of the effect of location on collateralisation. 
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In the third group of variables, we include banking sector characteristics. To 
test our third hypothesis, we again use country–level variables that provide 
information about the structure of the banking system. We use CR, the share of 
all commercial bank assets that are owned by the three largest commercial banks, 
to measure the concentration in the lending market. To control for differences in 
ownership structure in the lending markets of the examined countries, we use the 
shares of the total banking system assets that are owned by foreign banks 
(FOREIGN) and state–owned banks (STATE) as measures of the ownership 
structure in lending markets. Because foreign banks frequently face difficulties in 
evaluating subjective information about borrowers, they primarily use objective 
information and standardised decision techniques in their lending decisions, 
whereas domestic banks are more apt to use soft information and long–term 
relationships (Berger and Udell, 1995; Berger et al. 2001; Petersen and Rajan, 
2002). As Berger and Udell (2006) indicate, state–owned lenders frequently use 
government support in the form of subsidies to supply additional credit to SMEs. 
This credit is generally supplied to satisfy political purposes; as another aspect of 
providing this credit, state–owned firms are also expected to help borrowing firms 
by easing the collateral requirements for loans. Accordingly, we expect a positive 
coefficient for FOREIGN and a negative coefficient for STATE to describe the 
relationship of these two variables to our dependent variables. 
Finally, to control for macroeconomic conditions in the examined countries, we 
use LNGDPPC, which represents the natural logarithm of the per capita gross 
domestic product. As LNGDPPC increases, we expect the presence of collateral to 
decrease due to the possible occurrence of credit expansion and implementation of 
less stringent loan conditions, which would produce lower collateral to loan ratios 
and decreased collateralisation. 
2.4 Data and descriptive statistics 
The primary data set that is used in this study is provided by BEEPS, which is 
a joint project of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
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(EBRD) and the World Bank (WB). The BEEPS is administered throughout 27 
transition economies from Eastern Europe and Central Asia (including Turkey) to 
assess the business environments for private enterprises in the examined 
countries23. Surveys were conducted in 2002, 2005, 2007, 2008, and 2009 in which 
6153, 10421, 1952, 3375, and 7815 firms were surveyed, respectively. Our analysis 
is based on the pooled cross–section data from these surveys24. 
We argue that this data set possesses a number of advantages compared to the 
data sets that are used in previous studies. Most importantly, it enables us to 
extract valuable information about firms from different countries. Moreover, the 
data include firms in both rural areas and large cities. Thus, these data enable us 
to analyse diverse firms in a large number of countries. 
For our final sample of SMEs to be in accordance with both BEEPS definitions 
and OECD conventions, we define SMEs to be firms that have a maximum of 250 
full–time employees and thereby arrive at a total sample of 21570 SMEs. Among 
these 21570 SMEs, 8365 SMEs had obtained external loan, and 6582 SMEs had 
agreed to loan contracts that included collateral.  
Most of the previous studies on SMEs evaluate all SMEs as a single group of 
firms and do not distinguish between micro, small and medium firms. However, 
the determinants of collateral requirements for these groups of firms may differ. In 
accordance with the BEEPS classifications, we define medium firms as firms that 
have less than 250 and more than 49 full–time employees and small firms as firms 
that have less than 50 and more than 9 full–time employees. In addition, we 
distinguish between small and micro firms by defining micro firms as firms that 
have less than 10 full–time employees. Using these classifications, we perform not 
only regressions for the full sample of SMEs but also separate regressions for small, 
medium, and micro–sized firms. 
Table 2.2 in below presents the basic summary statistics for the firm-level 
variables that are included in the regressions.  We grouped the summary statistics 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 See Table 2.D in the appendix for the sample of countries included in the analysis. 
24 For further information see BEEPS reports on methodology and observations 
http://www.ebrd.com/pages/research/analysis/ surveys/beeps.shtml 
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for firms with and without loan in this table.  The results in this table show that 
there is only little difference between the summary statistics of the both groups of 
firms. This evidence implies that the bias in the regression coefficient estimates 
due to sample selection will not constitute an important problem.  
Table 2.2 Summary statistics for firms with and without loan 
 
Firms without loan Firms with loan Total 
 
Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. N 
OVERDUE 0.04 0.19 4832 0.05 0.22 4255 0.04 0.20 9087 
CRIME 0.15 0.36 6189 0.24 0.43 5647 0.19 0.40 11836 
AGE 13.42 11.36 6177 14.87 12.34 5643 14.11 11.86 11820 
SIZE 25.50 43.35 6215 25.46 43.01 5665 25.48 43.19 11880 
SOLEOWN 0.16 0.37 6215 0.14 0.35 5665 0.16 0.36 11880 
FEMALEOWN 0.06 0.24 6069 0.04 0.20 5550 0.05 0.22 11619 
QUALITY 0.22 0.41 6048 0.32 0.47 5426 0.26 0.44 11474 
CITY 3.00 1.47 5404 3.10 1.47 4717 3.05 1.47 10121 
 
 
Table 2.3 provides detailed summary statistics regarding the variables that are 
used in the empirical part of this study. The mean value of COLL1 in this table 
shows that 79% of the loans extended to SMEs were secured by collateral. The 
average collateral to loan ratio (for the loan contracts that included collateral) 
was 145% on average with a standard deviation of 87.3%25. Of the loan contracts 
that included collateral, 80% required a collateral that was greater than the value 
of the loan (that is, COLL2>100)26. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 For the 1521 large firms in our sample, 76% of the loans were secured by collateral. Once the 
collateral is included in the loan contracts, the mean value of the collateral to the loan value (as 
measured by COLL3) was 135%, with a standard deviation of 89%. This comparison implies that 
the degree of collateral that is required for loans is slightly higher for SMEs than for larger firms. 
26 Along BEEPS firms are also asked to provide the type of lending institution, however only 4194 
SMEs answered this question. As presented in Table 2.B in the appendix, our data indicate that 
collateral was present in loan contracts for 78% of the loans from private commercial banks, 
whereas state–owned banks and government agencies required collateral for 74% of the loans that 
they granted. The percentage of loans that required collateral decreased to 53% for loans that were 
granted by non–bank financial institutions, which include microfinance institutions, credit 
cooperatives, credit unions, and finance companies, and this percentage is even lower (44%) for the 
remaining lenders, which include family/friends, moneylenders, and other types of lenders. 
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Table 2.3 Summary statistics 
 SMEs Medium firms Small firms Micro firms 
Variable N mean std. dev. N mean std. dev. N mean std. dev. N mean std. dev. 
COLL1 8365 0.787 0.410 2820 0.828 0.378 3616 0.789 0.408 1929 0.724 0.45 
COLL2 8365 113.7 97.47 2820 114.2 86.04 3616 115.2 98.06 1929 110.1 111.1 
COLL3 6582 144.5 87.3 2334 138.02 75.24 2852 146.1 87.6 1396 152.1 103.3 
OVERDUE 7073 0.056 0.23 2462 0.066 0.248 3010 0.052 0.22 1601 0.05 0.217 
CRIME 8346 0.257 0.44 2809 0.311 0.463 3609 0.248 0.43 1928 0.19 0.398 
AGE 8329 14.35 13.9 2802 19.04 19.22 3603 12.66 10.05 1924 10.65 7.93 
SIZE 8365 51.04 58.7 2820 117.1 57.59 3616 23.9 11.26 1929 5.23 2.17 
SOLEOWN 8360 0.231 0.422 2820 0.116 0.321 3611 0.223 0.416 1929 0.414 0.493 
FEMALEOWN 6211 0.063 0.244 2010 0.031 0.174 2759 0.053 0.223 1442 0.129 0.335 
QUALITY 8313 0.239 0.426 2803 0.348 0.476 3593 0.219 0.413 1917 0.116 0.32 
CITY 8365 0.200 0.400 2820 0.233 0.423 3616 0.200 0.40 1929 0.153 0.36 
PUBREG 86 10.66 14.34 86 10.6 14.77 86 10.9 14.2 86 10.25 13.97 
PRVTBR 86 33.17 31.22 86 32.8 31.24 86 31.9 30.2 86 35.97 32.75 
CR 77 64.002 20.9 77 61.8 22.5 77 64.5 20.6 77 66.23 18.71 
STATE 76 13.90 17.02 76 14.9 17.9 76 13.34 17.2 76 13.48 15.1 
FOREIGN 76 54.6 33.3 76 54.8 32.91 76 54.5 33.6 76 54.75 33.2 
LNGDPPC 83 8.55 0.88 83 8.57 0.897 83 8.5 0.878 83 8.55 0.866 
Notes: N is the number of observations. Std.dev. is the standard deviation.
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Table 2.C in the Appendix shows the collateral types included in the loan 
contracts. The land and buildings seems the most–preferred type of collateral, 
whereas machinery and equipment are a secondary choice for collateral in loan 
contracts across the examined countries. These numbers are in line with 
Niinimäki’s (2009), observation that real estate is the most common and dominant 
form of collateral. 
Table 2.E in Appendix presents the summary statistics at the country level; in 
this table, countries are sorted in descending order of their average values of 
COLL1. The mean value for the presence of collateral is the lowest in Turkey; in 
the country, approximately only half of commercial loans are secured by collateral. 
Georgia is the country with the highest collateralisation, as 95% of the examined 
loans were secured by collateral. Georgia is also ranked first with respect to the 
degree of collateral that was required for loans, with an average collateral to loan 
ratio (as measured by COLL3) of 217.3%. Among the examined countries, Turkey 
also has the lowest mean value of collateral to loan ratio as measured by COLL3 
(of 116%)27.  
Finally, Table 2.4 presents the basic summary statistics for collateralisation in 
different country groups. This table reveals no major differences among the 
examined country groups with respect to the mean values of collateralisation on 
loans that are extended to SMEs. We observe that compared with non–EU 
countries, the EU countries in our sample have lower collateralisation with respect 
to both the presence of collateral and collateral to loan ratio28. As we test the 
statistical significance of the difference between the mean values of 
collateralisation variables via t-test we see that this difference is also statistically 
significant at 0.01% for all collateralisation variables COLL1, COLL2, COLL3. In 
all of the assessed sub–groups of countries, we observe that among the sizes of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 See Figures 2.A and 2.B in the Appendix for the picture.  
28 The gap between EU and non-EU countries grows if we consider the candidate countries of 
Croatia and Turkey. The 2005 wave of the BEEPS was implemented in several other countries, 
including Germany. In the 2005 BEEPS results for Germany, 90% of the 793 loans that were 
extended to SMEs were secured by collateral, and the average collateral to loan ratio for these 
loans was 127%, with a 37.2% standard deviation. This standard deviation for COLL3 is lower 
than the standard deviation for any of the countries in our sample. 
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firms that are considered to be SMEs, micro firms demonstrate the lowest mean 
value for the presence of collateral (COLL1), and the mean value for the presence 
of collateral is lower for small firms than for medium firms. By contrast, if 
collateral is included in the loan contracts (that is, if COLL1=1), higher collateral 
to loan ratios (COLL3) are observed as firm size decreases (from medium to small 
to micro–sized enterprises). 
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Table 2.4 Collateralisation by country groups and firm size 
  
SMEs Medium firms Small firms Micro firms 
N mean std. dev.  min max N mean std. dev.  min max N mean std. dev.  min max N mean std. dev.  min max 
EU 
Coll1 2405 0.76 0.43 0 1 833 0.84 0.36 0 1 1010 0.74 0.44 0 1 562 0.66 0.47 0 1 
Coll2 2405 102.2 89.2 0 1000 833 108.3 72.4 0 700 1010 101.6 92.1 0 1000 562 94.2 104.5 0 1000 
Coll3 1822 134.9 78.0 1 1000 703 128.3 60.3 1 700 749 137.0 81.1 2 1000 370 143.0 98.0 3 1000 
NON–EU 
Coll1 5960 0.8 0.4 0 1 1987 0.82 0.38 0 1 2606 0.81 0.39 0 1 1367 0.75 0.43 0 1 
Coll2 5960 118.3 100.3 0 1500 1987 116.7 91.1 0 600 2606 120.5 99.8 0 1000 1367 116.6 113.1 0 1500 
Coll3 4760 148.2 90.4 1 1500 1631 142.2 80.5 1 600 2103 149.3 89.7 1 1000 1026 155.4 105.0 1 1500 
CIS Coll1 2463 0.84 0.37 0 1 912 0.86 0.35 0 1 1099 0.84 0.36 0 1 452 0.79 0.41 0 1 
 
Coll2 2463 125 93.8 0 1000 912 124.2 92.2 0 600 1099 125.6 92.7 0 1000 452 125.0 99.5 0 600 
 
Coll3 2071 148.7 83.3 1 1000 785 144.3 83.5 1 600 928 148.8 82.0 2 1000 358 157.9 85.5 1 600 
CEE Coll1 5094 0.8 0.4 0 1 1702 0.85 0.36 0 1 2155 0.8 0.4 0 1 1237 0.73 0.44 0 1 
 
Coll2 5094 116.5 94.2 0 1000 1702 117.7 81.5 0 700 2155 119.3 96.4 0 1000 1237 109.9 105.5 0 1000 
  Coll3 4080 145.4 82.8 1 1000 1445 138.6 70.15 1 700 1734 148.2 85.2 1 1000 901 150.9 95.3 2 1000 
Total Coll1 8365 0.8 0.41 0 1 2820 0.83 0.38 0 1 3616 0.79 0.41 0 1 1929 0.72 0.45 0 1 
 
Coll2 8365 113.7 97.5 0 1500 2820 114.2 86.0 0 700 3616 115.2 98.1 0 1000 1929 110.1 111.1 0 1500 
  Coll3 6582 144.5 87.3 1 1500 2334 138.0 75.2 1 700 2852 146.1 87.7 1 1000 1396 152.1 103.3 1 1500 
Notes: The EU member countries included in the sample are: Bulgaria, Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Estonia, Czech Republic. The Non-EU 
countries included in the sample are Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia, Croatia, FYROM, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Montenegro, Russia, Serbia, 
Tajikistan, Turkey, Ukraine, Uzbekistan. The CEE countries included in the calculations are: Albania, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, FYROM, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia. The CIS countries included in the sample are: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan. N is the number of observations. 
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2.5 Estimation results  
Table 2.5 reports the estimation results for the underlying parameters of the 
econometric models that are presented in the previous section. In our regressions 
we control for sector and year fixed effect while we cannot control for country 
fixed effects due to multicollinearity between the country level variables and 
country fixed effects. For all of the examined groups of firms, we first provide the 
tobit result where the dependent variable is COLL2, whereas the remaining two 
columns report the estimations of the two–part model. In the first part of the 
two–part modelling strategy, we provide the probit model estimation results to 
estimate the probability of the presence of collateral in loan contracts; in this 
assessment, COLL1 is the dependent variable. In the second part we present the 
truncated regression results for the positive values of collateral to loan value ratio 
(COLL3). The average variance inflation factor for the dependent variables is 
calculated as 1.29, which indicates the absence of multicollinearity. As we perform 
a standard likelihood ratio test to assess the applicability of the two–part model 
against the tobit approach, we found out that the tobit model is too restrictive 
due to its assumptions29. 
With respect to the first hypothesis, the positive and significant coefficient 
estimates for CRIME in probit regression provide a degree of support. We note 
that the presence of collateral is more likely for SMEs that have experienced losses 
due to theft, robbery, vandalism or arson as compared with other SMEs. However, 
this effect is not valid for micro and medium enterprises, and the truncated 
regression results indicate that CRIME does not play a role in determining the 
degree of collateral in loan contracts that are extended to SMEs. OVERDUE has 
no significant impact on either the presence of collateral or the collateral to loan 
ratio for SMEs. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
29  Following Ramalho and Silva (2009), the likelihood ratio statistic is calculated as 
LR = !2 Ltobit! Lprobit+ Ltrun( )"#$ %&' ! !k
2 , where Ltobit is the likelihood of the tobit model; Lprobit 
is the likelihood of the probit model; Ltrun is the likelihood of the truncated regression model; and 
k is the number of independent variables in the equations. The formulation of the null hypothesis 
indicates that the tobit model is an appropriate modelling strategy to explain zero collateralisation; 
this null hypothesis is rejected in our regressions. 
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With respect to firm–level control variables, AGE affects COLL1 negatively for 
the total sample of SMEs and medium firms; this result is in accordance with our 
predictions that loan contracts for older firms are less likely to include collateral. 
By contrast, we are unable to observe a negative effect for of AGE on the positive 
values of collateral to loan value ratios (COLL3). Indeed our results indicate that 
the loan contracts of older firms have significantly higher collateral to loan value 
ratios in all groups of SMEs. These results show that the loan contracts of older 
firms are less likely to include collateral, but once included they have to bear high 
collateral to loan value ratios.  
Our estimation results generally yield positive coefficient estimates for the SIZE 
on COLL1 for the whole sample of SMEs. This finding can be explained by the 
fact that smaller SMEs often lack collateralisable assets and therefore apply for 
loans that do not require collateral, such as loans from microfinance institutions or 
from informal creditors. By contrast, micro–sized firms have insignificant 
coefficient estimates for SIZE. 
Examining the ownership structure of SMEs, we see that the presence of 
collateral in loan contracts is less likely for SMEs that are established as sole 
proprietorships than for SMEs that are corporations. We observe a negative effect 
at 10% for the control variable FEMALEOWN on the collateral to loan value 
ratio for loan contracts that are extended to medium firms. There can be two 
possible explanations for this negative relationship. First, female borrowers are 
more disciplined than male borrowers with respect to repaying their loans, which 
make them to receive loan in more favourable terms. Second because they are 
more risk averse as compared to males, they are do not generally agree with loan 
contracts that have strict collateral requirements. However it should be kept in 
mind that this effect is not valid in the rest of the regressions, as the coefficient 
estimate for FEMALEOWN is statistically insignificant. 
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Table 2.5 Estimation results 
 
SMEs Medium firms Small firms Micro firms 
Tobit 
Two–part model 
Tobit 
Two–part model 
Tobit 
Two–part model 
Tobit 
Two–part model 
Probit Trunc. reg. Probit Trunc. reg. Probit Trunc. reg. Probit Trunc. reg. 
Coll2  Coll1 Coll3 Coll2  Coll1 Coll3 Coll2  Coll1 Coll3 Coll2  Coll1 Coll3 
OVERDUE 1.042 0.125 -11.48 -9.955 0.031 -17.420 6.893 0.105 2.012 -8.488 0.165 -39.60 
 (8.708) (0.122) (11.09) (11.55) (0.222) (13.95) (13.60) (0.176) (17.37) (20.67) (0.291) (22.19) 
CRIME 8.313* 0.145* 1.647 9.253 0.123 7.381 10.230 0.174* 1.873 -7.918 -0.063 -1.967 
 (3.967) (0.057) (4.676) (5.824) (0.104) (6.482) (6.175) (0.088) (7.656) (10.98) (0.117) (11.60) 
AGE 0.015 -0.004* 0.410** -0.283 -0.007** 0.072 0.692* 0.003 0.955** 0.860 -0.001 1.739**  
 (0.135) (0.002) (0.150) (0.149) (0.002) (0.150) (0.320) (0.004) (0.370) (0.599) (0.006) (0.623) 
SIZE 0.091** 0.003*** -0.054 0.050 0.001 0.043 0.162 0.008* -0.501 1.004 0.016 -0.312 
 (0.031) (0.001) (0.041) (0.048) (0.001) (0.052) (0.224) (0.003) (0.290) (2.149) (0.024) (2.389) 
SOLEOWN -9.638 -0.207** 2.634 1.513 -0.157 8.360 -8.999 -0.244* 4.871 -13.91 -0.106 -9.181 
 (5.241) (0.068) (5.455) (10.720) (0.173) (10.02) (7.804) (0.103) (8.594) (10.51) (0.116) (11.75) 
FEMALEOWN -4.623 0.046 -12.26 -13.58 0.235 -35.27 10.77 0.280 -6.756 -7.589 -0.149 3.080 
 (7.950) (0.105) (8.486) (16.080) (0.287) (18.610) (12.79) (0.184) (14.61) (13.55) (0.152) (13.44) 
QUALITY -3.190 -0.049 -3.009 -10.460 -0.180 -4.924 6.298 0.046 5.252 -7.939 -0.099 -0.638 
 (4.352) (0.058) (5.433) (5.969) (0.098) (6.753) (6.669) (0.090) (8.643) (16.530) (0.165) (19.84) 
CITY -12.98** -0.189** -5.385 -20.90*** -0.249* -16.19* -6.002 -0.119 1.372 -15.900 -0.277 3.004 
 (4.998) (0.062) (6.728) (6.263) (0.105) (7.348) (7.745) (0.092) (10.660) (16.360) (0.149) (23.32) 
PUBREG -0.333* -0.006** -0.115 -0.521** -0.013*** -0.064 -0.154 -0.002 -0.097 -0.058 -0.002 0.200 
 (0.139) (0.002) (0.168) (0.197) (0.003) (0.203) (0.209) (0.003) (0.253) (0.354) (0.004) (0.449) 
PRVTBR -0.522*** -0.005*** -0.403*** -0.437*** -0.006** -0.277* -0.396*** -0.004* -0.333* -0.742*** -0.005** -0.614**  
 (0.073) (0.001) (0.085) (0.109) (0.002) (0.114) (0.116) (0.001) (0.141) (0.166) (0.002) (0.205) 
CR -0.094 -0.001 -0.065 -0.286* -0.003 -0.263 0.029 0.001 0.012 0.391 -0.001 0.961*   
 (0.095) (0.001) (0.120) (0.125) (0.002) (0.146) (0.147) (0.002) (0.184) (0.329) (0.003) (0.438) 
STATE -0.078 0.002 -0.301* 0.224 0.006 -0.013 -0.192 0.002 -0.444 -0.803* -0.005 -0.958*   
 (0.112) (0.002) (0.138) (0.167) (0.003) (0.187) (0.172) (0.003) (0.230) (0.329) (0.004) (0.418) 
FOREIGN 0.635*** 0.005*** 0.612*** 0.643*** 0.008*** 0.508*** 0.647*** 0.006*** 0.634*** 0.590** 0.003 0.660**  
 (0.077) (0.001) (0.096) (0.118) (0.002) (0.135) (0.119) (0.001) (0.152) (0.181) (0.002) (0.214) 
LNGDPPC -32.24*** -0.302*** -27.71*** -33.17*** -0.243* -35.39*** -34.55*** -0.383*** -26.72*** -29.18*** -0.231** -22.40*** 
 (3.099) (0.045) (3.573) (5.795) (0.104) (6.286) (4.812) (0.068) (6.000) (5.952) (0.073) (6.305) 
N 4035 4019 3244 1355 1344 1149 1764 1756 1417 916 907 678 
log likelihood -20598.4 -1865.1 -18659.7 -7024.5 -513.5 -6468.1 -9021.1 -807.4 -8186.1 -4457.2 -488.6 -3934.7 
Notes: Observations from Serbia, Montenegro, Moldova, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan are excluded from these regressions, due to a lack of country level variables. All 
regressions include constant term, year and sector fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at firm level and reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% levels, respectively. 
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The coefficient estimate for QUALITY is found to be negative and statistically 
significant at 10% only for medium firms, indicating that medium firms with 
quality certifications are less likely to be asked for collateral in their loan 
applications. However, these firms do not receive loans with more favourable 
terms in terms of collateral, as demonstrated by the fact that the effect of 
QUALITY is statistically insignificant in the truncated regression. 
Finally, compared with SMEs that are located in smaller cities, SMEs that are 
located in the capital and/or large cities are less likely to obtain loans that require 
collateral and also benefit from lower collateral to loan ratios. However, this effect 
is not significant for small and micro firms. In accordance with our expectations, 
this result demonstrates that the collateral requirements for SMEs are less 
stringent in the capital and in large cities with a population of over one million. 
This result can be explained by the fact that financial centres are mostly located 
in these cities; thus, it is easier to switch to other lenders and search for loans that 
do not require collateral if the loan terms that are offered by one lender become 
stricter. 
Analysing the estimation results for the effects of the firm–level variables, we 
observe that these variables do not have a great deal of explanatory power for 
determining collateralisation. These insignificant results for the examined firm–
level explanatory variables can be attributed to the characteristics of less–
developed economies 30 . Lenders are more likely to experience difficulties in 
assessing the available information regarding borrower firms in these countries. 
Reports about firms in these countries can be unreliable due to the weaknesses of 
the legal, informational, and institutional infrastructures of these developing 
nations. This problem may be more severe for informationally opaque SMEs. 
Thus, firm characteristics might be less important than the market conditions for 
determining the collateral characteristics of commercial loans. The positive and 
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30 We also used additional firm-specific control variables to verify our results. In particular, we 
used dummy variables to test the effects of being an innovative or exporting firm; however, we do 
not observe significant effects of these variables. 
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significant coefficient estimates of CRIME and CITY provide a degree of support 
for this inference. 
With respect to the second hypothesis, the coefficient estimates for PRVTBR 
and PUBREG are negative and significant for many regressions. We interpret 
these results as evidence for the fact that information sharing reduces 
informational asymmetries and eventually reduces adverse selection problems by 
improving the information that banks possess about credit applicants. This 
situation makes information sharing more important for SMEs than for larger 
firms because banks refrain from lending to informationally opaque SMEs. In 
countries where banks can exchange information on the riskiness of borrowers, 
banks choose to lend to safer SMEs. Our results indicate that as the percentage of 
individuals or firms listed by private credit bureaus and public credit registries 
increases in a country, both the probability of the presence of collateral and the 
collateral to loan ratio decrease for loans. This finding is consistent with the 
results of Brown et al. (2009), who find a negative association between 
information sharing and the ease of obtaining external financing. Thus, in 
countries where lenders possess better information about the repayment history 
and unpaid debts of borrowers through public and private credit bureaus, both 
the probability of the presence of collateral and the degree of this collateral 
decrease, particularly for financially opaque SMEs. 
With respect to the third hypothesis, we find evidence indicating that banking 
concentration has a negative impact on the degree of collateral for medium sized 
SMEs, confirming hypothesis H3b at 10%. This negative relationship is attributed 
to the lender–based theory of collateral, which presumes that in more 
concentrated lending markets, lenders have an informational advantage due to 
their more lengthy borrower–lender relationships. Accordingly, concentrated 
markets are associated with less stringent collateral requirements. Our findings for 
medium firms confirm the results of Jiménez et al. (2006 and 2009). However, this 
effect is not significant in all model specifications, and this relationship appears to 
be valid only for medium firms. Moreover direction of the relationship turns to 
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positive for the collateral to loan value ratio as measured by COLL3 in case of 
micro sized firms. This result indicates stricter loan conditions i.e. higher 
collateral requirements for micro sized firms, as the lending market concentration 
increases. However these results are also not particularly robust, as demonstrated 
by our subsequent robustness assessments. 
With respect to the asset share of foreign banks in the total banking system 
assets, the positive and significant coefficients of FOREIGN indicate that the 
likelihood of collateral and the degree of this collateral is higher in countries with 
a greater share of foreign banks. This result can be explained by the fact that 
foreign banks engage in the intensive use of objective information and 
standardised decision techniques in their lending decisions because they experience 
difficulties in accurately evaluating subjective information about borrowers. We 
find that STATE only has a significant effect of reducing the collateral to loan 
ratios for micro sized firms. The effect of STATE on COLL3 is higher for micro–
sized firms than for small firms, and this effect vanishes for medium firms31. This 
result indicates that lower collateral to loan ratios exist in countries with higher 
shares of state banks; this effect is particularly evident for small and micro firms. 
With respect to country–level control variables, our estimation results 
demonstrate a negative and statistically significant association between 
LNGDPPC and collateralisation nearly in all specifications. This significant result 
reveals that improvements in macroeconomic conditions help ease loan contract 
terms by relaxing collateral requirements. 
2.5.1 Robustness checks 
In a first round of robustness checks, we changed the definitions of the 
borrower risk proxies. We first used a categorical variable instead of CRIME to 
account for the effect of risk that arises from the location of the SME. This 
variable was set equal to 0 if crime, theft and disorder are no obstacle to the 
current operations of the firm, 1 if these factors are a minor obstacle, =2 if they 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31 For the small firms the coefficient estimate of STATE for COLL3 is statistically significant at 
10%.
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are a moderate obstacle, =3 if they are a major obstacle, or =4 if they are a very 
severe obstacle. Second, we replaced the utility arrears with tax arrears. Although 
there were fewer available observations for these variables, our results remained 
mostly unchanged in these regressions. 
In the second round of robustness checks, we used additional control variables. 
First, we added dummy variables for various lender types: (1) private commercial 
banks; (2) state–owned banks or government agencies; (3) non–bank financial 
institutions, including microfinance institutions, credit cooperatives, credit unions, 
or finance companies; and (4) other lenders32. Because only 4194 firms answered 
the survey question about lender type, the inclusion of lender type as a 
consideration reduces the number of observations across all of the examined 
groups of firms by more than half. Nevertheless, the coefficient estimates for the 
remaining variables remain similar and do not lose statistical significance. If we 
use the private commercial banks as the base group for all other groups, all of the 
other lender groups yield negative coefficient estimates for small and medium 
enterprises. These results can be interpreted as evidence that compared with 
privately owned banks, other groups of lenders help SMEs by reducing collateral 
requirements and thereby easing loan conditions. However, we do not observe 
significant coefficient estimates for the effect of borrowing from state–owned 
banks. Thus, borrowing from the third and fourth groups of lenders has a negative 
effect on collateralisation for small and medium enterprises. The remaining 
coefficient estimates generally remained similar to baseline estimations; however, 
under these conditions, the little evidence that exists to support a negative 
relationship between bank concentration and collateralisation in our baseline 
results became insignificant.  
We also consider the effect of the legal environment by examining an index 
from the Doing Business project of the World Bank that measures the strength of 
legal rights in a nation. This index ranges from 0 to 10, with higher scores 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
32 See Table 2.B in the Appendix for information regarding the presence of collateral in the loans 
that were extended by lender types. 
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indicating that collateral and bankruptcy laws protect the rights of borrowers and 
lenders and facilitate lending; thus, better laws expand access to credit. For the 
countries in our sample, the mean value for this variable is 6.15 (the median is 6), 
and the standard deviation is 2.02. This variable has its highest value for 
Montenegro (an average value of 9.95) and its lowest value for Uzbekistan (an 
average value of 2). Because this variable was highly correlated with the 
FOREIGN and STATE control variables, we run separate regressions for this 
variable to avoid multicollinearity. Our previous estimation results remained 
unchanged. The coefficient estimates for the legal rights index do not produce 
significant results for the presence of collateral, as measured by COLL1; however, 
this index has a statistically significant positive effect on the degree of collateral in 
loan contracts, as measured by COLL3. As argued by Brown et al. (2009), better 
legal protection makes loan contracts easier to enforce and facilitates the issuance 
of a larger number of loan contracts. This legal protection may cause the lender to 
require higher collateral to loan ratios. 
To control for the effect of legal origin, we used a set of dummy variables for 
the origin of the legal system of each examined country (French, German, or 
Socialist) 33 . However, these dummy variables yield insignificant coefficient 
estimates in all specifications. Thus, we excluded legal origin dummy variables 
from the regressions. This finding confirms the results of Pistor et al. (2000), who 
reveal that better shareholder laws and creditor rights cannot solve the problems 
of obtaining external financing. Many years are required for these laws to generate 
detectable effects. 
In the third round of the robustness checks, we created a subsample by 
removing observations of firms that were surveyed in more than one year until we 
obtained a single observation per firm. In particular, we first excluded the firms 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
33 This type of consideration was in accordance with the approach of La Porta et al. (1997), a 
study that addresses the legal origins of countries as a source of differences in financial sectors and 
firm structures among countries. The countries in our sample feature three different legal origins: 
French, German, and Socialist. Turkey, Romania, Lithuania, and Albania are the countries that 
adopted French laws. Bosnia, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Croatia, the FYROM, Hungary, 
Latvia, Montenegro, Poland, Serbia, Slovakia, and Slovakia are the countries that adopted German 
laws, whereas the remaining nations that were examined adopted socialist laws. 
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that did not provide information regarding COLL2. If the firm reported values of 
COLL2 for two different years, we excluded observations from years with at least 
one missing explanatory variable and the data from the year 2009. If the 
observations were complete with all of the explanatory variables provided over the 
course of more than one year, we arbitrarily excluded the observation from the 
year 2002. Because only few firms were surveyed in multiple years, this 
subsampling process did not produce dramatic changes in either our empirical 
results or the descriptive statistics.  
Finally, our sample consists of both EU and non–EU countries, and all of the 
EU countries that we examine are post–communist. We first perform separate 
regressions based on the 1422 SMEs that answered the survey questions about 
collateralisation for these post communist EU countries. In these regressions, 
OVERDUE gains a certain degree of significance, whereas all the remaining 
coefficient estimates except LNGDPPC decrease in significance. In all of these 
estimations, female ownership (FEMALEOWN) is found to have a negative but 
statistically insignificant association with collateralisation. In regressions based on 
the 2613 SMEs from non–EU countries, we observe a positive association between 
female ownership and the presence of collateral for the small enterprises from non–
EU countries. In the non–EU countries of our sample, the coefficient estimates for 
CR become positive for the presence of a collateral regression (COLL1) for the 
small–sized firms that were surveyed, whereas these coefficient estimates remain 
negative for medium firms. 
In our estimates of different sets of regressions for the CEE and CIS countries, 
we obtain similar results for the two groups of countries, except for the effects of 
CR and FEMALEOWN. The coefficient estimates for CR become positive for 
small and micro–sized firms in CIS countries; by contrast, we observe a negative 
coefficient for CR for small and micro–sized firms in CEE nations. A stronger 
negative effect of FEMALEOWN on collateralisation is observed for the CEE 
countries than for the CIS countries.  
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2.6 Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter is to investigate the determinants of collateral 
requirements on loans extended to SMEs in less-developed countries through the 
examination of firm–specific, lender market–specific and country–specific variables. 
Using BEEPS, we evaluate extensive information not only by assessing borrowers 
themselves but also by incorporating the perceptions of these borrowers with 
respect to their local business environment. In contrast to previous empirical 
research on collateral, we not only focus on the presence of collateral in loan 
contracts but also on the degree of collateral in these contracts. Thus, from a 
methodological point of view, we contribute to the literature by examining the 
determinants of the degree of collateral for loans. Our analysis assesses both 
borrower characteristics, which have typically been the major focus of previous 
investigations, and the country–specific factors that affect collateral requirements. 
Our results indicate that country–specific variables are more important than firm–
specific variables for determining both the presence and the degree of collateral in 
loan contracts of SMEs in less–developed countries. We find that in countries in 
which lenders have better information about borrowers’ repayment history and 
unpaid debts through public and private credit bureaus, both the probability for 
the presence of collateral and the degree of that collateral decrease in loan 
contracts. Thus, collateral requirements serve as a tool for resolving the problem 
of asymmetric information about the borrower’s quality. In contrast to previous 
studies we also distinguish between small, medium, and micro enterprises. We 
present evidence that the determinants of collateral requirements are not 
necessarily same for businesses of different sizes. 
Our study helps remedy the scarcity of empirical evidence for less–developed 
and transition economies and therefore yields important policy implications for 
SMEs, financial institutions and policy makers. Because collateral requirements 
depend more on each country’s information asymmetry than on borrower risk, to 
improve the abilities of SMEs to access finance it appears to be crucial to improve 
the process of collecting information about the borrower, both in terms of quality 
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(how the risk is evaluated) and in terms of the affordability/credibility of this 
information (who performs the analysis). In this context, lending activity may 
benefit from entities that are dedicated to the information collecting process, such 
as mutual guarantee societies (MGSs). MGSs can play an important role as 
principal interlocutors for enterprises in improving access to credit; by entering 
long–term relationships with banks, MGSs enable banks to acquire reliable 
information. MGSs also offer guarantees that are effective in mitigating the risks 
of banks because they are compliant with Basel II guidelines. Moreover, MGSs 
could help maximise the capacity to leverage public resources. From a macro 
perspective, the introduction of a method to evaluate risk–based collateral 
requirements, which can be implemented in the presence of better and shared 
information, raises interesting policy questions regarding the allocation planning of 
public resources to enterprises. Within the context of the current economic and 
financial environment, the public sector must be able to offer targeted and 
effective resources to enterprises. By improving the risk analysis and the 
information sharing level of a country, MGSs can help ensure that scarce public 
resources are used more effectively by providing an indication of the adequate 
level of guarantees for various enterprises. 
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2.8 APPENDIX  
    2.8.1. Appendix I 
The BEEPS is a joint project of the EBRD and the World Bank. The main aim 
of this series of surveys are to acquire information on the quality of the business 
environment that from the viewpoints of firms and building a panel data set of 
this firms to observe the changes in the business environment triennially. The 
survey was first conducted in 1999–2000 and administered to approximately 4,000 
enterprises in 26 countries of CEE (including Turkey) and the CIS to assess the 
environment for private enterprise and business development. Since the survey 
questionary has changed a lot from this first round of the survey to the fourth 
round of the BEEPS in 2008-2009, we do not include this first round of the 
BEEPS.  
The second round of the BEEPS was conducted in 2002 and includes 
approximately 6500 enterprises in 28 countries,16 from CEE (Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, FR Yugoslavia, FYR 
Macedonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, 
Slovenia and Turkey) and 12 from the CIS (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, 
Ukraine and Uzbekistan). The sample structure for the second wave of the 
BEEPS was designed to be as representative as possible to the population of firms 
within the industry and service sectors. In each country, the sectoral composition 
of the total sample in terms of manufacturing versus services was determined by 
their relative contribution of GDP. Firms that operated in sectors subject to 
government price regulations and prudential supervision, such as banking, electric 
power, rail transport, and water and wastewater were excluded in this and rest of 
the BEEPS waves. As firms from this excluded sectors are excluded from the 
survey, these were also excluded from the GDP contribution by re-weighting 
industry and services. The size distribution of at least 10% of the total sample 
should be in the small, 10% in the medium and 10% in the large size categories 
where small enterprises are defined as the firms that have 2-49 employees, medium 
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firms 50-249, large = 250 -9,999 employees. Firms with only one employee and 
more that 10,000 employees are excluded in the survey design. This sampling 
procedure in the second round was also followed in the third round of the BEEPS. 
Approximately 9,500 enterprises in the same 28 countries are included in the third 
round of the BEEPS, which is conducted in 2004 and 2005. Furthermore, firms 
from Germany, Greece, Portugal, South Korea and Vietnam were covered in 2004 
and Ireland and Spain in 2005 to set a benchmark for the 28 countries surveyed in 
the BEEPS.  
In the fourth round of the BEEPS in 2008-2009, the survey covered 
approximately 12,000 enterprises in 29 countries (including Mongolia). Industry, 
establishment size and region levels of stratification were used in all countries. For 
each country the sample was stratified along Manufacturing, Retail trade and 
other services. In some of the countries, there were specific target numbers of 
interviews for more detailed sectors within these three groups. Size stratification 
was defined following the standardized definition: small (5-19 employees), medium 
(20-99 employees), and large (more than 99 employees but excluding the firms 
with more than 10,000 employees). 
There were no additional requirements on the ownership, exporter status, 
location or years in operation of the establishment as was the case in the previous 
rounds of BEEPS. Along the defined stratification guidelines, priority was given to 
completing interviews with establishments who participated in BEEPS 2005 in 
order to obtain a panel dataset of firms.   
Two strategies are followed in order to mitigate the item non-response 
problems: 
- For sensitive questions that the respondent may not be willing to answer, 
such as corruption, informality or tax evasion, enumerators were instructed to 
collect the refusal to respond as (-8). 
- Establishments with incomplete information were re-contacted in order to 
complete this information if possible. However, there were clear cases of low 
response. Survey non-response was addressed by maximising efforts to contact 
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establishments that were initially selected for interviews. Up to 4 attempts were 
made to contact an establishment for interview at different times/days of the 
week before a random replacement establishment (with similar strata 
characteristics) was suggested for interview. Survey non-response did occur, but 
substitutions were made in order to potentially achieve strata-specific aims.  
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2.8.2 Appendix II 
Table 2.A Why do not firms apply for new loans? 
Main reason for not applying for a new loan N % 
No need for a loan – the firm has sufficient capital 6,300 69.65 
Interest rates are not favourable 1,086 12.01 
Application procedures for loans or lines of credit are complex  496 5.48 
Collateral requirements are too high 435 4.81 
Did not think that the loan would be approved 177 1.96 
The size or maturity times of available loans are insufficient 99   1.09 
It is necessary to make informal payments to obtain bank loans 62   0.69 
Other 256 2.83 
Don’t know 134 1.48 
Total 9,045 100 
   
 
Table 2.B Collateral requirements of SMEs across financial institutions. 
Size of 
firm 
Variable 
Private 
commercial 
banks 
State–owned 
banks or 
government 
agencies 
Non–bank 
financial 
institutions 
Other Total 
SMEs coll1=0 765 158 79 28 1,030 
 coll1=1 2,598 454 90 22 3,164 
 total 3,363 612 169 50 4,194 
Medium coll1=0 208 50 17 7 282 
 coll1=1 1,044 189 24 5 1,262 
 total 1,252 239 41 12 1,544 
Small coll1=0 372 73 41 15 501 
 coll1=1 1,164 182 38 8 1,392 
 total 1,536 255 79 23 1,893 
Micro coll1=0 185 35 21 6 247 
 coll1=1 390 83 28 9 510 
 total 575 118 49 15 757 
Notes: Non–bank financial institutions include microfinance institutions, credit 
cooperatives, credit unions, or finance companies. 
 
 
Table 2.C Forms of collateral in loans that are granted to SMEs 
 a b c d e 
a. Land and buildings owned by the borrowing firm 3,771         
b. Machinery and equipment, including movables 727 1,732       
c. Accounts receivable and inventories 306 261 650     
d. Personal assets (e.g., houses) of an owner of the SME. 410 262 159 1,165   
e. Other forms of collateral 152 141 101 113 889 
Notes: This table presents the number of collateral types that were required. The 
intersection shows the number of firms that are asked to provide both forms of 
collaterals.  
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Table 2.D Sample composition by year and country 
Country 
Year of survey 
Total 
2002 2005 2007 2008 2009 
Albania 34 72 128 0 14 248 
Belarus 20 128 0 0 95 243 
Georgia 14 23 0 0 38 75 
Tajikistan 71 90 0 75 0 236 
Turkey 53 86 0 0 136 275 
Ukraine 26 67 356 0 57 506 
Uzbekistan 53 95 320 0 31 499 
Russia 74 89 0 0 87 250 
Poland 40 57 0 0 102 199 
Romania 29 26 0 0 138 193 
Serbia 28 49 0 84 0 161 
Kazakhstan 72 260 0 0 81 413 
Moldova 56 189 0 0 128 373 
Bosnia 31 55 0 0 29 115 
Azerbaijan 35 41 0 0 102 178 
FYROM 46 70 0 0 116 232 
Armenia 60 124 0 0 85 269 
Kyrgyz 5 6 0 0 48 59 
Estonia 175 302 0 0 110 587 
Czech Republic 54 216 0 0 162 432 
Hungary 141 148 0 0 252 541 
Latvia 30 83 0 0 156 269 
Lithuania 35 68 0 0 73 176 
Slovakia 90 83 0 0 136 309 
Slovenia 32 34 0 71 0 137 
Bulgaria 0 430 0 378 0 808 
Croatia 78 199 0 143 0 420 
Montenegro 59 63 0 40 0 162 
Total 1,441 3,153 804 791 2,176 8,365 
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Table 2.E Summary statistics by country 
Country 
 
Coll1 Coll2 Coll3 Overdue Crime Age Size 
Sole 
own 
Female 
own 
Quality City Pubreg Prvtbr Cr State Foreign Lngdppc 
Georgia mean  0.95 205.7 216.5 0.03 0.19 12.89 41.3 0.22 0.08 0.18 0.32 0 16.4 71.2 0 80.6 7.52 
 
median 1 200 200 0 0 8 20 0 0 0 0 0 16.4 71 0 90.8 7.98 
 
std dev. 0.22 125.4 119.1 0.17 0.4 15.71 49.0 0.41 0.28 0.38 0.47 0 0 2.35 0 12.2 0.52 
 
N 161 161 153 161 161 161 161 161 131 160 161 161 161 161 161 161 161 
Kazakhstan mean  0.91 119.3 131.3 0.02 0.25 9.11 57.9 0.29 0.12 0.16 0.11 0 29.9 68.8 0.86 10.4 8.32 
 
median 1 105 120 0 0 8 34 0 0 0 0 0 29.9 65 0.2 7.3 8.24 
 
std dev. 0.29 87.4 82.6 0.15 0.43 6.22 61.1 0.46 0.32 0.37 0.31 0 0 5.96 1.21 4.94 0.47 
 
N 373 373 339 373 372 371 373 373 285 371 373 373 373 373 373 373 373 
Hungary mean  0.9 149.9 166.0 0.03 0.35 14.3 48.5 0.12 0.04 0.35 0.1 0 11.4 69 6.32 78.9 9.24 
 
median 1 150 150 0 0 12 24 0 0 0 0 0 11.4 61 7 82.6 9.3 
 
std dev. 0.3 89.51 78.7 0.18 0.48 16.3 57.6 0.32 0.18 0.48 0.3 0 0 15.4 1.21 7.35 0.22 
 
N 413 413 373 411 413 413 413 413 284 413 413 413 413 413 413 413 413 
Moldova mean  0.9 126.6 141.3 0.03 0.17 11.3 51.6 0.19 0.09 0.07 0.23 0 0 62.1 16.9 29.5 . 
 
median 1 140 150 0 0 9 29 0 0 0 0 0 0 65 17.6 33.6 . 
 
std dev. 0.31 60.7 45.03 0.17 0.37 9.37 59.5 0.4 0.29 0.26 0.42 0 0 11.8 2.85 9.54 . 
 
N 269 269 241 265 269 269 269 269 169 268 269 269 269 269 269 269 0 
Albania mean  0.89 137.9 154.8 0.06 0.15 9.35 34.2 0.31 0.03 0.26 0.12 8.3 0 82.1 3.15 93.4 7.94 
 
median 1 140 150 0 0 9 20 0 0 0 0 8.3 0 84 0 94.2 8.13 
 
std dev. 0.31 74.8 60.53 0.24 0.35 5.09 40.8 0.47 0.18 0.44 0.32 0 0 5.48 3.67 0.86 0.29 
 
N 248 248 221 120 246 248 248 248 208 244 248 248 248 248 248 248 248 
Romania mean  0.88 128.7 145.9 0.02 0.19 12.7 62.2 0.02 0.02 0.3 0.1 13 33.3 64.3 7.15 68.5 8.52 
 
median 1 120 130 0 0 11 33 0 0 0 0 13 33.3 64.5 7 59.2 8.43 
 
std dev. 0.32 92.3 84.54 0.14 0.39 9.56 65.8 0.14 0.13 0.46 0.3 0 0 0.97 0.66 12.2 0.4 
 
N 432 432 381 428 428 429 432 430 307 423 432 432 432 432 432 432 432 
FYROM mean  0.88 143.8 163.3 0.06 0.23 15.5 49.1 0.2 0.01 0.28 0.32 39.4 0 77.0 1.5 80.7 8.22 
 
median 1 125 167.5 0 0 13 27 0 0 0 0 39.4 0 77 1.4 93.3 8.42 
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 Table 2.E continued 
 
std dev. 0.32 102.6 93.67 0.23 0.42 13.2 52.9 0.4 0.08 0.45 0.47 0 0 1.07 0.18 20.0 0.33 
 
N 193 193 170 191 193 191 193 193 158 193 193 193 193 193 193 193 193 
Belarus mean  0.86 109.1 126.9 0.05 0.24 14.8 60.5 0.25 0.16 0.11 0.11 33.5 0 83.2 74.6 28.2 8.04 
 
median 1 120 130 0 0 10 36.5 0 0 0 0 33.5 0 79.3 75.2 20 8.04 
 
std dev. 0.35 65.7 52.6 0.22 0.43 14.3 62.2 0.43 0.37 0.31 0.31 0 0 6.75 3.08 15.3 0.57 
 
N 236 236 203 234 236 233 236 236 140 234 236 236 236 236 236 236 236 
Kyrgyz mean  0.85 139.6 163.8 0.07 0.31 14.6 52.8 0.3 0.14 0.16 0.26 0 11.9 86.7 4.55 72.3 6.21 
 
median 1 140 150 0 0 9 31 0 0 0 0 0 11.9 86 4.8 73.6 6.17 
 
std dev. 0.36 100.1 88.11 0.26 0.46 14.39 61.5 0.46 0.35 0.36 0.44 0 0 8.17 0.34 1.69 0.36 
 
N 115 115 98 115 113 115 115 115 70 115 115 115 115 115 86 86 115 
Montenegro mean  0.85 162.4 191.7 0.17 0.19 13.0 41.5 0.58 0.13 0.17 0.24 26.2 1.69 . 2.23 82.0 8.58 
 
median 1 120 150 0 0 10 21 1 0 0 0 26.7 0 . 0 87.1 8.74 
 
std dev. 0.36 160.7 157.6 0.38 0.39 11.8 53.7 0.5 0.34 0.38 0.43 3.47 13.0 . 5.5 15.9 0.36 
 
N 59 59 50 58 59 58 59 59 54 58 59 59 59 0 59 59 59 
Azerbaijan mean  0.84 103.7 123.4 0.03 0.08 15.8 48.6 0.45 0 0.19 0.36 7 0 70.8 49.4 7.82 7.82 
 
median 1 100 100 0 0 10.5 23 0 0 0 0 7 0 69 43.4 9.3 8.54 
 
std dev. 0.37 62.7 47.1 0.17 0.27 15.4 55.4 0.5 0 0.39 0.48 0 0 4.48 6.12 1.54 0.77 
 
N 75 75 63 66 75 74 75 75 52 74 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 
Russia mean  0.83 114.5 138.6 0.04 0.41 13.5 70.8 0.17 0.06 0.17 0.3 0 14.4 18.65 39.2 12.8 8.6 
 
median 1 110 130 0 0 9 47 0 0 0 0 0 14.4 18 39.2 8.3 8.58 
 
std dev. 0.38 85.7 74.5 0.2 0.49 17 69.3 0.37 0.24 0.38 0.46 0 0 9.01 0 5.17 0.53 
 
N 541 541 447 540 537 540 541 541 355 533 541 541 541 541 252 541 541 
Ukraine mean  0.83 139.9 169.3 0.02 0.27 13.9 56.6 0.26 0.12 0.13 0.22 0 10.1 41.9 9.86 29.74 7.64 
 
median 1 145 170 0 0 9 30 0 0 0 0 0 10.1 41 9.4 21.3 7.52 
 
std dev. 0.38 101.1 86.0 0.15 0.45 15.1 62.5 0.44 0.33 0.34 0.41 0 0 6.65 1.29 15.7 0.53 
 
N 420 420 347 419 420 413 420 417 285 419 420 420 420 420 420 420 420 
Croatia mean  0.82 106.3 130.3 0.1 0.21 17.7 46.6 0.38 0.07 0.26 0.05 0 81.2 59.1 4.25 90.7 9.36 
 
median 1 100 100 0 0 14 22 0 0 0 0 0 81.2 58 4.7 90.4 9.49 
 
std dev. 0.39 92.5 85.7 0.3 0.41 16.2 55.7 0.49 0.26 0.44 0.21 0 0 2.41 0.64 0.41 0.25 
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 Table 2.E continued 
 
N 499 499 407 178 498 499 499 499 413 493 499 499 499 499 499 499 499 
Bulgaria mean  0.81 118.1 145.1 0.01 0.23 12.4 51.5 0.21 0.06 0.31 0.13 37 13.1 55.97 2.09 81.4 8.53 
 
median 1 130 140 0 0 11 29 0 0 0 0 37 13.1 52 2.1 82.3 8.62 
 
std dev. 0.39 78.9 61.1 0.12 0.42 9.49 54.9 0.41 0.23 0.46 0.34 0 0 16.24 0.18 2.77 0.26 
 
N 506 506 412 150 506 503 506 506 459 504 506 506 506 506 506 506 506 
Estonia mean  0.8 101.5 126.2 0.02 0.51 14.9 54.5 0.06 0 0.23 0.29 0 22.4 92.16 0 98.6 9.25 
 
median 1 100 120 0 1 12 24 0 0 0 0 0 22.4 87 0 98.3 9.51 
 
std dev. 0.4 79.66 69.01 0.12 0.5 17.2 60.6 0.24 0 0.42 0.45 0 0 5.32 0 0.55 0.35 
 
N 199 199 160 197 198 199 199 199 137 199 199 199 199 199 199 199 199 
Czech  mean  0.8 99.3 124.8 0.18 0.5 12.1 49.3 0.28 0.07 0.3 0.16 4.9 73.2 73.8 . . 9.44 
Republic median 1 100 100 0 0.5 11 25 0 0 0 0 4.9 73.2 63 . . 9.41 
 
std dev. 0.4 91.8 86.1 0.38 0.5 8.65 59.3 0.45 0.26 0.46 0.36 0 0 14.8 . . 0.41 
 
N 250 250 199 243 250 247 250 250 157 250 250 250 250 250 0 0 250 
Latvia mean  0.79 102.87 129.9 0.04 0.42 13.0 61 0.15 0.07 0.19 0.35 57.2 0 50.7 11.6 62.6 9.02 
 
median 1 100 100 0 0 11 21 0 0 0 0 57.2 0 47 17.1 69.3 9.34 
 
std dev. 0.41 103.4 99.9 0.21 0.5 12.3 68.6 0.36 0.26 0.39 0.48 0 0 4.39 6.42 8.35 0.42 
 
N 178 178 141 178 178 177 178 178 134 177 178 178 178 178 178 178 178 
Armenia mean  0.79 119.3 151.8 0.04 0.11 12.4 34.7 0.43 0.03 0.15 0.38 16.9 38.3 59.9 0 55.2 7.48 
 
median 1 130 150 0 0 8 17 0 0 0 0 16.9 38.3 68 0 48.7 7.32 
 
std dev. 0.41 99.4 87.3 0.19 0.31 13 44.6 0.5 0.16 0.36 0.49 0 0 14.6 0 7.09 0.37 
 
N 243 243 191 243 243 243 243 243 218 243 243 243 243 243 243 243 243 
Lithuania mean  0.78 104.1 132.8 0.05 0.39 13.5 60.1 0.2 0.07 0.2 0.19 20 67.8 79.9 0 91.4 9 
 
median 1 100 100 0 0 11 32.5 0 0 0 0 20 67.8 80.5 0 91.5 9.13 
 
std dev. 0.41 122.5 123.9 0.22 0.49 12.2 61.9 0.4 0.26 0.4 0.4 0 0 1.31 0 0.32 0.38 
 
N 232 232 182 232 232 232 232 232 168 228 232 232 232 232 232 232 232 
Uzbekistan mean  0.78 97.7 124.6 0.07 0.05 15.6 57.1 0.29 0.12 0.09 0.19 4.5 3.3 85.5 67.6 4.4 6.29 
 
median 1 120 120 0 0 9 38.5 0 0 0 0 4.5 3.3 83 67.6 4.4 6.34 
 
std dev. 0.41 61.2 37.5 0.25 0.22 17.2 59.7 0.46 0.32 0.29 0.39 0 0 5.83 0 0 0.43 
 
N 162 162 127 162 161 162 162 162 78 162 162 162 162 162 59 59 162 
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 Table 2.E continued 
Bosnia mean  0.78 135.1 172.8 0.09 0.23 18.25 55.2 0.37 0.1 0.27 0.34 30.2 47.2 71.9 2.29 90.8 8.17 
 
median 1 112 150 0 0 12 31 0 0 0 0 30.2 47.2 50 3.6 90.9 8.05 
 
std dev. 0.41 110.5 95.4 0.29 0.42 17.8 61.2 0.48 0.3 0.44 0.47 0 0 22.9 1.49 5.07 0.44 
 
N 275 275 215 267 273 273 275 275 199 275 275 275 275 275 275 275 275 
Slovakia mean  0.77 105.1 136.1 0.17 0.4 12.3 49.8 0.2 0.07 0.26 0.09 2.2 44.5 78.4 1.06 94.8 9.38 
 
median 1 100 120 0 0 11 21.5 0 0 0 0 2.2 44.5 81 1.1 96.7 9.35 
 
std dev. 0.42 85.2 72.0 0.37 0.49 9.45 57.0 0.4 0.26 0.44 0.29 0 0 5.98 0.15 2.72 0.34 
 
N 176 176 136 174 176 176 176 176 124 176 176 176 176 176 176 176 176 
Tajikistan mean  0.75 110.4 146.8 0.09 0.12 11.6 46.6 0.27 0.06 0.14 0.22 0 0 . 10.9 7.59 6.16 
 
median 1 120 150 0 0 6 26 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 9.7 8.9 6.68 
 
std dev. 0.43 90.4 74.13 0.29 0.32 12.7 54.0 0.45 0.24 0.35 0.42 0 0 . 1.26 1.36 0.59 
 
N 137 137 103 137 137 135 137 137 102 137 137 137 137 0 66 66 137 
Poland mean  0.73 105.8 144.8 0.02 0.28 17.2 45.9 0.39 0.14 0.17 0.04 0 91.7 64.2 21.7 73.0 8.92 
 
median 1 120 130 0 0 13 20 0 0 0 0 0 91.7 55 21.5 74.3 8.98 
 
std dev. 0.44 84.51 64.2 0.15 0.45 15.8 59.1 0.49 0.35 0.38 0.19 0 0 13.0 0.22 1.35 0.27 
 
N 587 587 429 586 587 586 587 587 345 585 587 587 587 587 587 587 587 
Serbia mean  0.72 112.5 155.8 0.09 0.34 19.6 59.0 0.35 0.06 0.2 0.29 0 100 . 23.8 58.6 8.39 
 
median 1 100 120 0 0 13 32.5 0 0 0 0 0 100 . 23.9 66 8.68 
 
std dev. 0.45 105.1 92.4 0.29 0.47 19.6 63.1 0.48 0.23 0.4 0.45 0 0 . 0.22 12.5 0.37 
 
N 270 270 195 266 270 269 270 270 215 267 270 270 270 0 114 114 270 
Slovenia mean  0.55 71.4 130.5 0.13 0.28 17.0 35.6 0.2 0.03 0.27 0.18 2.7 0 60.7 14.2 24.9 9.79 
 
median 1 50 100 0 0 13 14 0 0 0 0 2.7 0 56 12.6 22.6 9.81 
 
std dev. 0.5 88.9 82.1 0.33 0.45 16.7 47.6 0.4 0.17 0.44 0.39 0 0 9.25 2.19 4.18 0.34 
 
N 309 309 169 306 309 309 309 309 199 309 309 309 309 309 309 309 309 
Turkey mean  0.53 61.7 115.6 0.06 0.11 16.2 39.8 0.05 0.01 0.45 0.35 18.3 42.2 70.7 31.9 11.3 9.05 
 
median 1 20 100 0 0 14 20 0 0 0 0 18.3 42.2 96 33.1 6.3 8.87 
 
std dev. 0.5 112.1 131.6 0.24 0.31 10.7 49.1 0.21 0.1 0.5 0.48 0 0 27.0 1.3 5.34 0.19 
 
N 808 808 431 374 807 805 808 808 766 804 808 808 808 808 808 808 808 
Total mean  0.79 113.7 144.5 0.06 0.26 14.3 51.0 0.23 0.06 0.24 0.2 10.7 33.2 64 13.9 54.7 8.55 
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 Table 2.E continued 
 
median 1 100 130 0 0 11 26 0 0 0 0 2.7 22.4 64 7 63.6 8.69 
 
std dev. 0.41 97.5 87.3 0.23 0.44 13.9 58.7 0.42 0.24 0.43 0.4 14.3 31.2 20.92 17.02 33.3 0.88 
  N 8365 8365 6582 7073 8346 8329 8365 8360 6211 8313 8365 8365 8365 7900 7467 7756 8096 
Notes: Countries are ranked in descending order according to the mean value of COLL1. 
 
Table 2.F Pairwise correlation coefficients 
 COLL1 COLL2 COLL3 OVERDUE CRIME AGE SIZE 
SOLE 
OWN 
FEMALE 
OWN 
QUALITY CITY PUBREG PRVTBR CR STATE FOREIGN 
OVERDUE 0.01 -0.02 -0.03 1             
CRIME 0.07 0.03 -0.01 0.06 1            
AGE -0.02 0.01 0.02 0.08 0.02 1           
SIZE 0.08 0.01 -0.05 0.02 0.10 0.27 1          
SOLE 
OWN 
-0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.11 -0.21 1         
FEMALE 
OWN 
-0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.06 -0.10 0.46 1        
QUALITY -0.02 -0.04 -0.03 0.02 0.00 0.09 0.21 -0.14 -0.08 1       
CITY -0.05 -0.07 -0.05 -0.02 0.01 0.04 0.08 -0.13 -0.07 0.09 1      
PUBREG -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.04 -0.01 0.00 -0.05 -0.03 0.06 0.12 1     
PRVTBR -0.07 -0.06 -0.03 0.03 0.04 0.10 -0.01 0.10 0.03 0.03 -0.03 -0.25 1    
CR -0.05 -0.02 0.02 0.03 -0.04 0.01 -0.08 -0.02 -0.03 0.10 -0.16 0.11 0.09 1   
STATE -0.09 -0.12 -0.09 -0.01 -0.04 0.05 0.03 -0.06 -0.01 0.00 0.07 0.07 -0.06 -0.03 1  
FOREIGN 0.11 0.11 0.06 0.00 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.02 -0.04 0.15 0.29 0.25 -0.56 1 
LNGDPPC -0.07 -0.11 -0.09 0.01 0.08 0.08 0.02 -0.13 -0.07 0.14 0.11 -0.01 0.33 -0.06 -0.02 0.20 
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Figure 2.A Percentage of collateral to the loan value (COLL3) by countries 
 
 
Figure 2.B Presence of collateral in loan contracts (COLL1) by countries 
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Chapter 3    
Why Do SMEs Use Informal Credit?34 
 
 
3.1 Introduction  
Informal finance refers to financial transactions that occur outside official 
financial institutions. These transactions are not regulated by governmental 
authorities. Note that the definition of informal finance is not related to legality 
issues. Informal financial transactions can be legal, such as borrowing from family 
members, or can be forbidden by the law, such as moneylender activities in many 
countries 35 . There are various sources of informal credit, e.g., family/friends, 
moneylenders, rotating savings and credit organisations (ROSCAs), loan sharks, 
indigenous savings and credit clubs, informal credit unions, and savings collectors. 
However, some of the common characteristics of these sources are their primary 
dependence on relationships and social networks, interest rates that differ from 
those in formal financial markets, generally small and short-term loans, small or 
no collateral, and lack of regulation or registry. 
The number of people worldwide who have no deposit and/or loan account in 
formal financial institutions is estimated to be between two and three billion 
(Karlan and Morduch, 2009; Mantilla, 2010). Together with this figure, results of 
enterprise surveys around the world indicate that approximately 35% of the firms 
have difficulty to access external finance (Demirguc-Kunt and Beck, 2008). The 
informal finance mostly serves these people who are excluded from the formal 
financial sector or credit-constrained borrowers (mostly SMEs, poor households, 
informal businesses, borrowers in rural areas that are located far from formal 
creditors, and people who are not able to meet collateral requirements). As such, 
the existence of informal financial markets is linked to credit rationing or, in a 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34 This paper is co-authored with Yener Altunbas and Flavio Bazzana. An earlier version of this 
paper was presented at 61th Midwest Finance Association Meeting in New Orleans, USA and at 
4th Economic Development International Conference of the GRETHA-GRES in Bordeaux, France. 
35  See Pagura and Kirsten (2006) for a discussion on the definition of informal financial 
organisations and Table 3.A in the appendix for a detailed picture. 
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broader sense, to credit constraint phenomena36. Many studies consider informal 
credit as a last resort for credit-constrained borrowers (Bell, 1990; Ghosh et al., 
2000). Accordingly, credit markets are segmented into two parts, a formal and an 
informal part, with the informal creditors mostly serving a residual class of 
borrowers.   
In contrast, informal credit can also be used by firms that have easy access to 
formal financial services (Kochar, 1997; Azam et al., 2001). Lower or no interest 
on loans from family/friends due to altruistic concerns makes this type of loans 
attractive to borrowers. For example, results of interviews with villagers in Egypt 
show that although households have access to formal financial services, informal 
financial services can be preferred by borrowers due to the complex structure of 
formal financial contracts, which makes them difficult to understand (Baydas et 
al., 1995). In particular, less educated and “finance literate” women participate 
more in informal financial transactions compared with men, especially with regard 
to savings. 
If a credit-rationed borrower cannot obtain a formal loan and family/friend 
networks are not available, he/she may borrow from moneylenders who charge 
unfair and higher interest rates. If this borrower is an SME, its return from 
investment, based on credit from moneylenders, will be smaller than the return 
from investment of competitors who are considered creditworthy by the formal 
financial sector. Additionally, the SME will possibly not be able to realise the 
benefits of debt finance, which reduces tax liability, if its borrowing is not 
reflected in the financial accounts of the firm. Eventually, these SMEs may not be 
able to grow out of being small and depending on moneylenders. Using data from 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
36 Even though many studies do not distinguish between credit-rationed and credit-constrained 
borrowers, there is a slight difference between them. A credit-constrained borrower is a borrower 
who is not able to o b t a i n  the required amount of credit. Discouraged borrowers, i.e., 
borrowers that do not apply for credit expecting that the application will be rejected, and 
borrowers without sufficient collateral to pledge are also credit-constrained borrowers. Credit 
rationing, however, is a more supply-oriented concept and occurs if a bank is able to lend at a 
certain interest rate but is not willing to do so due to risk concerns. As such, credit-rationed 
borrowers can be considered a subset of credit-constrained borrowers. See Liu and Spanjers 
(2009) for further explanations. 
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India, Bell (1990) shows that interest rates are set higher in informal credit 
markets due to the higher risk levels of borrowers, higher costs of entry for new 
informal creditors, and, thus, lower competition on the supply side of the informal 
credit market, which increases the price of informal credit. Using the Investment 
Climate Survey of the World Bank, Ayyagari et al. (2010) show that the positive 
effect of informal credit on firm growth is limited. As such, perceptions on 
informal finance can be negative at first glance37. However, there are also studies 
on the positive effects of informal finance, i.e., alleviating credit constraints. 
Manig (1996) addresses informal finance as a source of rural development in 
Pakistan. Huck et al. (1999) emphasise the importance of informal credits to 
funding new businesses in a small village in Chicago. Despite its inefficient 
banking system and poor legal infrastructure and institutional quality, China is 
one of the fastest growing economies in the world. Allen et al. (2005) and Molnar 
and Tanaka (2007) explain this anomaly by the existence of alternative informal 
financing channels in the private sector, which are based on reputation and 
relationships.  
Previous empirical studies show that despite financial liberalisation efforts and 
regulations, informal credits still constitute a large share of credits, especially of 
those provided to poor households and SMEs. Tsai (2004) notes that the limited 
supply of bank credits, limits in the governmental capacity to implement its 
policies, the political and economic segmentation of local markets, and the 
institutional weaknesses of many microfinance programs are factors that 
contribute to the persistence of the informal financial transactions in China and 
India. 
Because there is no formal registration of transactions in informal financial 
transactions, it is difficult to obtain data on the real size of these activities. Some 
researchers individually collect household or enterprise survey data on countries. 
These surveys may be well designed to meet the requirements of researchers and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
37 This perception is due to the higher interest rates charged to borrowers by moneylenders 
(informal creditors). For further discussions on the exploitation of borrowers by informal lenders, 
see Bolnick (1992), Aliber (2002), and Mati and Sen (2009). 
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be suitable for answering their research questions; however, they generally suffer 
from small sample sizes. In contrast, there are only a few studies that use 
available larger surveys that have been conducted mostly by the World Bank38. 
Previous empirical literature concentrates on the use of informal credits by 
households, whereas only a few studies focus on the informal credit use of firms. 
Most literature concentrates on the individual characteristics of subjects and/or 
on the institutional environment as determinants of informal finance in individual 
developing countries, whereas only a few studies use cross-country data. Despite 
the importance of firms for economic growth and development, a gap exists 
regarding the role of formal financial development and, in particular, the role of 
banking concentration in the informal credit use of firms, and there are only a few 
studies on informal finance in transition economies and Eastern European and 
Central Asian countries. To our knowledge, there are no studies on informal 
finance in developed economies. 
Empirical studies on informal finance focus mostly on single developing 
countries, rather than on several countries, because informal finance is more 
prevalent in developing countries39. These studies on informal finance are based on 
survey data of households or enterprises and mostly investigate individual 
characteristics of subjects and/or the institutional and legal environment of the 
country. Although rare, some studies use interviews to identify the characteristics 
of informal financial transactions40.  
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38 For instance, Azam et al. (2001) surveyed 140 firms, Steel et al. (1997) surveyed 280, Zhang 
(2008) surveyed 172, and Guirkinger (2008) surveyed approximately 500 households. In contrast, 
the studies by Straub (2005), Safavian and Wimpey (2007), and Beck et al. (2008) are examples of 
studies that used the World Bank Enterprise Surveys. For example, Safavian and Wimpey (2007) 
used a sample of 3,564 enterprises from 29 countries i n  t h e  WBES in 2005. Beck et al. (2008) 
used a sample of 2,754 enterprises from 48 countries. 
39 China is one of the countries that is examined extensively due to the importance of informal 
finance in the financing of the private sector (see Park et al., 2003; Tsai, 2004; Zhang, 2008; 
Turvey and Kong, 2010; Ayyagari et al., 2010). Ghosh et al. (2000) and Pagura and Kirsten 
(2006) are examples of other studies based on developing economies.  
40 As an example of the interview studies, Bolnick (1992) directly interviews moneylenders in 
Malawi. The survey results show that moneylenders charge much higher interest rates compared 
with the costs of conducting business, i.e., although there is no strict entry restriction on the 
informal market, moneylenders obtain monopoly rents. Bolnick (1992) suggests promoting 
competition among informal financial organisations to increase social wealth. He also emphasises 
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The main purpose of this paper is to understand why SMEs choose to finance 
their working capital and fixed asset investments via informal credit. Therefore, 
we examine both country- and firm-level determinants (e.g., the financial 
development level and size of a country, gender of the owners, and location of 
firms) of the informal credit use of SMEs. Our primary data sources are the 
Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Surveys (BEEPS). We use the 
2005 version of these surveys as our main dataset because it provides detailed 
information on different types of informal credit. In addition to the 2005 set of the 
BEEPS, we also use a standardised (by EBRD) sample of the 2002-2009 sets of 
BEEPS. To our knowledge, this is one of the largest data set used in the informal 
credit literature.  
The rest of this study is organised as follows. The second section explains the 
methodology and describes the empirical model. Data are presented in the third 
section. After the presentation of the empirical results in the fourth section, the 
final section provides concluding remarks. 
3.2 Hypotheses and literature 
H1 Informal credit is mostly used by credit-constrained SMEs. 
Informal credit is seen as financing of last resort for borrowers, in many studies 
(Bell, 1990; Petersen and Rajan, 1995; Biais and Gollier, 1997; Ghosh et al., 2000). 
That is to say borrowers who are not found creditworthy in formal credit markets 
apply for credit from informal creditors41. “Power of the lenders” is addressed as 
the main argument in explaining credit rationing phenomenon in loan markets—as 
formalized by Townsend (1979), (Hart and Moore, 1994)—42. According to these 
theories, lenders prefer the borrowers that they can exercise their power on 
(Djankov et al., 2007). Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), on the other side, explain the 
existence of credit rationing by the unique interest rate that maximize the 
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the importance of social networks in the lending decisions of informal creditors. 
41 Bolnick (1992), Aliber (2002), Mati and Sen (2009) show that informal creditors can exploit 
borrowers via high interest rates.  
42 Power of the lenders on borrowers is expressed as the ability of collecting back the debts 
easily, charging higher interest rates, and requiring higher fees/collaterals etc... 
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expected return from a loan. Rather than the power of the lender, the important 
point in lending decisions of banks is the information on risk level of the borrower. 
Higher interest rates signal higher default risk, and accordingly they lessen the 
expected return. In this case even some borrowers are ready to pay higher interest 
rates, they won’t get the loan amount they required, because they are evaluated 
as risky borrowers by the bank, they are credit rationed. It is likely for these 
credit-rationed borrowers to look for credit if there exists another market segment, 
i.e. informal credit markets. Accordingly credit markets are segmented into two 
parts: formal and informal, where the informal credit mostly serves to the credit 
constrained firms. 
Park et al. (2003) estimate the effect of competition between informal43 and 
formal financial organizations 44  on the performance indicators—measured by 
deposit growth, loan composition, loan repayment, and bank effort indicators—of 
formal financial organizations. They find that competition separates the market in 
which formal financial organizations keep the best customers and leave the 
secondary market (most household loans) to informal ones.  
Kochar (1997), on the other hand, considers formal and informal markets as 
weak substitutes, and argues that informal financial markets do not stem from 
credit rationing. Instead, low demand for formal finance is considered as the 
source of informal finance by Kochar (1997), informal financial markets are indeed 
a first best choice for borrowers in rural markets where lack of infrastructure. 
H2 SMEs with female owners use informal credit more intensively as compared 
to SMEs with male owners.  
Previous literature shows that gender matters for participation in the informal 
finance. Many studies find that women participate in informal finance more than 
men, especially on the savings side(Baydas et al., 1995; Carter and Rosa, 1998; 
Tsai, 2004). Tsai (2004), attributes this to the better developed social networks of 
women with one another. In household level Baydas et al. (1995), Carter and Rosa 
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43 Namely Rural Cooperative Foundations (RCF). 
44 Namely Rural Credit Cooperatives (RCC). 
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(1998), Marlow and Patton (2005) attributes this result to the lower education 
levels of women, which make formal financial contracts difficult to understand 
while some studies argue that female entrepreneurs’ are subject to a higher credit 
rationing in formal credit markets. Carter and Rosa (1998) finds that female 
entrepreneurs’ relationships with bankers are weaker compared to men because of 
sexual stereotyping and discrimination. There is also a vast body of literature that 
address higher degree of risk aversion of women compared with men (Croson and 
Gneezy, 2009).  Accordingly women can be considered to be less likely to apply for 
bank credit and refrain from risky borrowings due to their preferences. On the 
other hand previous evidence show that women entrepreneurs are better borrowers 
than men in terms of lower default rates (D’Espallier et al., 2011). This result is 
mostly attributed to women’s difficulty in accessing credit, which reduces their 
risk of moral hazard. 
H3 SMEs located in smaller cities rely more on informal credit compared to 
SMEs in bigger cities 
Some studies highlight the importance of location of borrowers on informal 
credit choice (Guirkinger, 2008; Gine, 2010). Using survey data on Thai 
householders in rural areas, Gine (2010) shows that the existence of transaction 
(for the borrowers) and enforcement costs (for the bank) promotes informal 
financial transactions in rural areas. Gine (2010) shows that banks are less willing 
to lend to borrowers whose creditworthiness is difficult to evaluate in rural areas 
and banks have limited ability to enforce contracts, when compared to informal 
lenders which makes banks reluctant to lend people in rural areas. Moreover the 
fixed transaction costs of borrowing can be another explanation for the higher 
informal credit usage in rural areas, especially when the needed amount of credit 
is small. In case of borrowing from formal sources, the average fixed cost will be 
smaller as the loan amount increases. Since the formal credit providers located 
generally in bigger towns, transaction costs are higher for the borrowers those are 
located in rural areas, moreover the enforcement costs are higher for the banks in 
case of lending to borrowers in rural areas. 
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Based on a household survey in Peru, Guirkinger (2008) provides evidence on 
that more geographically and socially distant formal lenders rely on hard 
information, and apply harsh punishment rules in case of a default. Bolnick (1992) 
and Liu and Spanjers (2009) argue that lenders grant credit according to their 
social ties in informal financial transactions. This argument is likely to be 
prevalent in rural areas where social ties are strong and borrowers are more 
immobile. Azam et al. (2001) argues that informal credit is easier to obtain 
compared to with lower interest rates due to altruism concerns. This makes 
informal credit the first best choice of firms in Azam et al.’s (2001) model. 
Borrowers who lacks of necessary social ties to get informal credit, apply for 
formal credit. 
Turvey and Kong (2010) examine the effect of trust and other factors on 
informal credits. They show that informal lending in China largely depends on the 
sense of community trust. Azam et al. (2001) also addresses the importance of 
social networks in informal credit decisions. Azam et al. (2001) shows that 
difficulty of having access to formal sector funds is a most important factor in 
determining the informal credit demands of firms in Africa and refers informal 
finance as a tool to reduce moral hazard problems and alleviate credit constraints. 
Azam et al. (2001) also show that rate of return required by the lenders is lower 
in informal credit market than in the formal market. This is attributed to the 
better monitoring performance of informal lenders. 
Based on a survey of medium, small, and micro enterprises in Sofia (Bulgaria), 
Tardieu (2007) finds similar results that of Safavian and Wimpey (2007) and 
Straub (2005), networks are important for the firms that largely rely on informal 
credit. Tardieu (2007) also underlines that the lending decisions of formal sources 
of credit (banks) rely mostly on hard information (financial accounts, business 
plans, etc.) and these formal creditors mostly prefer to give credits to bigger firms 
that are also more transparent. Some SMEs only have soft information about their 
businesses such as informal business plans. This kind of firms with higher degree 
of informality within business transactions and reports, are more likely to choose 
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informal sources of credit such as family, friends, acquaintances... Using firm 
survey data, Zhang (2008) examines the choice of formal or informal finance via 
the socio-economic indicators. The results indicate the importance of relationships 
on financing decisions of the firms in China. 
H4 Intensity of informal credit usage of SMEs is negatively associated with the 
financial development level in their countries 
Using the historical records of banks and courts in Plymouth, US between 
1803—1850, Wang (2008) shows that when there was only one bank in the county 
only richest people were the borrowers. As another bank began to operate, farmers 
left their informal lenders and their share on total credit volume increased, that is 
to say, an increase in bank competition leads to poor to rely more on formal bank 
credit. Accordingly, as the competition in formal banking system increases, a 
decrease in informal credit demands of firms is expected. Therefore bank 
competition, as being one of the indicators of financial development, is an 
important factor in determining the existence and persistence of informal finance 
in a country (Madestam, 2008; Park et al., 2003). Madestam (2008) explains the 
effect of bank competition on informal finance and shows that if formal banks 
operate in a competitive environment, borrowers use banks and moneylenders to 
get credit45. As competition in banking increases, banks will be more efficient, the 
amount of loanable funds will increase and the interest rates will go down. 
Moreover the enterprises that are not found creditworthy previously both by 
banks and moneylenders may be eligible for credit in such a competitive 
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45  In his model, moneylenders are also borrowers from banks, in addition to the firm and 
household borrowers. He shows that if formal banks operate in a non-competitive 
environment, moneylenders are the only source of credit for the poor. He argues that 
moneylenders have better monitoring ability compared to banks. In his model, banks’ having 
unlimited funds and informal lenders often lack the needed capital. Together with their own 
capital, moneylenders are able to access to bank credit with lower costs than their customers and 
give this money to their customers as loan with a higher spread. In this case the agency cost of 
banks can be reduced since moneylender is assumed to monitor the borrower more efficiently 
than the bank. The result of the model yields higher interest rates and lower borrower welfare 
in case of informal borrowing. In addition to this, informal credit market increases poor 
people’s access to credit. This market segmentation deepens as the competition in formal 
banking decreases, where the segmented outcome is preferred both by wealthier moneylenders 
and banks. 
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environment.  There are two channels for these people to get credit: first—and less 
likely—, they can get credit from the banks directly; second they can get credit 
form a new moneylender who borrows from the bank. Accordingly, if formal banks 
operate in a non-competitive environment, moneylenders are the only source of 
credit for borrowers. This hypothesis is a result of Stiglitz and Weiss’s (1981) 
credit rationing theory, since it implicitly assumes that borrowers may use 
informal credit when they are excluded by the formal financial system. However, 
due to transparency concerns, this hypothesis will possibly not be valid for 
informal or illegal firms even if banks charge lower interest rates on loans.   
There are two different views in the literature regarding the role of bank 
concentration on firm finance: market power and information hypotheses. Market 
power hypothesis argues that concentration in banking sector is detrimental for 
credit availability. Information hypothesis, on the other hand, argues that firms 
built better relationships in concentrated banking environments, which results in 
higher credit availability. Using firm-level data from 74 countries from the World 
Business Environment Survey (WBES), Beck et al. (2004) show that firms face 
higher financing obstacles in countries where the banking systems are less 
competitive. The results of Beck et al. (2004) indicate a strong relation between 
bank concentration and higher financing obstacles in economically and 
institutionally less-developed economies, this relation is insignificant for 
institutionally, financially, and economically well-developed economies. Using both 
the Lerner index and concentration measures, Carbo-Valverde et al. (2009) 
supports both hypotheses by using data on Spanish SMEs. The study shows that 
the two hypotheses can be reconciled when we controlled for demand elasticity, 
banking sector contestability and bank investment in information. In particular, 
bank market power increases firm financing constraints supporting the market 
power hypothesis together with contestability and information production 
diminishes this effect supporting the information hypothesis. 
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H5 Informal credit usage of SMEs is expected to be higher in countries with 
lower legal quality. 
After La Porta et al. (1997) a vast literature grew on law, legal origin, 
institutional quality, finance and economic growth rapidly. Straub (2005) and 
Madestam (2008) attribute the existence informal financial transactions in 
developing countries to low quality of institutions like judicial enforcement, 
corruption, rule of law, and regulatory burden. Similarly Wachtel and Haselmann 
(2006) show that under low legal quality and bad institutional settings, banks are 
not eager to lend, and mostly provide loans to less risky borrowers such as 
governments and bigger firms. In such an environment the existence of informal 
creditors matters for the credit rationed borrowers. 
Moreover Beck et al. (2004) empirically shows that in countries with low levels 
of economic and institutional development, firms are more likely to have 
difficulties to access external funds. Using a sample of 3564 enterprises from 29 
countries in World Bank Enterprise Survey (WBES) in 2005, Safavian and 
Wimpey (2007) test the hypothesis whether enterprises may choose to finance 
their operations entirely from informal sources in order to avoid regulatory burden 
and examination. Their results address legal environment quality as a key factor 
that encourages formal lending. Straub (2005) also finds that smaller firms in less 
stable countries with low legal quality are more likely to prefer informal credit for 
their financing needs. 
3.3 Data  
The main data sources of our study are the BEEPS. BEEPS are joint projects 
of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the 
World Bank (WB). These surveys are designed to assess the business environment 
and development of private enterprises in EBRD countries 46. To date, these 
surveys have been conducted every three years in each country from 1999 to 2009. 
Our analysis is primarily based on 2005 BEEPS data because this version of the 
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46 See the BEEPS reports at http://www.ebrd.com/pages/research/analysis/surveys/beeps.shtml for 
detailed information. 
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survey contains the most detailed information on firms’ informal credit use. In this 
third wave of the BEEPS, 14,107 firms from 34 countries were surveyed. 
Approximately 9,000 of the firms are located in 27 countries: 17 in the CEE 
(Albania, Bulgaria, Turkey, Croatia, Poland, Romania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Serbia, Moldova, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, FYR Macedonia, Czech 
Republic, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia) and 10 in the CIS (Belarus, Georgia, 
Tajikistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and 
Kyrgyzstan). The same survey is also implemented in 6 advanced economies 
(Greece, Germany, Spain, Portugal, Ireland and South Korea) and one developing 
Asian country (Vietnam) to set a benchmark and enable comparisons to be made 
with these economies. For our final sample of SMEs to be in line with the 
definition of the BEEPS and OECD conventions, we define SMEs as firms with a 
maximum of 250 full-time employees, resulting in a sample of 12,834 SMEs for the 
2005 BEEPS data47. 
This dataset has advantages compared to previous studies. First, to our 
knowledge, it is the largest data set compared with previous studies. Second, the 
data set includes firms in both rural areas and large cities; thus, it enables us to 
analyse diverse firms in a large number of countries. The BEEPS also enable us to 
extract valuable information on firm characteristics and business environments for 
our empirical analysis. Moreover, the sample includes both very small and micro 
firms with only a few employees and firms with up to 9,900 employees, which 
allows us to make comparisons between SMEs and large firms. Last, the sample 
provides a direct measure of informal credit use by asking about the finance 
sources of the firm’s working capital and fixed asset investments.   
The EBRD also provides a standardised data set of the 2002-2009 BEEPS 
waves. In addition to the estimation results from the BEEPS 2005 data, we 
provide regression results from this standardised data set. Data from previous 
years are standardised to fit with the 2009 wave of the BEEPS and contain 
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47  The definition of SMEs in the 2005 wave of the BEEPS was the following: small=2-49 
employees, medium=50-249 employees, and large=250-9,999 employees. 
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information from 27 CEE and CIS countries48. In the 2002-2009 BEEPS, firms 
were asked to report the percentages of fixed assets financed by trade credit and 
other credit sources, which include moneylenders, family/friends and non-bank 
financial sources. 
3.4 Methodology 
The dependent variables of this study (IC) are drawn from the responses of 
enterprises that participated in the BEEPS. The percentage of working capital 
purchases and fixed asset investments financed by different informal credit sources 
are used as the key measures of informal credit use of SMEs. In the 2005 set of the 
BEEPS, the question posed to enterprises was: “What proportion of your firm’s 
working capital and new fixed investments has been financed from each of the 
following sources over the last 12 months?”49. BEEPS provide information on three 
different types of informal finance: family/friends, moneylenders, and trade credit. 
Using these different informal credit types, we have 7 dependent variables, as 
defined in Table 3.1. 
Our dependent variables are expressed as fractions of working capital/fixed 
assets, where ! ! !" ! !. This bounded nature of our dependent variables leads to 
some predicted values exceeding these boundaries when using OLS, which is 
analogous to the drawbacks of the linear probability model for binary data as 
discussed by Papke and Wooldridge (1996). We use a generalised linear model 
(GLM) with a logit link and the binomial family, as suggested by Papke and 
Wooldridge (1996) which is also suitable for dependent variables that contain a 
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48 The CEE and CIS countries included in this pooled sample are: Albania, Belarus, Georgia, 
Tajikistan, Turkey, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Russia, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Kazakhstan, Moldova, 
Bosnia, Azerbaijan, Macedonia, Armenia, Kyrgyz, Estonia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Croatia, and Montenegro. Surveys were conducted in 
2002, 2005, 2007, 2008, and 2009, with 6153, 10421, 1952, 3375, and 7815 firms surveyed, 
respectively.  
49 Other alternatives to informal credit sources include internal funds/retained earnings, equity (i.e., 
issue new shares), borrowing from local private commercial banks, borrowing from foreign banks, 
borrowing from state-owned banks (including state development banks), credit cards, leasing 
arrangements, and the government (other than state-owned banks). Interviewers are asked to 
verify whether the total is 100%.  
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large number of zeroes. This model is applicable for dependent variables in the 
interval [0,1] and assumes that ! !" ! ! !!!!), where  is a known non-
linear function that satisfies the following constraint: . Typically,  
is chosen to be , a logistic cumulative distribution function, 
where  can be consistently estimated by the non-linear least squares method. 
Assuming a Bernoulli distribution for IC conditional on X, Papke and Wooldridge 
(1996) show that it is more efficient to estimate  by maximising the following 
Bernoulli log-likelihood, L(! ) = ic log[G(X! )]+ (1! ic)log[1!G(X! )] . We model our 
firm-level dependent variables as functions of firm- and country-level variables. 
Table 3.1 presents definitions and data sources of the variables used in the 
regressions.  
Table 3.1 Variable definitions and sources of the BEEPS 2005 data 
Variable Definition Source 
Dependent variables 
IC1_FA Percentage of fixed asset investments financed by family/friends over the 
previous 12 months. 
BEEPS 
IC1_WC Percentage of working capital purchases financed by family/friends over 
the previous 12 months. 
BEEPS 
IC2_FA Percentage of fixed asset investments financed by moneylenders over the 
previous 12 months. 
BEEPS 
IC2_WC Percentage of working capital purchases financed by moneylenders over the 
previous 12 months. 
BEEPS 
IC3_FA Percentage of fixed asset investments financed by trade credit from 
suppliers and customers over the previous 12 months.  
BEEPS 
IC3_WC Percentage of working capital purchases financed by trade credit over the 
previous 12 months. 
BEEPS 
ICP Average percentage of fixed asset and working capital purchases financed 
by informal credit over the previous 12 months 
(ICP=IC_WC+IC_FA)/2). 
BEEPS 
Firm-level independent variables 
FINCONST An ordinal variable that ranges from 1 to 4. This variable becomes 1 if the 
firm responds that access to finance (e.g., collateral required or financing 
not available from banks) is “no obstacle” for the operation and growth of 
the business. This variable becomes 2, 3, and 4 if the firm responds that it 
is a “minor obstacle”, “moderate obstacle”, and “major obstacle”, 
respectively.   
BEEPS 
FEMALE Dummy=1 if at least one of the principal owners is female and is zero 
otherwise. 
BEEPS 
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Table 3.1 continued 
CITY An ordinal variable that ranges from 1 to 4. This variable becomes 4 if the 
firm is located in the capital and/or in a city with a population of over 1 
million, 3 if the firm is located in a city that has a population between 
250,000 and 1,000,000, 2 if the firm is located in a city that has a 
population between 50,000 and 250,000, and 1 if the firm is located in a 
city/town that has population under 50,000.  
BEEPS 
SIZE Number of full-time employees.  BEEPS 
AGE The number of years for which the firm has been operating. BEEPS 
MACRO  An ordinal variable that ranges from 1 to 4. This variable becomes 1 if the 
firm reported that macroeconomic instability (in terms of inflation or 
exchange rate) is “no obstacle” for the operation and growth of the SME, 2 
if it is a “minor obstacle”, 3 if it is a “moderate obstacle” and 4 if it is a 
“major obstacle”.  
BEEPS 
OVERDUE Dummy=1 if the firm has any utility payments overdue (by more than 90 
days) at the time of the survey and is zero otherwise.  
BEEPS 
Country-level independent variables 
STTRADED Total shares traded on the stock exchange market to GDP. Beck et al. 
(2010) 
CR Asset share of the three largest banks among the commercial banks (%). Bankscope 
PRVTCRE Private credit by formal banks/GDP. Beck et al. 
(2010) 
TIME Average number of years from the filing for insolvency in court until the 
resolution of distressed assets. 
World Bank 
 
In order to test our first hypothesis, BEEPS provide a direct measure of 
financial constraints based on reported difficulties in access to external finance. 
Specifically, firms are asked to report the extent—on a 1 (“No obstacle”) to 4 
(“Major obstacle”) scale—to which financing problems are obstacles to the 
operation and growth of their businesses (FINCONST). To investigate the role of 
gender in informal credit decisions of firms, a dummy variable (FEMALE) is 
employed. FEMALE equals to one, if there is at least one female amongst the 
owners of the firm, zero otherwise. Previous empirical studies examine the effect of 
gender on informal credit usage mostly at household level, while there are 
relatively few empirical studies at firm level. Studies show that women participate 
in informal finance, —especially in savings part— more than men (Tsai, 2004; 
Estrin and Mickiewicz, 2009). This result is generally attributed to lower 
education and income levels of women, and their weaker relationships with the 
officers in formal financial institutions (Baydas et al., 1995; Carter and Rosa, 
1998; Marlow and Patton, 2005).  
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In order to test the second hypothesis an ordinal variable (CITY) is employed. 
This variable ranges from 1 to 4. CITY becomes 4 if the firm is located in Capital 
and/or in a city which has a population of over 1 million, 3 if the firm is located 
in a city that has a population between 250,000-1,000,000, 2 if the firm is located 
in a city that has a population between 50,000-250,000, and 1 if the firm is located 
in a city/town that has population under 50,000. This variable enables us to test 
for potential differences in financing opportunities available in larger versus 
smaller towns. Physical distance to formal sources of credit matters for informal 
credit choices of firms as previous studies suggested. This result is linked to the 
existence of transaction (for the borrowers) and enforcement costs (for the bank), 
which promote the existence informal creditors in rural areas (Guirkinger, 2008; 
Gine, 2010). Moreover it can be used as a proxy for social ties, which are weaker 
in bigger cities. Accordingly, informal credit usage of firms is expected to be 
higher in smaller cities, as compared to bigger cities. 
Borrowers are less likely to rely on informal credit in countries where the 
financial system is more developed (Straub, 2005; Madestam, 2008). This situation 
is attributed to the high number of available financing opportunities and easiness 
of access to these services in countries with developed financial structures. Three 
measures of financial development50 are employed in this study: value of the total 
shares traded on the stock exchange market to GDP, expressed in percentage 
(STTRADED). This variable is an approximation for the equity market 
development level. The concentration in banking sector (CR) is employed as an 
inverse measure of financial development in banking sector. To approximate for 
the concentration in banking sector the value of assets of three largest banks as a 
share of total assets within the commercial banks is used. Finally in order to 
account for the loan market development, the percentage of private credit by 
formal banks over GDP (PRVTCRE) is employed.  
In order to test for the final hypothesis for the effect of legal quality, again a 
country-specific variable is used. TIME is the “Average number of years from the 
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50 Source: Beck et al. (2010). 
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filing for insolvency in court until the resolution of distressed assets”51. Since this 
variable approximates for inefficiency of legal system, we expect a positive 
association with the dependent variables.   
We use four control variables: First the firm size (SIZE) is included as a control 
variable in the regressions. This variable is expressed as the number of full-time 
employees. Smaller businesses are less likely to have appropriate information (e.g. 
financial statements, business records) when applying for formal credit i.e. they 
are more likely to face financing difficulties in formal markets. Accordingly small 
firms are expected to be more likely to finance their investments via informal 
credits due to financial constraints (Tardieu, 2007; Safavian and Wimpey, 2007; 
Zhang, 2008). Second we use the number of years (AGE) that the SME has been 
operating. This variable is constructed by subtracting the self-reported year that 
the firm began its operations from the year that the survey is conducted. 
Financial growth life cycle theory indicates that firms use different financing 
methods at different cycles of their lives. As the firm gains experience in the 
business field by the time, it gains reputation. It becomes easier to monitor such a 
firm for the formal banks. Moreover, these kind of older firms are more likely to 
be able to provide collateral in order to obtain formal credit. Since it is much 
difficult to get formal external credit for younger firms, and they mostly rely on 
internal finance and informal credit (Berger and Udell, 1998). In line with these 
predictions, Huck et al. (1999) and Zhang (2008) address business experience and 
age of the firm as an important determinant of informal credit usage of firms.  So 
we expect higher levels of informal credit usage for the younger firms as compared 
to older firms. Third, we use a dummy variable (OVERDUE), which becomes one 
if the SME reported that it had any utility payments overdue (by more than 90 
days) in previous year, zero otherwise. This variable stands here as a proxy for 
financial distress and we expect higher informal credit use by SMEs that have 
utility arrears. Finally we use an ordinal variable (MACRO) that reflect the 
SME’s perception about how the macroeconomic environment affects the SMEs 
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51 Source: World Bank www.doingbusiness.org  
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operations. This variable becomes 1 if the firm reported that macroeconomic 
instability (inflation, exchange rate) is “no obstacle” for the operation and growth 
of the firm, 2 if “minor obstacle”, 3 if “moderate obstacle” and 4 if “major 
obstacle”. In instable macroeconomic environments, formal lenders are less willing 
to lend, in these environments personal relationships and networks gain much 
more importance people may lend only to people whom they know previously. So, 
we expect higher informal credit usage of SMEs, in environments where 
macroeconomic instability is problematic for businesses. 
3.5 Results and discussion 
3.5.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 3.2 provides the summary statistics of the variables used in the empirical 
part of the study. According to this table, an average of 9.6% of the working 
capital (IC_WC) and 5.4% of fixed assets (IC_FA) are financed via informal 
sources. This information reveals that SMEs use informal credit to meet their 
smaller financing needs. These numbers may be seen quite marginal, as they are 
smaller in magnitude. If we calculate the share of each informal credit source in 
external financing we reach higher values as reported in Table 3.B in the 
appendix. To give an insight on the importance of informal credit we see that 
nearly 25% of the working capital expenses that are financed via external sources 
are trade credit. More importantly, this table reveals that the informal loans 
account nearly for the 40% of the total loans that are used to finance working 
capital expenses, while 23% of the total loans that are used to finance fixed asset 
purchases are informal loans. These numbers reveal that informal credit is an 
important source of external finance for the SMEs.  
We define ICD as a dummy variable that equals one if the firm has ever used 
informal credit to finance its working capital/fixed asset investments over the 
previous 12 months and zero otherwise. The mean value of ICD shows that 27% of 
the SMEs in our sample used informal sources to finance a part of their working 
capital and/or fixed asset purchases. Table 3.2 reveals a large variation of AGE 
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and SIZE across the SME sample set, while there is also a large variation in the 
country-level variables. For example, as an indicator of financial development, the 
ratio of shares traded in the stock exchange market to the GDP ranges from 
0.023% in Armenia to 152% in South Korea. Similarly, the percentage of the 
private credit traded by formal banks to the GDP (PRVTCRE) ranges from 
6.91% in Armenia to 142% in Ireland. The approximation of the quality of the 
legal system in the corresponding countries (TIME) also shows a large variation 
from 0.4 to 9.2 years.  
Table 3.2 Summary statistics for the 2005 BEEPS 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N 
IC_FA 5.403 17.907 0 100 9304 
IC_WC 9.589 22.363 0 100 12564 
ICP 7.476 17.415 0 100 9250 
ICD 0.272 0.445 0 1 9250 
IC1_FA  2.527 12.304 0 100 9304 
IC1_WC 2.808 12.277 0 100 12568 
IC2_FA 0.571 5.478 0 100 9304 
IC2_WC 0.694 5.737 0 100 12564 
IC3_FA 2.305 11.538 0 100 9304 
IC3_WC 6.086 17.852 0 100 12564 
FINCONST 2.207 1.124 1 4 12319 
FEMALE 0.281 0.450 0 1 9962 
C     CITY 2.531 1.231 1 4 12834 
STTRADED 29.099 42.114 0.023 152.001 28 
CR 63.866 16.786 18.484 98.333 32 
PRVTCRE 57.864 43.198 6.915 142.109 27 
TIME 2.786 1.527 0.400 9.200 34 
SIZE 32.204 48.796 2 250 12833 
AGE 14.763 14.974 4 200 12824 
OVERDUE  0.027 0.161 0 1 12700 
MACRO 2.418 1.145 1 4 12462 
Notes: This table includes 3 additional variables: IC_FA is the percentage of fixed 
asset investments financed by informal credit over the previous 12 months 
(IC_FA=IC1_FA+IC2_FA+IC3_FA), IC_WC is the percentage of working 
capital purchases financed by informal credit over the previous 12 months 
(IC_WC=IC1_WC+IC2_WC+IC3_WC), and ICD is a dummy variable that 
equals one if the firm has ever used informal credit to finance its working 
capital/fixed asset investments over the previous 12 months and zero otherwise. 
However, we did not perform regressions on these potential dependent variables to 
keep the length of the chapter reasonable. N is the number of observations.  
 
Tables 3.3 and 3.4 present the summary statistics of various types of informal 
credit by country groups. These tables reveal no major differences between the 
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country groups with respect to mean values of informal credit use by SMEs, 
especially as measured by ICP and ICD. However, we observe larger differences, 
as expected, in the types of informal credits; i.e., SMEs in countries with 
advanced economies rarely use credit from family/friends and moneylenders 
compared with other countries. However, these SMEs in advanced economies use 
informal finance in the form of trade credits from suppliers and customers. In 
advanced economies, 8.16% of the working capital and 3.09% of the fixed asset 
purchases are financed by trade credits. These percentages are the highest among 
the country groups. 
Among the three country groups, the CIS countries have the highest average of 
informal finance from moneylenders, family and friends. Among these countries, 
only three are upper middle-income countries, namely, Belarus, Russia, and 
Kazakhstan, whereas the rest are lower middle- and low-income countries 
according to the IMF World Economic Outlook definition52. Not surprisingly, the 
percentage of working capital financed by family/friends and moneylenders is the 
highest for the low-income developing Asian country, Vietnam. However, the 
average values of the percentage of fixed assets financed by family/friends and 
moneylenders are slightly higher in CIS countries than in Vietnam. 
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52  Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan are the low-income CIS countries, while Georgia, 
Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Armenia are the lower middle-income countries.  
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Table 3.3 Summary statistics for informal credit use by SMEs across country groups 
Country gr. Statistics icp icd ic_wc ic1_wc ic2_wc ic3_wc ic_fa ic1_fa ic2_fa ic3_fa 
CIS 
Mean  7.23 0.24 7.75 2.88 0.89 3.97 6.27 3.65 0.98 1.63 
Std. Dev. 17.78 0.42 20.3 12.17 6.61 14.71 19.36 14.97 7.07 10.15 
N 2139 2139 3287 3287 3287 3287 2144 2144 2144 2144 
CEE 
Mean  7.31 0.25 10.3 3.79 0.77 5.74 5.49 2.88 0.56 2.05 
Std. Dev. 18.06 0.43 23.8 14.61 5.80 17.44 18.43 13.15 5.14 10.97 
N 3408 3408 4557 4557 4557 4557 3437 3437 3437 3437 
Advanced 
Mean  7.70 0.31 10.13 1.54 0.43 8.16 4.69 1.28 0.31 3.09 
Std. Dev. 16.86 0.46 22.81 9.03 5.10 20.65 16.60 8.81 4.70 13.32 
N 3189 3189 4183 4187 4183 4183 3209 3209 3209 3209 
Vietnam 
Mean  8.63 0.40 11.22 4.43 1.04 5.74 6.09 3.69 0.63 1.77 
Std. Dev. 15.13 0.49 17.86 13.27 4.08 12.66 16.26 13.08 4.69 7.51 
N 447 447 450 450 450 450 447 447 447 447 
Total 
Mean  7.49 0.27 9.61 2.82 0.70 6.09 5.42 2.55 0.57 2.30 
Std. Dev. 17.45 0.45 22.4 12.31 5.76 17.87 17.95 12.35 5.50 11.55 
N 9183 9183 12477 12481 12477 12477 9237 9237 9237 9237 
Notes: This table includes 3 additional variables: IC_FA is the percentage of fixed asset investments financed by informal credit over the previous 12 months 
(IC_FA=IC1_FA+IC2_FA+IC3_FA), IC_WC is the percentage of working capital purchases financed by informal credit over the previous 12 months 
(IC_WC=IC1_WC+IC2_WC+IC3_WC), and ICD is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm has ever used informal credit to finance its working 
capital/fixed asset investments over the previous 12 months and zero otherwise. However, we did not perform regressions on these potential dependent variables 
to keep the length of the paper reasonable. CIS countries included in the calculations are Belarus, Georgia, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Russia, 
Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and the Kyrgyzstan. CEE countries included in the calculations are Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Turkey, Poland, Romania, 
Bosnia, and Herzegovina, Serbia, Moldova, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, FYR Macedonia, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia. The 6 
included countries with advanced economies are Greece, Germany, Spain, Portugal, Ireland, and South Korea. N is the number of observations. 
 
 
!
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Table 3.4 Summary statistics for informal credit use by SMEs across country groups 
Country group Statistics icp icd ic_wc ic1_wc ic2_wc ic3_wc ic_fa ic1_fa ic2_fa ic3_fa 
Low income 
Mean  7.51 0.32 7.71 2.74 0.98 3.98 5.35 3.18 0.87 1.31 
Std. Dev. 15.40 0.47 17.30 10.39 6.14 12.37 16.16 12.57 6.52 7.14 
N 758 758 1073 1073 1073 1073 760 760 760 760 
Lower Middle income 
Mean  7.45 0.23 8.44 3.69 1.00 3.75 6.81 4.27 0.85 1.69 
Std. Dev. 18.46 0.42 21.33 14.15 6.90 14.24 19.63 15.80 5.98 9.40 
N 1367 1367 1830 1830 1830 1830 1368 1368 1368 1368 
Upper Middle Income 
Mean  7.58 0.25 10.00 3.81 0.74 5.45 5.93 3.17 0.67 2.10 
Std. Dev. 18.50 0.43 23.48 14.76 5.69 17.08 19.46 14.14 5.86 11.50 
N 3178 3178 4468 4468 4468 4468 3192 3192 3192 3192 
High Income 
Mean  7.43 0.30 10.07 1.66 0.49 7.92 4.53 1.31 0.34 2.87 
Std. Dev. 16.56 0.46 22.73 9.11 5.25 20.35 16.26 8.70 4.75 12.86 
N 3880 3880 5106 5110 5106 5106 3917 3917 3917 3917 
Total 
Mean  7.49 0.27 9.61 2.82 0.70 6.09 5.42 2.55 0.57 2.30 
Std. Dev. 17.45 0.45 22.40 12.31 5.76 17.87 17.95 12.35 5.50 11.55 
N 9183 9183 12477 12481 12477 12477 9237 9237 9237 9237 
 Notes: This table includes 3 additional variables: IC_FA is the percentage of fixed asset investments financed by informal credit over the previous 12 months 
(IC_FA=IC1_FA+IC2_FA+IC3_FA), IC_WC is the percentage of working capital purchases financed by informal credit over the previous 12 months 
(IC_WC=IC1_WC+IC2_WC+IC3_WC), and ICD is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm has ever used informal credit to finance its working capital/fixed 
asset investments over the previous 12 months and zero otherwise. However, we did not perform regressions on these potential dependent variables to keep the length of 
the paper reasonable. Low-income countries included in these calculations are Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Vietnam. The lower middle-income countries are 
Albania, Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova, Azerbaijan, and Armenia. The upper middle-income countries are Bulgaria, Belarus, Turkey, Russia, Poland, Romania, Serbia, 
Kazakhstan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, FYR Macedonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Finally, the high-income countries are Croatia, Estonia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovak 
Republic, Slovenia, Greece, Germany, Spain, Portugal, Ireland, and South Korea. N is the number of observations.  
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In our sample of countries, the highest degree of informal credit use by SMEs 
was found in Latvia, an upper middle-income EU country in CEE, compared with 
other countries 53 . Although the rate of borrowing from moneylenders and 
family/friends is not as high as in the other countries (for example, none of the 
SMEs in Latvia borrows from moneylenders to finance fixed asset purchases), 
SMEs rely heavily on trade credits to finance their working capital needs in this 
country. Thus, the higher use of trade credits makes Latvia the country in which 
the SMEs use the highest level of informal credits, as demonstrated by the mean 
value of ICP.  
In contrast, Uzbekistan, a low-income CIS country, is the country in which the 
average informal credit use is the lowest among the countries. None of the fixed 
asset investments of SMEs are financed by trade credits in this country, and more 
than 95% of both fixed assets and working capital purchases of SMEs in 
Uzbekistan are financed by internal funds. 
Another important observation from these simple mean values is that SMEs 
use informal credit mostly to finance their working capital purchases, rather than 
using it for fixed asset investments. This finding is not surprising because informal 
credit is mostly used for small and short-term financing needs. From the same 
statistics calculated for the large firms with more than 250 full-time employees in 
Tables 3.3 and 3.4, we observe smaller mean values of informal credit use for large 
firms compared with SMEs in their respective regions and development levels. 
These summary statistics are reported in Tables 3.E and 3.F in the Appendix. 
The correlations between variables are presented in Table 3.G in the Appendix. 
We observe high positive correlations between the percentages of working capital 
purchases and fixed asset investments that are financed by the same group of 
credit sources. Therefore, if an SME uses loans from family/friends to finance its 
working capital, the same SME will most likely use loans from family/friends to 
finance its fixed asset investments. Comparing the correlation coefficients between 
other groups of credit sources (IC1_WC and IC2_FA versus IC1_WC and 
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IC3_FA), we observe that borrowing from family/friends and borrowing from 
moneylenders are more correlated with each other than with trade credits.   
3.5.2 Estimation results 
In this section, we analyse the factors that affect SMEs’ percentages of fixed 
asset investments and working capital expenses financed via informal credit 
sources using 2005 BEEPS data54. To test our hypotheses we run seven baseline 
regressions in which all countries were included.55 In these regressions we include 
industry fixed effects to capture industry-level unobservable characteristics.56 In 
line with our expectations, in each regression, we find positive and statistically 
significant associations between FINCONST and all forms of informal credit. In 
order to examine more clearly the role of credit constraints, we also distinguish 
between firms for whom the variable “access” has a value equal to 1, (i.e. access 
to finance is reported as “no obstacle”) by running separate regressions as 
presented in Table I in the Appendix. This regression results show that firms that 
report access to finance as “very severe, major and moderate obstacle” are more 
likely to use any kind of informal credit as compared to firms that report access to 
finance as “no obstacle”. These strongly positive relationships indicate that credit-
constrained SMEs use more informal credit in any form, compared to non credit-
constrained SMEs. We observe that financial constraints have larger effects on 
borrowing from family/friends and moneylenders than on borrowing from 
suppliers and customers (trade credits). Accordingly, if a SME considers itself 
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54 In OLS models, R2 is strongly accepted as a goodness-of-fit measure for the model. However, 
there is no commonly accepted measure in previous papers that use GLM. To measure the 
goodness-of-fit, we use the correlation between the response and its conditional expectation given 
the predictors , as suggested by Zheng and Agresti (2000). 
55 However, due to a lack of country-level data, we had to exclude Albania, Belarus, Tajikistan, 
Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Serbia, and Azerbaijan from the regressions. Accordingly, our data set 
shrinks to 7,873 SMEs at maximum. Note that this data set is still the largest compared with 
previous studies. When choosing the independent variables, we made sure to use the least 
correlated variables and checked the variance inflation factor to avoid multicollinearity. In our 
regressions we can not control for country fixed effects due to multicollinearity between the 
country level variables and country fixed effects. 
56 Note that the dependent variables are not expressed in percentages in the regressions; instead, 
they are divided by 100 to allow variations in [0,1] to be applied to the GLM model.   
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more financially constrained, it is more likely to use credits from family/friends 
and moneylenders than from suppliers and customers.   
The regression results in Table 3.5 indicate that SMEs that have at least one 
female owner rely less on the moneylender type of informal credits to finance their 
fixed asset investments/working capital expenses, compared to SMEs with only 
male owner(s). However, we observe that SMEs with at least one female owner 
use more trade credit compared with SMEs without a female owner(s).  
Table 3.5 Determinants of informal credit use of SMEs: full sample 
Variable Family friends Moneylender Trade Credit 
Tot inf. 
Credit 
IC1_FA IC1_WC IC2_FA IC2_WC IC3_FA IC3_WC ICP 
FINCONST 
0.269*** 0.242*** 0.298** 0.290** 0.131 0.129** 0.200*** 
(0.065) (0.053) (0.111) (0.108) (0.097) (0.045) (0.033) 
FEMALE 
0.006 -0.012 -0.638 -0.823** 0.281** 0.074 0.036 
(0.135) (0.112) (0.365) (0.276) (0.101) (0.082) (0.066) 
CITY 
0.105 0.054 0.110 0.064 -0.003 -0.019 0.052 
(0.063) (0.069) (0.094) (0.095) (0.071) (0.043) (0.040) 
STTRADED 
-0.007 -0.001 0.005 0.004 0.004 -0.003 0.001 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) 
CR 
0.014** 0.002 -0.020*** -0.001 -0.001 -0.006 0.002 
(0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.002) 
PRVTCRE 
-0.006* -0.009* -0.016* -0.008 0.007 0.011** 0.003*   
(0.003) (0.004) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.002) 
TIME 
0.054 0.0831* 0.164*** 0.096** 0.150** 0.039 0.076*** 
(0.038) (0.040) (0.028) (0.029) (0.050) (0.053) (0.020) 
SIZE 
-0.017*** -0.011*** -0.001 0.004 0.003 0.004** 0.000 
(0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
AGE 
-0.014** -0.026*** -0.023 -0.043* -0.006 0.000 -0.007*   
(0.005) (0.007) (0.014) (0.017) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
OVERDUE 
0.322 0.538* -0.639* 0.716** 0.333 0.098 0.322*   
(0.344) (0.264) (0.297) (0.252) (0.277) (0.200) (0.160) 
MACRO 
0.075 0.067 -0.046 0.036 0.139 -0.039 0.054 
(0.072) (0.075) (0.113) (0.080) (0.090) (0.046) (0.039) 
Pseudo R2 0.181 0.174 0.143 0.122 0.126 0.176 0.151 
N 5869 7636 5869 7635 5869 7635 5841 
Notes: This table reports GLM estimates of the percentages of fixed assets/working capital financed by 
informal credit. All regressions include industry fixed effects and constant term. Robust standard 
errors are clustered by country and reported in parentheses. The * indicates statistical significance at 
5%, ** at 1%, and *** at 0.1%. N is the number of observations. 
 
In addition to these regressions, we created a subsample of sole proprietorship 
SMEs and tested the effect of female ownership where owner of the firm is also 
the manager of the firm. Results are tabulated in Table 3.G in the Appendix. In 
these regressions we do not observe significant gender effect on the trade credit 
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usage. However we observe stronger negative effect of female entrepreneurship on 
usage of credit from moneylenders. These results can be explained by various 
results addressed in the previous literature. First, female entrepreneurs are more 
risk-averse than male entrepreneurs; which leads them to use less credit from 
moneylenders as compared to their male counterparts. Second, female borrowers 
have lower default rates than men, which makes female borrowers attractive to 
formal creditors. Finally, female entrepreneurs have to be more competent to 
conduct business in what has traditionally been considered a man’s world. In 
contrast to the stereotyped housewife who is more likely to use informal credit, 
female entrepreneurs rely less on informal credit. We do not find significant 
location effects, as measured by CITY, on the informal credit use of SMEs in most 
of the regressions. This result can be attributable to the improvements in new 
banking technologies such as internet and telephone banking which decreases the 
importance of distances.  
Regarding the effect of financial development on informal credit, we do not find 
a statistically significant association between equity market development, as 
measured by STTRADED, and informal credit use in any of the seven regressions. 
Regarding the effect of the banking concentration, the positive and significant 
coefficient estimate of CR on the first regression where the dependent variable is 
IC1_FA indicates that as a banking system becomes more concentrated, SMEs 
finance a higher percentage of their fixed asset investments with credit from 
family/friends. However, regression results yield insignificant estimates for the 
percentage of working capital purchases financed by family/friends and for the 
remaining dependent variables, except for IC2_FA, for which we find a 
significantly negative coefficient estimate. This finding can be regarded as 
evidence of an intermediation effect, as discussed by Madestam (2008), i.e., an 
increase in the banking concentration reduces the credit volume, and only some 
borrowers can obtain credit, such as moneylenders, because they act as an 
intermediary between the banks and the final borrowers. These weakly 
statistically significant and inconsistent coefficient estimates for CR can be 
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evaluated to support Beck et al. (2004) as CR doesn’t have strong effect in 
developing and less-developed economies. This argument leads us to run separate 
regressions by country groups. Because PRVTCRE can be an indicator of the 
supply of funds from formal lenders, the negative and statistically significant 
coefficients of PRVTCRE in regressions 1-3 indicate a trade-off relationship 
between the informal credit use and the ratio of the formal credit to the GDP as 
argued in hypothesis 1. However, we find a significantly positive relationship 
between IC3_WC, ICP and PRVTCRE. This result can be attributed to 
intermediation effects, i.e., informal lenders act as intermediaries between 
borrowers and formal lenders, as discussed by Madestam (2008).  
The coefficient estimates of TIME mostly indicate a significant positive 
influence on the percentages of fixed asset investments/working capital purchases 
financed by various informal credit sources. This result suggests that in the case of 
low-quality legal systems, banks are reluctant to lend and prefer to provide loans 
to less risky borrowers rather than to informationally opaque SMEs. In such an 
environment, informal creditors serve as a substitute to formal lending institutions 
for the SMEs. 
Regarding the effect of the SIZE of the SME, as measured by the number of 
full-time employees, the coefficient estimates yield some negative results, i.e., an 
increase in SIZE leads to a decrease in borrowing from family/friends, as 
measured by IC1_FA and IC1_WC. However, we observe a reverse effect of SIZE 
on the use of trade credit, as measured by IC3_WC, which suggests that larger 
SMEs finance higher percentages of working capital purchases with trade credit. 
Thus, smaller SMEs use more informal credit in the form of borrowing from 
family/friends, whereas larger SMEs use more trade credit. Regarding the effect of 
the age of the firm, the negative and statistically significant coefficient estimates 
for AGE show that as an SME becomes older in the market, it uses significantly 
less informal credit, especially from family/friends and moneylenders. The 
coefficient estimates for OVERDUE indicate that financially distressed firms use 
more informal credit (especially in the form of borrowing from family/friends) 
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than other firms. With regard to the effect of macroeconomic instabilities 
(MACRO), we do not observe a statistically significant effect.   
We also tested whether our results differ across country groups by running 
separate regressions for each country group. In Tables 3.7 and 3.8 we present the 
results of the same GLM regression results by different country groups. We first 
present the results for high-income countries in Table 3.6. 
Table 3.6 Determinants of informal credit use of SMEs: high-income countries 
Variable 
Family friends Moneylender Trade Credit Tot inf. credit 
IC1_FA IC1_WC IC2_FA IC2_WC IC3_FA IC3_WC ICP 
FINCONST 
0.241* 0.296** 0.621*** 0.405*** 0.193 0.179*** 0.203*** 
(0.109) (0.107) (0.097) (0.106) (0.115) (0.036) (0.044) 
FEMALE 
-0.181 -0.173 -0.608 -0.984** 0.137 -0.021 -0.088 
(0.198) (0.204) (0.633) (0.333) (0.129) (0.075) (0.065) 
CITY 
0.080 0.077 0.136 0.115 -0.108 -0.075 0.010 
(0.104) (0.055) (0.162) (0.130) (0.103) (0.056) (0.054) 
STTRADED 
-0.003 0.000 0.008 0.007 0.006 0.000 0.002 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.015) (0.009) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001) 
CR 
0.007 0.001 -0.024 0.019 0.013 0.009 0.005 
(0.011) (0.015) (0.049) (0.026) (0.015) (0.011) (0.007) 
PRVTCRE 
0.002 -0.001 -0.015 -0.012 -0.002 0.004 0.006*   
(0.004) (0.006) (0.026) (0.014) (0.008) (0.006) (0.003) 
TIME 
0.148*** 0.119* 0.220* 0.135* 0.049 -0.046 0.106*** 
(0.041) (0.053) (0.099) (0.053) (0.090) (0.079) (0.028) 
SIZE 
-0.027** -0.028*** 0.004 0.004 0.005* 0.004* 0.002 
(0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.007) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
AGE 
-0.020 -0.049*** -0.025 -0.022 -0.004 0.000 -0.007 
(0.011) (0.012) (0.029) (0.015) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
OVERDUE 
0.677* 1.024*** -1.201** 0.833* 0.671** 0.136 0.495**  
(0.325) (0.210) (0.451) (0.385) (0.249) (0.285) (0.172) 
MACRO 
0.053 0.069 -0.282 0.047 0.093 -0.089 0.023 
(0.108) (0.109) (0.221) (0.163) (0.099) (0.051) (0.050) 
Pseudo R2 0.148 0.222 0.270 0.169 0.141 0.174 0.195 
N 2996 3791 2996 3790 2996 3790 2976 
Notes: This table reports GLM estimates for the percentages of fixed assets/working capital 
financed by informal credit. All regressions include industry fixed effects. Robust standard errors 
(clustered by country) are in parentheses. The * indicates statistical significance at 5%, ** at 1%, 
and *** at 0.1%. N is the number of observations. 
 
Because many low-income and lower middle-income countries57 lack country-
level variables, we chose to report the regression results from middle-income 
countries in Table 3.7. The results in Tables 3.6 and 3.7 do not show a significant 
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57 Albania, Belarus, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Serbia, and Azerbaijan are the countries that 
lack country-level data. 
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change compared with Table 3.5; we only loose a small degree of statistical 
significance, especially for the country-level financial development variables for 
high-income countries. We observe that financial distress, as measured by utility 
arrears (OVERDUE), becomes more important in high-income countries compared 
with middle-income countries, whereas financial development variables gain 
importance in middle-income countries in terms of statistical significance.  
Table 3.7 Determinants of informal credit use of SMEs: middle-income countries 
Variable 
Family friends Moneylender Trade Credit Tot inf. credit 
IC1_FA IC1_WC IC2_FA IC2_WC IC3_FA IC3_WC ICP 
FINCONST 
0.260** 0.214*** 0.216 0.294 -0.087 0.059 0.185*** 
(0.080) (0.063) (0.174) (0.182) (0.098) (0.065) (0.045) 
FEMALE 
0.104 -0.028 -0.527 -0.773 0.558*** 0.071 0.106 
(0.178) (0.140) (0.496) (0.447) (0.136) (0.153) (0.120) 
CITY 
0.115 0.021 0.173 0.103 0.145** 0.058 0.100 
(0.095) (0.106) (0.118) (0.140) (0.047) (0.080) (0.056) 
STTRADED 
-0.024** 0.002 0.013 0.026** 0.002 -0.015 -0.010 
(0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.007) 
CR 
0.023** 0.001 -0.013** 0.000 -0.008 -0.011 0.004 
(0.008) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.009) (0.005) 
PRVTCRE 
0.000 -0.002 0.012 0.024** 0.027** 0.041*** 0.016 
(0.017) (0.017) (0.020) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.013) 
TIME 
-0.018 0.197 -0.397 -0.188 0.640*** 0.163 0.081 
(0.123) (0.164) (0.250) (0.178) (0.182) (0.229) (0.100) 
SIZE 
-0.017** -0.011*** -0.003 0.003 0.001 0.003 -0.003 
(0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) 
AGE 
-0.004 -0.012*** -0.015 -0.059* -0.018 0.005 -0.005 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.014) (0.028) (0.025) (0.009) (0.006) 
OVERDUE 
-0.251 0.009 -1.150 0.536 -1.301 0.014 0.008 
(0.714) (0.515) (1.062) (0.417) (0.897) (0.391) (0.358) 
MACRO 
0.023 -0.014 0.078 0.087 0.256 0.044 0.046 
(0.100) (0.111) (0.127) (0.106) (0.143) (0.059) (0.065) 
Pseudo R2 0.191 0.130 0.107 0.153 0.147 0.223 0.154 
N 2467 3401 2467 3401 2467 3401 2460 
Notes: This table reports GLM estimates for the percentages of fixed assets/working capital 
financed by informal credit. All regressions include industry fixed effects. Robust standard errors 
(clustered by country) are in parentheses. The * indicates statistical significance at 5%, ** at 
1%, and *** at 0.1%. N is the number of observations. 
 
3.5.3 Robustness checks 
In this section, we present estimation results from the standardised data set of 
the 2002-2009 waves of the BEEPS. In this pooled sample, data from previous 
years are standardised to fit the 2009 wave of the BEEPS and include information 
from 27 countries in Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Although 
! "#!
many questions remained the same in different years, information on the informal 
credit use is not as detailed as it was in the 2005 wave. For instance, we do not 
have any information on the percentages of working capital purchases financed by 
various sources, and we only have information on the percentages of fixed assets 
financed via trade credit and other credit sources, which include moneylenders, 
family/friends, and non-bank financial sources58. However, we use this data set 
because it is larger than the 2005 wave of the BEEPS. 
These standardised data are available in terms of the percentages of fixed asset 
investments financed via (1) internal funds or retained earnings, (2) owners’ 
contributions or newly issued equity shares, (3) private banks, (4) state-owned 
banks, (5) credit from suppliers and advances from customers, or (6) other sources 
(moneylenders, friends, relatives, and non-bank financial institutions) 59 . 
Accordingly, (5) corresponds to trade credit, and the information on the total 
informal credit use of firms, to finance their fixed asset investments, can be 
extracted from the sum of (5) and (6). Table 3.8 report the estimation results 
from this sample60. 
In Table 3.8, we present the GLM regression results. In line with the results 
from the 2005 BEEPS, as presented in Table 3.5, we find that informal credit is 
mostly used by SMEs that report access to finance as an obstacle for their 
business operations in Table 3.8. The results of the GLM models show that as the 
access to finance becomes more problematic from 1 (no obstacle), to 4 (major 
obstacle) for an SME, this SME uses credit from informal sources more 
intensively. 
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58  Moreover, we do not have information on SMEs’ perceptions on how the macroeconomic 
instabilities affect their businesses (MACRO). 
59 Interviewers are asked to ensure that the percentages of fixed assets financed by different 
financing sources sum up to 100%. 
60 The definitions and summary statistics of the variables used in this part of the study are 
presented in Tables 3.I and 3.J in the Appendix. In the 2009 wave of the BEEPS, interviewers 
were asked to report their opinions and perceptions of the responses. If the interviewer reported 
that responses to the questions were not truthful, we excluded those observations. We also 
excluded observations for which the interviewer reported: “The responses to the questions 
regarding figures are arbitrary and unreliable”. Some of the firms were surveyed in multiple years 
as a second sub-sample; we excluded these SME observations until we obtained a single firm 
surveyed in each year and our results remained similar to those in Table 3.8. 
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     Table 3.8 Estimation Results for SMEs: 2002-2009 BEEPS 
Variable 
Other 
ICP1 
Trade Credit 
ICP2 
Tot. inf. credit 
ICP3 
FINCONST 0.218*** 0.069 0.170*** 
(0.035) (0.041) (0.028) 
FEMALE 
-0.030 0.116 0.020 
(0.090) (0.113) (0.073) 
CITY 
0.278 -0.157 0.036 
(0.178) (0.138) (0.114) 
STCAPIT 
0.002 0.004** 0.004**  
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
CR 
0.012*** -0.001 0.006*** 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
LOANGDP 
0.007*** 0.004* 0.006*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
TIME 
0.000 -0.0005* 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
SIZE 
0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
AGE 
-0.005 -0.006 -0.005 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
OVERDUE 
0.813*** 0.366 0.686*** 
(0.186) (0.233) (0.152) 
Pseudo R2 0.264 0.175 0.188 
N 6824 6824 6824 
Notes: This table reports GLM estimates of the percentages of fixed asset investments financed by 
informal credit. The dependent variable “other” stays for moneylenders, friends, relatives, and 
non-bank financial institutions. All regressions include industry and year fixed effects. Robust 
standard errors are clustered at firm level and provided in parentheses. The * indicates statistical 
significance at 5%, ** at 1%, and *** at 0.1%. N is the number of observations. 
 
These results confirm that informal financial markets mostly serve the credit-
constrained SMEs. In these regressions we do not observe a statistically significant 
coefficient estimate for CITY61, which is in line with the results in Table 3.5. To 
test for the effect of financial development, three different measures are used to 
approximate the financial (non-)development level: outstanding loans from 
commercial banks as a percentage of the GDP (LOANGDP); value of listed shares 
of the GDP expressed in percentages (STCAPIT); and, as an inverse proxy for 
financial development, the asset share of the three largest banks among the 
commercial banks (CR). We find a positive and statistically significant association 
between STCAPIT and informal credit usage of SMEs in the form of trade credit 
rather than in the form of other informal credit sources. This result implies that 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
61 In this set of regressions CITY is a dummy variable which takes one if the firm is located in the 
capital or in a city with more than 1 million population, zero otherwise.  
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SMEs rely more on trade credit in countries where the stock market is more 
developed.   
Moreover, the positive and significant coefficient estimate for CR in the first 
regression provides evidence regarding the positive role of banking concentration 
(as a measure of financial non-development) on informal credit use. However CR 
does not have a statistically significant effect on the percentage of fixed assets 
financed by trade credit. This result can be linked to market power, suggesting 
that more concentrated banking environments result in reduced credit availability, 
especially for small businesses62. We also find positive and significant coefficient 
estimates for LOANGDP in all regressions, this result also confirms our regression 
results of the 2005 BEEPS for PRVTCRE where the dependent variables are 
percentage of fixed assets/working capital expenses financed by trade credit. 
Regarding TIME63, informal credit use and low quality of the legal system are 
positively but significantly related to ICP1 but negatively and significantly related 
to ICP2. In countries where the legal quality is low SMEs are more likely to use 
trade credit rather than using other forms of informal credit. The coefficient 
estimates for country level explanatory variables reveals that trade credit acts as a 
substitute to credits from moneylender and family/friends when the financial 
development level and legal quality increases. In line with previous studies and 
our findings, the coefficient estimate for AGE in the ICP3 regression is negative 
but statistically significant at only 10%. The most robust result obtained in this 
table is consistent with the results from the 2005 BEEPS; specifically, we find a 
positive association between the informal credit use of SMEs and financial 
distress, as measured by OVERDUE. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
62 As discussed in the hypotheses section, there are two different views in the literature regarding 
the role of bank concentration on firm finance: market power and information hypotheses. The 
market power hypothesis argues that concentration in the banking sector is detrimental to credit 
availability. The information hypothesis, in contrast, argues that firms build better relationships in 
concentrated banking environments, which results in higher credit availability (Carbo-Valverde et 
al. 2009). 
63 In this set of regressions TIME is the average number of days counted from the moment the 
plaintiff decides to file the lawsuit in court until payment. This country level data come from the 
World Bank.  
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3.6 Conclusion 
SMEs have many obstacles to overcome to be eligible for formal credit. These 
firms often lack the necessary collateral and hard information on their business. 
Even if they have the necessary collateral and hard information, these firms may 
opt to use less expensive funds from family/friends due to their stronger social 
ties. Our sample of SMEs from the 2005 BEEPS indicates that 27% of the SMEs 
(including SMEs in Vietnam and advanced economies in addition to SMEs in 
CEE and CIS countries) used informal credit to finance part of their fixed asset 
investments and/or working capital purchases, while 24% of the SMEs from CEE 
and CIS countries in our sample from the 2002-2009 BEEPS used informal sources 
to finance part of their fixed asset investments. As we consider the share of 
informal credit within the total borrowing we see that the informal loans account 
nearly for the 40% of the total loans that are used to finance working capital 
expenses, while 23% of the total loans that are used to finance fixed asset 
purchases are informal loans. 
In our paper, we examine the determinants of a broader spectrum of informal 
credit sources that include moneylenders, family/friends, and trade credit. We 
examine both the country and firm-level factors of this choice, such as the formal 
financial development of the countries or the firm size, owners’ gender, and 
location of the firms. We address these issues using BEEPS, which is a joint 
project of the EBRD and the World Bank. This data set is relatively large, 
especially compared with the data sets used in most of the previous studies on 
informal finance; thus, it enables us to analyse a diverse set of SMEs in a large 
number of countries. Using different types of informal credit as dependent 
variables, we are able to distinguish between the determinants of different 
informal credit types. We observe that determinants of borrowing from 
family/friends and from moneylenders are similar, whereas determinants of trade 
credit show a more varied pattern. 
In line with the previous literature, empirical results of this paper address 
informal credit as an important source of credit for SMEs. We observe higher 
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percentages of working capital financed by informal sources compared with the 
percentage of fixed assets financed via informal sources. This result is consistent 
with the characteristics of informal credit, which primarily includes small and 
short-term loans. We find that credit-constrained SMEs rely more on informal 
credit of any type. 
We find some evidence suggesting that SMEs with female owners use less 
informal credit from moneylenders. An explanation for this result is the different 
risk preferences of female entrepreneurs (i.e., female firm owners are more risk 
averse than males). Another explanation is that female entrepreneurs are 
addressed as better borrowers with lower default rates in the previous literature. 
This situation may affect women’s ability to easily access formal finance. 
Additionally, female entrepreneurs must be more competent compared with their 
rivals to conduct business and survive in what has traditionally been a man’s 
domain. On the other hand female entrepreneurs use more trade credit as 
compared to their male counterparts.  
Our regression results mostly indicate a positive relationship between the legal 
non quality and informal credit use, which suggests that informal credit usage in 
the form of borrowing from family friends and moneylenders is higher in countries 
where legal procedures take longer. On the other hand the length of legal 
procedures are found to decrease trade credit use of SMEs.  
In countries with more developed financial markets, firms have many options 
for financing their projects; thus, they are less likely to use informal credit in the 
form of family/friends and moneylenders. We find some evidence supporting this 
hypothesis, i.e., concentrated banking systems lead SMEs to use these forms of 
informal credit more intensively. This result can be linked to market power, 
suggesting that more concentrated banking environments result in reduced credit 
availability, especially for small businesses. The overall results of this study 
indicate financing obstacles as the cause of informal credit use and indicate that 
informal creditors meet the financing requirements of SMEs in less-developed 
countries. Moreover financially distressed SMEs (as approximated by utility 
! "#"!
arrears) use informal credit in any form more intensively. Accordingly, informal 
credit plays an important role in alleviating problems of firms regarding credit 
constraints. 
There are several directions for future researches. First, informal credit use has 
potential effects on a firm’s performance and growth, especially for start-up firms. 
Therefore, how to encourage the use of informal finance to establish new 
businesses can be an interesting research question. Another interesting topic of 
future research is the interaction between the expansion of new banking 
technologies (e.g., internet banking) and the informal credit choice of firms, 
especially in smaller cities. Because there is no registration of the transactions in 
informal financial markets, finding accurate data is the biggest obstacle for future 
research. The BEEPS provide relevant data with which to test the effects of 
informal credit use on firms’ performance and growth. However, there is no firm-
specific data on the use of new banking technologies by sample firms. Using 
country-specific data on Internet banking usage to approximate advances in 
banking technologies can be a potential solution to these data problems. 
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3.8 Appendix 
 
Table 3.A Informal creditors 
Financial Institutions 
Commercial Banks Apex Organizations Unregulated MFIs Self Help Groups 
State Banks Rural Banks NGOs Farmers’ Organizations  
Postal Banks Cooperative Banks Savings and Credit 
Ass. 
Women’s Associations  
Insurance Companies Microfinance Banks Village banks Indigenous Savings 
Clubs 
Leasing Companies Credit Unions  Moneylenders Deposit Collectors 
Money Transfer Firms Regulated MFIs  ROSCAs Loan sharks 
!More formal Less formal" 
 Source: Pagura and Kirsten (2006) 
 
 
 
Table 3.B Share of informal credit types in total external finance 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
IC1EX_FA 3477 11.60 29.35 0 100 
IC2EX_FA 3477 2.90 14.90 0 100 
IC3EX_FA 3477 8.62 24.41 0 100 
IC1EX_WC 5669 12.49 29.62 0 100 
IC2EX_WC 5669 3.17 15.07 0 100 
IC3EX_WC 5669 24.03 37.40 0 100 
Notes: IC1EX_FA is the share loans that are borrowed from family/friends 
that are used to finance the fixed asset purchases. IC2EX_FA is the share 
loans that are borrowed from moneylenders that are used to finance the fixed 
asset purchases. IC1EX_FA is the share loans that are borrowed as trade 
credit that are used to finance the fixed asset purchases. IC1EX_WC is the 
share loans that are borrowed from family/friends that are used to finance 
the working capital expenses. IC2EX_WC is the share loans that are 
borrowed from moneylenders that are used to finance the working capital 
expenses. IC1EX_WC is the share loans that are borrowed as trade credit 
that are used to finance the working capital expenses.  
 
 
Table 3.C Summary statistics of informal credit use of SMEs across countries  
 
  
 
icp icd ic_wc ic1_wc ic2_wc ic3_wc ic_fa ic1_fa ic2_fa ic3_fa 
C
IS
 C
O
U
N
T
R
IE
S
 
Belarus Mean  9.52 0.26 9.17 3.47 0.64 5.06 10.89 6.29 1.37 3.23 
Std. Dev. 22.42 0.44 23.58 15.31 4.91 17.66 27.11 21.47 7.77 16.02 
N 183 183 275 275 275 275 186 186 186 186 
Georgia Mean  4.03 0.11 4.71 2.52 0.48 1.71 4.35 1.61 1.21 1.53 
Std. Dev. 14.87 0.32 17.75 11.93 3.69 8.99 16.16 6.32 5.63 8.66 
N 62 62 184 184 184 184 62 62 62 62 
Tajikistan Mean  8.64 0.29 7.09 2.12 1.18 3.79 8.21 5.00 1.47 1.74 
Std. Dev. 19.49 0.46 19.94 9.68 8.01 14.70 22.20 18.07 6.48 11.64 
N 92 92 178 178 178 178 92 92 92 92 
Ukraine Mean  9.17 0.28 10.08 2.86 0.98 6.23 8.01 4.41 0.80 2.80 
Std. Dev. 19.94 0.45 23.14 12.46 7.49 18.36 22.41 17.04 6.93 12.63 
N 380 380 523 523 523 523 380 380 380 380 
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Table 3.C is continued.  
Uzbekistan Mean  1.02 0.06 1.04 0.15 0.37 0.52 0.16 0.00 0.16 0.00 
Std. Dev. 4.48 0.24 6.54 1.92 3.93 4.93 1.14 0.00 1.14 0.00 
N 96 96 270 270 270 270 96 96 96 96 
Russia Mean  7.44 0.26 10.85 2.86 0.92 7.07 4.87 1.33 1.09 2.45 
Std. Dev. 16.71 0.44 22.88 11.58 6.17 18.62 17.69 9.05 8.95 12.16 
N 373 373 526 526 526 526 373 373 373 373 
Kazakhstan Mean  4.88 0.22 6.31 1.64 0.79 3.88 3.23 1.86 0.45 0.91 
Std. Dev. 12.51 0.41 17.87 7.52 5.78 15.08 13.28 10.25 3.37 8.00 
N 274 274 528 528 528 528 274 274 274 274 
Azerbaijan Mean  4.80 0.11 5.97 2.70 1.57 1.70 4.48 2.22 1.04 1.22 
Std. Dev. 16.78 0.32 19.01 13.23 10.04 9.26 16.71 13.03 6.19 8.43 
N 270 270 300 300 300 300 270 270 270 270 
Armenia Mean  9.62 0.32 8.37 7.42 0.58 0.37 9.94 8.79 0.98 0.17 
Std. Dev. 19.96 0.47 19.69 19.14 3.58 2.71 21.11 20.61 5.95 2.13 
N 286 286 328 328 328 328 286 286 286 286 
Kyrgyz  
Republic 
Mean  7.62 0.27 9.63 3.06 1.57 5.00 4.60 2.44 1.84 0.32 
Std. Dev. 17.27 0.44 21.12 9.54 9.97 15.61 15.98 10.03 12.14 2.52 
N 123 123 175 175 175 175 125 125 125 125 
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Bulgaria Mean  8.47 0.32 15.32 9.32 0.92 5.08 6.28 3.86 1.01 1.40 
Std. Dev. 17.31 0.47 29.56 25.10 5.73 15.97 18.44 14.58 7.01 8.50 
N 207 207 266 266 266 266 207 207 207 207 
Albania Mean  3.82 0.17 4.24 1.20 0.61 2.44 3.09 1.70 0.00 1.40 
Std. Dev. 11.35 0.37 13.60 6.26 4.87 10.73 13.95 10.70 0.00 9.09 
N 161 161 189 189 189 189 161 161 161 161 
Croatia Mean  4.04 0.23 8.24 2.03 0.96 5.24 3.01 1.06 0.35 1.60 
Std. Dev. 10.10 0.42 19.81 8.02 4.62 15.78 10.67 5.94 3.47 8.31 
N 137 137 193 193 193 193 141 141 141 141 
Turkey Mean  6.37 0.19 8.06 5.30 1.28 1.48 5.41 3.59 0.54 1.28 
Std. Dev. 16.67 0.40 21.43 16.53 8.57 8.70 16.50 12.69 3.20 8.73 
N 305 305 493 493 493 493 306 306 306 306 
Poland Mean  5.61 0.23 7.08 2.61 0.53 3.95 4.45 2.39 0.78 1.28 
Std. Dev. 14.90 0.42 18.26 11.81 4.28 12.86 15.48 11.50 6.73 7.82 
N 749 749 900 900 900 900 750 750 750 750 
Romania Mean  9.68 0.27 11.78 4.48 0.23 7.08 7.50 3.82 0.07 3.61 
Std. Dev. 22.40 0.45 26.33 16.46 2.44 19.93 22.24 16.08 1.05 14.86 
N 452 452 533 533 533 533 453 453 453 453 
Serbia Mean  5.29 0.15 10.31 4.28 0.53 5.49 4.44 2.32 0.65 1.47 
Std. Dev. 17.32 0.36 24.86 15.40 4.98 18.39 18.67 12.00 5.69 10.41 
N 190 190 253 253 253 253 191 191 191 191 
Moldova Mean  8.58 0.24 12.95 4.32 1.47 7.16 6.94 3.25 1.08 2.61 
Std. Dev. 20.15 0.43 26.23 15.47 7.27 19.61 19.61 13.01 6.29 10.01 
N 208 208 306 306 306 306 209 209 209 209 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
Mean  3.58 0.16 6.38 2.92 0.00 3.45 3.61 2.33 0.00 1.28 
Std. Dev. 11.34 0.37 18.76 13.41 0.00 12.46 13.72 11.90 0.00 7.25 
N 88 88 168 168 168 168 90 90 90 90 
FYR 
Macedonia 
Mean  12.53 0.20 12.22 5.88 1.14 5.20 11.30 8.00 1.00 2.30 
Std. Dev. 29.16 0.40 29.18 18.71 7.00 18.82 30.34 24.33 7.04 11.62 
N 99 99 176 176 176 176 100 100 100 100 
Estonia Mean  12.59 0.37 17.90 2.43 1.74 13.74 8.19 2.86 1.07 4.26 
Std. Dev. 23.20 0.49 30.81 11.71 11.02 26.80 22.56 11.76 8.93 16.26 
N 129 129 175 175 175 175 140 140 140 140 
Hungary Mean  4.95 0.22 7.78 2.16 0.43 5.19 2.65 1.12 0.33 1.19 
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Source: 2005 BEEPS 
 
Table 3.D Summary statistics of the independent variables across countries 
Table 3.C is continued. 
 Std. Dev. 12.50 0.42 19.41 9.15 3.48 16.25 12.02 7.39 3.27 8.47 
 N 425 425 555 555 555 555 427 427 427 427 
Latvia Mean  18.19 0.56 22.39 5.37 0.99 16.02 11.81 6.87 0.00 4.94 
Std. Dev. 26.89 0.50 31.37 17.88 7.40 26.65 29.10 23.33 0.00 17.75 
N 104 104 168 168 168 168 107 107 107 107 
Lithuania Mean  9.76 0.34 15.63 2.04 1.41 12.18 6.19 2.10 0.87 3.23 
Std. Dev. 19.81 0.48 28.98 10.05 7.93 25.49 21.40 11.49 6.30 16.63 
N 154 154 182 182 182 182 155 155 155 155 
 
A
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V
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Czech 
Republic 
Mean  10.80 0.29 12.34 5.01 1.47 5.87 10.19 3.77 1.92 4.50 
Std. Dev. 24.62 0.46 27.44 17.43 10.94 19.46 26.43 15.08 11.86 18.33 
N 259 259 300 300 300 300 260 260 260 260 
Slovak 
Republic 
Mean  4.10 0.22 6.04 2.00 1.88 2.16 3.71 1.25 1.71 0.75 
Std. Dev. 11.63 0.42 16.64 10.88 9.63 8.53 14.70 8.94 10.79 5.05 
N 140 140 185 185 185 185 140 140 140 140 
Slovenia Mean  2.78 0.12 4.08 0.67 0.10 3.31 1.74 1.74 0.00 0.00 
Std. Dev. 9.19 0.33 14.17 4.88 1.43 12.95 12.39 12.39 0.00 0.00 
N 132 132 195 195 195 195 132 132 132 132 
Greece Mean  6.68 0.18 13.32 0.48 0.35 12.50 5.29 0.42 0.00 4.87 
Std. Dev. 19.06 0.39 29.86 3.01 4.20 29.34 18.31 3.54 0.00 17.93 
N 307 307 492 492 492 492 307 307 307 307 
Germany Mean  8.69 0.41 11.98 1.01 0.04 10.94 5.28 0.89 0.00 4.39 
Std. Dev. 15.28 0.49 21.14 6.20 0.75 20.14 14.96 5.30 0.00 14.17 
N 1058 1058 1070 1070 1070 1070 1059 1059 1059 1059 
Spain Mean  9.88 0.35 14.84 1.23 0.59 13.01 4.87 0.91 0.20 3.77 
Std. Dev. 18.18 0.48 27.08 7.85 5.66 25.86 17.43 7.29 3.04 15.55 
N 546 546 546 550 546 546 550 550 550 550 
Portugal Mean  6.03 0.20 7.38 2.04 0.07 5.26 3.23 2.48 0.00 0.75 
Std. Dev. 17.72 0.40 20.61 12.83 1.11 16.72 15.68 14.66 0.00 5.87 
N 158 158 405 405 405 405 161 161 161 161 
Ireland Mean  6.27 0.27 10.69 1.30 0.53 8.86 1.81 0.93 0.21 0.67 
Std. Dev. 15.15 0.44 23.54 8.93 6.71 21.18 12.09 9.29 4.63 6.35 
N 456 456 456 456 456 456 466 466 466 466 
South Korea Mean  2.73 0.12 2.69 1.96 0.33 0.40 2.95 2.43 0.45 0.07 
Std. Dev. 9.62 0.33 10.21 8.31 3.54 3.79 13.78 11.93 3.85 0.86 
N 133 133 534 534 534 534 134 134 134 134 
 
  
 
size age female city overdue macro sttraded cr prvtcre time 
C
IS
 C
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N
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Belarus Mean  35.09 11.27 0.24 2.78 0.05 2.25 . 78.08 . 5.80 
Std. Dev. 48.98 8.73 0.43 1.07 0.23 1.09 . 0.00 . 0.00 
N 294 294 232 294 291 287 0 294 0 294 
Georgia Mean  33.40 18.95 0.37 2.83 0.03 2.65 0.59 74.99 11.31 3.30 
Std. Dev. 48.58 23.39 0.49 1.23 0.16 1.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
N 186 186 145 186 186 182 186 186 186 186 
Tajikistan Mean  49.58 11.60 0.22 2.46 0.13 2.07 . . . 1.70 
Std. Dev. 59.28 11.61 0.42 1.18 0.33 0.99 . . . 0.00 
N 182 182 157 182 181 178 0 0 0 182 
Ukraine Mean  35.33 13.43 0.35 2.81 0.02 2.80 0.77 41.50 . 2.90 
Std. Dev. 51.91 15.15 0.48 1.09 0.13 1.11 0.00 0.00 . 0.00 
N 542 541 401 542 541 538 542 542 0.0 542 
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Table 3.D is continued 
Uzbekistan Mean  34.72 12.40 0.17 2.38 0.03 2.08 0.27 80.42 . 4.00 
Std. Dev. 52.69 12.33 0.38 1.21 0.16 1.03 0.00 0.00 . 0.00 
N 273 273 192 273 273 247 273 273 0 273 
Russia Mean  43.58 11.23 0.29 3.12 0.03 2.59 20.84 18.48 22.65 2.00 
Std. Dev. 59.43 12.52 0.45 1.13 0.17 1.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
N 535 535 414 535 530 518 535 535 535 535 
Kazakhstan Mean  37.49 9.87 0.37 2.84 0.02 2.01 1.89 65.79 27.59 1.50 
Std. Dev. 50.12 9.55 0.48 1.06 0.13 1.00 0.00 0.00 0 0.00 
N 536 536 411 536 536 523 536 536 536 536 
Azerbaijan Mean  42.40 9.59 0.15 3.46 0.01 1.52 . 68.42 . 2.70 
Std. Dev. 55.07 8.01 0.36 0.94 0.10 0.80 . 0.00 . 0.00 
N 316 315 214 316 275 264 0 316 0 316 
Armenia Mean  30.54 14.17 0.13 3.01 0.02 2.84 0.02 68.55 6.91 1.90 
Std. Dev. 45.89 15.03 0.33 1.29 0.13 1.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
N 334 334 300 334 334 329 334 334 334 334 
Kyrgyz  
Republic 
Mean  45.34 17.49 0.27 2.32 0.04 2.61 0.53 80.27 7.24 4.00 
Std. Dev. 56.48 18.04 0.45 1.19 0.21 1.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
N 181 181 139 181 181 177 181 181 181 181 
Total Mean  38.29 12.38 0.27 2.86 0.03 2.38 4.97 58.04 18.41 2.78 
Std. Dev. 53.14 13.56 0.44 1.17 0.17 1.12 8.13 21.56 8.59 1.23 
N 3379 3377 2605 3379 3328 3243 2587 3197 1772 3379 
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Bulgaria Mean  30.63 15.32 0.37 2.25 0.01 2.28 5.11 40.37 37.82 3.30 
Std. Dev. 50.68 15.45 0.48 1.18 0.12 1.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
N 272 272 204 272 272 267 272 272 272 272 
Albania Mean  30.19 10.75 0.14 2.53 0.02 2.76 . 78.30 11.80 2.00 
Std. Dev. 35.16 8.71 0.35 1.20 0.14 1.03 . 0.00 0.00 0.00 
N 189 189 165 189 189 185 0 189 189 189 
Croatia Mean  35.70 17.57 0.20 2.16 0.08 2.42 2.05 64.09 56.26 3.10 
Std. Dev. 50.31 15.79 0.40 1.23 0.27 1.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
N 203 203 136 203 202 202 203 203 203 203 
Turkey Mean  28.49 15.66 0.09 3.07 0.00 2.72 41.58 96.23 18.38 3.30 
Std. Dev. 40.64 16.70 0.29 1.18 0.00 1.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
N 505 505 440 505 492 496 505 505 505 505 
Poland Mean  28.96 16.43 0.34 2.42 0.02 2.90 9.86 55.52 27.73 3.00 
Std. Dev. 48.02 14.65 0.47 1.00 0.12 1.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
N 913 912 752 913 912 899 913 913 913 913 
Romania Mean  43.69 13.31 0.28 2.42 0.02 2.89 3.44 65.36 16.57 4.60 
Std. Dev. 56.77 14.08 0.45 1.04 0.15 1.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
N 544 544 384 544 543 532 544 544 544 544 
Serbia Mean  38.38 17.35 0.27 2.92 0.09 3.31 . . . 2.70 
Std. Dev. 58.03 18.65 0.44 1.17 0.28 0.96 . . . 0.00 
N 261 261 196 261 256 258 0 0 0 261 
Moldova Mean  41.39 11.70 0.27 2.62 0.02 3.04 0.57 51.11 20.75 2.80 
Std. Dev. 53.72 10.42 0.45 1.38 0.15 0.89 0.00 0.00 0 0.00 
N 317 317 233 317 312 308 317 317 317 317 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
Mean  41.85 15.40 0.26 2.51 0.04 2.56 . 50.12 . 3.30 
Std. Dev. 55.75 17.01 0.44 1.13 0.21 1.18 . 0.00 . 0.00 
N 182 182 138 182 178 169 0 182 0 182 
FYR Macedonia Mean  29.21 16.31 0.17 3.03 0.06 2.22 1.67 75.62 22.56 2.00 
Std. Dev. 49.37 17.22 0.38 1.22 0.23 1.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
N 182 182 145 182 179 156 182 182 182 182 
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Table 3.D is continued 
Estonia Mean  30.04 12.32 0.35 2.71 0.01 1.62 17.79 98.33 61.85 3.00 
Std. Dev. 43.37 10.24 0.48 1.33 0.10 0.83 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
N 198 198 132 198 195 187 198 198 198 198 
Hungary Mean  31.64 13.72 0.41 2.49 0.02 2.57 21.64 61.85 47.50 2.00 
Std. Dev. 44.37 14.09 0.49 1.19 0.14 1.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
N 563 563 459 563 561 554 563 563 563 563 
Latvia Mean  30.59 13.39 0.44 2.75 0.04 2.58 0.60 57.07 54.94 3.00 
Std. Dev. 52.47 16.60 0.50 1.41 0.21 1.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
N 187 187 143 187 183 184 187 187 187 187 
Lithuania Mean  40.53 14.83 0.25 2.42 0.01 2.18 2.88 78.26 32.81 1.70 
Std. Dev. 57.22 13.74 0.43 1.23 0.10 1.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
N 187 187 141 187 185 180 187 187 187 187 
Total  Mean  33.81 14.75 0.28 2.57 0.03 2.68 12.41 65.81 31.37 2.97 
Std. Dev. 49.81 14.86 0.45 1.20 0.16 1.12 12.91 16.18 14.62 0.77 
N 4703 4702 3668 4703 4659 4577 4071 4442 4260 4703 
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Czech Republic Mean  28.70 11.61 0.22 2.08 0.12 2.60 16.13 53.95 29.95 9.20 
Std. Dev. 48.84 8.95 0.42 1.21 0.32 0.98 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
N 317 313 254 317 311 311 317 317 317 317 
Slovak Republic Mean  32.94 13.90 0.18 2.64 0.02 1.96 0.15 71.93 31.36 4.80 
Std. Dev. 49.14 14.73 0.39 1.18 0.12 1.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
N 197 198 139 198 196 194 198 198 198 198 
Slovenia Mean  28.84 20.66 0.35 1.93 0.08 2.02 2.24 56.49 52.96 2.00 
Std. Dev. 45.53 19.21 0.48 1.21 0.28 0.89 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
N 195 195 136 195 193 193 195 195 195 195 
Greece Mean  16.51 16.95 0.24 2.62 0.00 2.07 23.00 68.76 71.49 2.00 
Std. Dev. 31.65 12.63 0.43 1.22 0.04 1.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
N 499 499 442 499 497 488 499 499 499 499 
Germany Mean  21.19 18.70 0.21 1.76 0.01 1.97 63.26 69.34 110.9 2.00 
Std. Dev. 33.96 14.23 0.41 1.03 0.10 1.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
N 1077 1077 851 1077 1073 1065 1077 1077 1077 1077 
Spain Mean  30.29 18.01 0.35 2.28 0.01 2.09 138.29 66.15 130.07 1.50 
Std. Dev. 49.81 17.19 0.48 1.18 0.12 1.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
N 553 552 492 553 544 544 553 553 553 553 
Portugal Mean  25.48 18.34 0.51 1.81 0.02 2.76 22.48 91.45 140.33 2.00 
Std. Dev. 47.54 19.26 0.50 1.12 0.14 1.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
N 454 454 319 454 447 423 454 454 454 454 
Ireland Mean  27.03 23.17 0.42 2.16 0.04 1.75 32.28 55.36 142.1 0.40 
Std. Dev. 45.46 24.57 0.49 1.34 0.20 0.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
N 467 465 406 467 463 462 467 467 467 467 
South Korea Mean  25.64 11.50 0.19 3.16 0.02 2.71 152.00 45.29 89.35 1.50 
Std. Dev. 46.54 8.27 0.39 1.01 0.14 1.29 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
N 537 537 318 537 535 522 537 537 537 537 
Total  Mean  24.90 17.30 0.29 2.22 0.03 2.19 62.50 65.08 100.34 2.36 
Std. Dev. 43.09 16.27 0.45 1.23 0.16 1.15 51.90 12.39 36.04 2.10 
N 4296 4290 3357 4297 4259 4202 4297 4297 4297 4297 
Vietnam  Mean  39.32 8.67 0.28 2.53 0.00 2.15 0.17 74.45 58 5.00 
Std. Dev. 46.62 6.03 0.45 1.36 0.07 0.98 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
N 455 455 332 455 454 440 455 455 455 455 
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Table 3.E Summary statistics of informal credit use of large firms by country 
groups 
  
icp icd ic_wc ic1_wc ic2_wc ic3_wc ic_fa ic1_fa ic2_fa ic3_fa 
CIS Mean  4.08 0.27 5.26 0.21 0.41 4.64 2.66 0.33 0.54 1.79 
 
Std. Dev. 11.72 0.45 15.46 1.35 3.00 15.09 11.85 3.13 3.43 10.96 
 
N 92 92 121 121 121 121 92 92 92 92 
           CEE Mean  5.77 0.20 6.35 0.43 0.88 5.04 5.25 0.50 0.87 3.88 
 
Std. Dev. 15.50 0.40 17.37 3.10 6.45 15.17 16.72 4.58 6.36 13.91 
 
N 161 161 185 185 185 185 161 161 161 161 
           Advanced 
 
Mean  5.65 0.27 8.72 0.61 0.34 7.77 3.16 0.19 0.27 2.70 
Std. Dev. 13.30 0.44 20.49 6.72 3.14 19.29 12.33 2.02 3.70 11.67 
N 362 362 477 477 477 477 364 364 364 364 
            Vietnam Mean  5.11 0.42 7.67 0.11 1.11 6.44 2.56 0.00 1.11 1.44 
 
Std. Dev. 7.25 0.50 12.82 0.75 4.87 11.76 7.12 0.00 4.87 5.07 
 
N 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 
    Total Mean  6.10 0.29 8.89 0.48 0.29 8.12 3.10 0.30 0.27 2.53 
 
Std. Dev. 13.79 0.45 20.32 5.30 3.21 19.45 12.39 3.84 3.40 11.15 
 
N 1086 1086 1327 1329 1327 1327 1092 1092 1092 1092 
Source: 2005 BEEPS  
 
 
Table 3.F Summary statistics of informal credit use of large firms by country 
groups 
  
icp icd ic_wc ic1_wc ic2_wc ic3_wc ic_fa ic1_fa ic2_fa ic3_fa 
Low income Mean  3.75 0.18 4.85 0.34 0.35 4.16 2.92 0.32 0.51 2.09 
 
Std. Dev. 11.32 0.38 15.30 2.46 3.77 14.65 11.79 3.55 4.86 10.15 
 
N 277 277 358 358 358 358 277 277 277 277 
           Lower Middle 
income 
Mean  7.37 0.31 11.08 0.67 0.42 9.99 3.85 0.24 0.26 3.35 
Std. Dev. 15.73 0.46 22.96 7.08 3.93 21.60 14.83 2.45 3.62 13.83 
N 379 379 476 476 476 476 381 381 381 381 
            Upper Middle 
Income 
 
Mean  6.75 0.33 10.02 0.43 0.02 9.57 2.58 0.38 0.00 2.20 
Std. Dev. 13.85 0.47 21.11 5.04 0.48 20.66 10.58 5.19 0.00 9.29 
N 380 380 443 445 443 443 384 384 384 384 
            High Income Mean  4.60 0.38 6.90 0.10 1.00 5.80 2.30 0.00 1.00 1.30 
 
Std. Dev. 7.04 0.49 12.37 0.71 4.63 11.31 6.79 0.00 4.63 4.82 
 
N 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 
    Total Mean  6.10 0.29 8.89 0.48 0.29 8.12 3.10 0.30 0.27 2.53 
 
Std. Dev. 13.79 0.45 20.32 5.30 3.21 19.45 12.39 3.84 3.40 11.15 
 
N 1086 1086 1327 1329 1327 1327 1092 1092 1092 1092 
Source: 2005 BEEPS  
 
 
Table 3.G Pairwise Correlations 
 
icp ic_wc ic_fa ic1_wc ic1_fa ic2_wc ic2_fa ic3_wc ic3_fa 
ic_wc 0.9 1 
       ic_fa 0.85 0.54 1 
      ic1_wc 0.56 0.53 0.48 1 
     ic1_fa 0.57 0.35 0.69 0.68 1 
    ic2_wc 0.27 0.27 0.21 0.04 0.03 1 
   ic2_fa 0.28 0.18 0.33 0.04 0.03 0.62 1 
  ic3_wc 0.58 0.7 0.23 -0.02 -0.02 0 0 1 
 
! """!
Table 3.G continued. 
 icp ic_wc ic_fa ic1_wc ic1_fa ic2_wc ic2_fa ic3_wc ic3_fa 
ic3_fa 0.5 0.32 0.59 0 0 0 0.01 0.4 1 
access 0.11 0.08 0.1 0.09 0.09 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
female 0.01 0 0.01 0 0.01 -0.03 -0.02 0.01 0.02 
city -0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0 0.02 -0.04 -0.02 
sttraded 0.01 0 -0.03 -0.05 -0.06 -0.03 -0.04 0.05 0.06 
cr 0.01 0 0 -0.01 0.01 0 -0.02 0.02 0.01 
prvtcre 0.02 0.04 -0.05 -0.08 -0.08 -0.04 -0.05 0.13 0.06 
time 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.05 -0.04 0 
size -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.05 -0.04 -0.01 0 0.01 0 
age -0.03 -0.01 -0.05 -0.07 -0.06 -0.03 -0.03 0.04 -0.01 
overdue 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0 0.01 0.01 
macro 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.03 0 0.03 
 
 
Table 3.G continued. 
 access female city sttraded cr prvtcre time size age overdue 
female -0.01 1 
        city -0.01 -0.04 1 
       sttraded -0.07 -0.03 0 1 
      cr -0.01 -0.05 -0.07 -0.06 1 
     prvtcre -0.1 0.07 -0.19 0.6 0.13 1 
    time 0.09 -0.05 -0.01 -0.36 0.11 -0.43 1 
   size -0.05 -0.04 0.06 0 -0.01 0 0.02 1 
  age -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 0.03 0.03 0.12 -0.07 0.24 1 
 overdue 0.06 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 0.05 0.01 0.05 1 
macro 0.3 0 0.04 -0.05 -0.08 -0.17 0.07 0 0 0.02 
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Table 3.H Estimation results for sole proprietorship firms  
Variable Family friends Moneylender Trade Credit 
Tot inf. 
Credit 
IC1_FA IC1_WC IC2_FA IC2_WC IC3_FA IC3_WC ICP 
FINCONST 
0.243* 0.226** 0.154 0.215 0.081 0.087 0.170*** 
(0.099) (0.087) (0.176) (0.156) (0.170) (0.066) (0.051) 
FEMALE 
0.033 -0.015 -1.354* -1.275** 0.183 -0.148 -0.069 
(0.188) (0.159) (0.540) (0.479) (0.159) (0.109) (0.097) 
CITY 
0.052 0.041 0.093 0.114 0.060 -0.091 0.015 
(0.080) (0.094) (0.158) (0.106) (0.099) (0.048) (0.049) 
STTRADED 
-0.003 0.000 0.016** 0.003 -0.002 -0.007 0.000 
(0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) 
CR 
0.019** 0.002 -0.017*** -0.008 -0.003 -0.006 0.008**  
(0.007) (0.010) (0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.009) (0.003) 
PRVTCRE 
-0.009 -0.009 -0.033*** -0.016* 0.010 0.0125* 0.000 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005) (0.002) 
TIME 
0.066 0.088* 0.170*** 0.098 0.156** -0.013 0.069*** 
(0.037) (0.038) (0.035) (0.060) (0.048) (0.064) (0.013) 
SIZE 
-0.016*** -0.007* -0.005 0.003 0.001 0.003 -0.002 
(0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
AGE 
-0.037** -0.038*** -0.031 -0.0837* 0.002 0.003 -0.015 
(0.013) (0.011) (0.022) (0.036) (0.009) (0.006) (0.011) 
OVERDUE 
0.648 0.327 -1.248 0.315 0.630 0.110 0.371 
(0.485) (0.460) (1.078) (0.387) (0.356) (0.350) (0.332) 
MACRO 
0.057 0.053 0.168 -0.077 0.082 -0.082 0.042 
(0.103) (0.091) (0.227) (0.102) (0.133) (0.076) (0.070) 
Pseudo R2 0.201 0.168 0.173 0.125 0.150 0.170 0.153 
N 2413 3279 2413 3279 2413 3279 2401 
Notes: This table reports GLM estimates of the percentages of fixed assets/working capital financed by 
informal credit. All regressions include industry fixed effects and constant term. Robust standard errors 
are clustered by country and reported in parentheses. The * indicates statistical significance at 5%, ** at 
1%, and *** at 0.1%. N is the number of observations. 
 
Table 3. I Estimation Results for separate groups of FINCONST 
Variable 
Family friends Moneylender Trade Credit 
Tot inf. 
 Credit 
IC1_FA IC1_WC IC2_FA IC2_WC IC3_FA IC3_WC ICP 
2.FINCONST 0.411 0.576*** 0.185 0.528 0.073 0.130 0.234 
 
(0.242) (0.128) (0.392) (0.305) (0.302) (0.152) (0.132) 
3.FINCONST 0.576** 0.529** 0.314 0.724* 0.305 0.365* 0.442*** 
 
(0.206) (0.172) (0.321) (0.336) (0.346) (0.147) (0.115) 
4.FINCONST 0.840*** 0.820*** 0.921** 0.910** 0.362 0.333* 0.591*** 
 
(0.203) (0.148) (0.290) (0.338) (0.282) (0.134) (0.101) 
FEMALE 0.007 -0.012 -0.651 -0.819** 0.281** 0.074 0.036 
 
(0.133) (0.112) (0.372) (0.278) (0.101) (0.082) (0.066) 
CITY 0.105 0.055 0.112 0.063 -0.003 -0.020 0.051 
 
(0.063) (0.069) (0.095) (0.095) (0.070) (0.044) (0.040) 
STTRADED -0.007 0.000 0.005 0.004 0.004 -0.003 0.001 
 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) 
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Table 3.I continued 
CR 0.0135** 0.002 -0.0200*** -0.001 -0.001 -0.006 0.002 
 
(0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.002) 
PRVTCRE -0.006* -0.009** -0.016* -0.008 0.007 0.011** 0.003*   
 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.002) 
TIME 0.053 0.0812* 0.169*** 0.0938** 0.149** 0.037 0.0749*** 
 
(0.038) (0.039) (0.030) (0.029) (0.051) (0.054) (0.021) 
SIZE -0.017*** -0.011*** -0.001 0.004 0.003 0.004** 0.000 
 
(0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
AGE -0.014** -0.026*** -0.023 -0.042* -0.006 0.000 -0.007*   
 
(0.005) (0.007) (0.014) (0.017) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
OVERDUE 0.323 0.540* -0.648* 0.726** 0.337 0.106 0.323*   
 
(0.344) (0.262) (0.294) (0.251) (0.284) (0.200) (0.160) 
MACRO 0.076 0.069 -0.040 0.035 0.138 -0.040 0.054 
 
(0.071) (0.075) (0.113) (0.081) (0.090) (0.047) (0.039) 
N 5869 7636 5869 7635 5869 7635 5841 
Notes: This table reports GLM estimates of the percentages of fixed assets/working capital financed by 
informal credit. All regressions include industry fixed effects and constant term. Robust standard errors 
are clustered by country and reported in parentheses. The * indicates statistical significance at 5%, ** 
at 1%, and *** at 0.1%. N is the number of observations. 
 
   
      Table 3.J Variable Definition and Sources for 2002-9 BEEPS data 
Variable Definition  Source 
ICP1 Percentage of fixed assets financed by moneylenders, 
family/friends, and other non-bank financial sources 
BEEPS 
ICP2 Percentage of fixed assets financed by credits from 
suppliers or customers.  
BEEPS 
ICP3 The sum of the ICP1 and ICP2. BEEPS 
FINCONST An ordinal variable that ranges from 1 to 4. This variable 
becomes 1 if the firm responds that access to finance (e.g., 
collateral required or financing not available from banks) 
is “no obstacle” for the operation and growth of the 
business. This variable becomes 2, 3, and 4 if the firm 
responds as “minor obstacle”, “moderate obstacle”, and 
“major obstacle” respectively.   
BEEPS 
FEMALE Dummy=1 if there is at least one owner is female, zero 
other- wise. 
BEEPS 
CITY Dummy=1 if the firm is located in the capital or in a city 
with population over one million, zero otherwise. 
BEEPS 
STCAPIT Value of listed shares to GDP expressed in percentage Beck et al. 
(2010) 
CR Asset share of the three largest banks within the 
commercial banks (%) 
Beck et al. 
(2010) 
LOANGDP Outstanding loans from commercial banks (%of GDP) FAS 
TIME Average number of days counted from the moment the 
plaintiff decides to file the lawsuit in court until payment. 
WB 
SIZE Number of the full time employees. BEEPS 
AGE The number of years that the firm has been operating BEEPS 
OVERDUE Dummy=1 if the firm had any payments overdue more 
than 90 days in the previous year, zero otherwise. 
BEEPS 
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Table 3.K Summary Statistics for 2002-9 Data 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N 
ICP1 9.181 24.633 0 100 14904 
ICP2 3.658 14.955 0 100 16041 
ICP3 12.715 28.124 0 100 14861 
FINCONST      1.432           1.264            0            4 24524     
FEMALE 0.344 0.475 0 1 18069 
CITY 0.143 0.350 0 1 25592 
STCAPIT 36.540 39.192 0.1 172  63 
CR 64.091 21.200 11 100 73 
LOANGDP 40.14 23.76 1.6 133.7 74 
TIME 451.389 205.497 195 1290 81 
SIZE 40.891 53.519 1 250 25592 
AGE 14.014 14.078 0 202 25455 
 
 
Table 3.L Country composition of the 2005 BEEPS sample. 
Country N Country N 
Bulgaria 272 FYR Macedonia 182 
Albania 189 Armenia 334 
Croatia 203 Kyrgyz Republic 181 
Belarus 294 Estonia 198 
Georgia 186 Czech Republic 317 
Tajikistan 182 Hungary 563 
Turkey 505 Latvia 187 
Ukraine 542 Lithuania 187 
Uzbekistan 273 Slovak Republic 198 
Russia 535 Slovenia 195 
Poland 913 Vietnam 455 
Romania 544 Greece 499 
Serbia 261 Germany 1,077 
Kazakhstan 536 Spain 553 
Moldova 317 Portugal 454 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 182 Ireland 467 
Azerbaijan 316 South Korea 537 
Total 12,834 
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Figure 3.A Composition of the financing sources for working capital purchases   
  
 Notes: Countries are ranked in descending order according to their informal credit usage. Source: 
2005 BEEPS. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.B Composition of the financing sources for fixed asset investments    
 
Notes: Countries are ranked in descending order according to their informal credit usage. Source: 
2005 BEEPS. 
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Figure 3.C Composition of the financing sources for fixed asset investments by 
different income groups.   
  
Source: 2005 BEEPS. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.D Composition of the financing sources for fixed asset investments by 
different income groups.   
 
Source: 2005 BEEPS. 
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Figure 3.E Composition of the financing sources for fixed assets purchases by 
different country groups. Source: 2005 BEEPS. 
 
Source: 2005 BEEPS. 
 
Figure 3.F Composition of the financing sources for working capital purchases in 
different country groups.  
 
Source: 2005 BEEPS. 
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Figure 3.G Kernel Density Function of IC1_FA 
 
 
 
Figure 3.H Kernel Density Function of IC1_WC 
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Figure 3.I Kernel Density Function of IC2_FA 
 
 
 
Figure 3.J Kernel Density Function of IC2_WC 
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Figure 3.K Kernel Density Function of IC3_FA 
 
 
Figure 3.L Kernel Density Function of IC3_WC 
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Chapter 4    
Female Entrepreneurs and Financial Constraints64   
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Gender is one of the primary drivers of economic disparities between people. 
Although females become more and more visible in business and financial 
environments in the last decades, there are still only few female examples of the 
“richest” people or the “biggest businesses” in all around the world. This situation 
is a call for research for the systematic differences between the male and females. 
Women are stereotyped differently from men in general e.g. women have more 
emotional and cautious image as compared to men. Previous literature shows that 
female owned enterprises are more likely to be smaller, they operate in labour 
intensive and service sectors as compared to their male counterparts (Carter and 
Rosa, 1998). Female owned businesses are more likely to use retained earnings and 
have lower percentage of debt finance (Haines et al., 1999). These differences may 
have three different explanations: First female firm owners do not prefer to borrow 
due to their preferences. Second discriminatory lenders do not prefer to extend 
loans to female owned businesses. Third, market and cultural structures are not 
suitable enough to allow female owners to get loans.   
Previous studies attach more risk aversion to females as compared to males 
(Powell and Ansic, 1997; Jianakoplos and Bernasek, 1998; Watson and Robinson, 
2003; Croson and Gneezy, 2009) and this risk averse nature of females might be 
one explanation for their lower ratios of debt finance. Because women perceive 
greater risk with use of alcohol and other drugs, they are less likely to be drug and 
alcohol addicted (Spigner et al., 1993). Harrant and Vaillant (2008) compare male 
and female attitudes toward HIV. They find that even when other factors are 
controlled, women infected by the HIV virus are more risk averse than men in 
their contestation behaviour. Croson and Gneezy (2009) present a review of the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
64 An earlier version of this paper was presented at 4th Economic Development International 
Conference of the GRETHA-GRES in Bordeaux, France.  
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experimental studies on gender based preference differences. In this framework 
women entrepreneurs are more likely to use retained earnings rather than using 
external finance not because they are discriminated in loan markets but due to 
female entrepreneurs own preferences. Schubert et al. (1999) provide contradictory 
experimental evidence to the studies that find females more risk averse as 
compared to their male counterparts. Different from the other experimental 
studies Schubert et al. (1999) controls for economic conditions and finds that 
female subjects do not generally make less risky financial choices than male 
subjects. Their findings suggest that the source of gender-specific risk behaviour 
found in the other studies may be due to differences in male and female 
opportunity sets rather than stereotypic risk attitudes.  
There is also a body of literature on the existence of gender-based 
discrimination against women in lending markets. In general, discrimination in 
lending markets comes from the desire of lenders to avoid making transactions 
and/or building relationships with certain demographical groups just because of 
their personal characteristics. In such cases, lenders have a disutility from granting 
loans to certain groups of borrowers and this discriminatory lenders may simply 
reject the loan applications or discourage the borrowers that they have a 
disutility, via stringent loan contract terms, i.e. charging higher interest rates, 
requiring higher collateral compared to loan size. Discriminatory lenders may 
decide regardless the riskiness of the alternative projects and they even may forgo 
profits in order to avoid interaction with the specific demographic groups. 
Sometimes lenders avoid granting loans to members of a certain group due to 
their beliefs and previous information on the demographic group. Literature on 
discrimination in loan markets is mostly dominated by the studies on racial 
discrimination and mortgage loan markets65 (Munnell et al., 1992, 1996; Berkovec 
et al., 1998; Ladd, 1998; Han, 2004) while only little evidence found in favour of 
gender based discrimination in business loan markets in non-developed economies. 
Previous studies on racial discrimination present evidence mostly from U.S. data. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
65  These studies show that Blacks and Hispanics are more likely to have their mortgage 
applications rejected and if they get loan, they are more likely to end up with default.   
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In general these studies concentrated on racial discrimination in loan markets, 
while there are only few studies on gender based discrimination in business loan 
markets.66 
Alesina et al. (2009) find that women in Italy pay higher interest rates for loans 
as compared to men, although there is no evidence show that women are riskier 
then men. Similar to Alesina et al. (2009), Bellucci et al. (2009) show that female 
entrepreneurs in Italy face more difficulties in accessing to credit, even though the 
interest rates they pay do not differ from those paid by male business owners. 
They present evidence consistent with the taste-based discrimination theory. 
Recently, Beck et al. (2011) find that loan officers charge higher interest rates to 
borrowers of the other gender although there is no difference in riskiness. They 
also show that the effect varies across borrower and loan officer characteristics, 
consistent with the idea of social distance; that is, younger loan officer are more 
likely to charge higher interest rates to older borrowers.  
All these studies examine the female and male owned firms. Kim (2006) 
examines the equally owned firms in addition to female and male owned firms by 
using small business data from USA. She finds that female owned firms experience 
least difficulties in terms of successful loan applications as compared to other 
groups of firms. Using BEEPS 2005 data, Muravyev et al. (2009) provide some 
evidence in favour of discrimination against female entrepreneurs. They also show 
that the probability of loan approval for female entrepreneurs increases as 
financial development level-as measured by percentage of financial institutions’ 
lending to GDP- in the country increases. 
Finally market conditions in a country are important to determine the severity 
of discrimination. Becker (1957) argues that if the firms operate in more 
competitive product/service markets, they have much less incentives for 
discrimination. A firm that operates in a competitive environment gets lower 
profits and in order to survive the tough market conditions, the firm sometimes 
has to leave its discriminatory behaviour. Accordingly as the competition in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
66 Cavalluzzo and Cavalluzzo (1998); Blanchflower et al. (2003) are based on SMEs in USA. 
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lending markets gets tougher, lenders have much less incentives to discriminate 
against a certain group of borrowers (See Berkovec et al. 1998; Cavaluzzo and 
Cavaluzzo, 1998; Cavaluzzo et al., 2002).  
To the best of our knowledge, our study is the second, after Muravyev et al. 
(2009) that use BEEPS data to address the financial constraints faced by female 
entrepreneurs in loan markets. Unlike Muravyev et al. (2009) we do not only use 
the 2005 data. We used pooled cross section dataset of 2002, 2005, 2007, 2008 and 
2009 BEEPS. Secondly unlike Muravyev et al. (2009) we do not have Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Spain, Portugal, South Korea and Vietnam. Finally we use 
different control variables67 to examine whether the female entrepreneurs are more 
disadvantaged as compared to their male counterparts in loan markets. 
The aim of our study is to see whether gender based advantage/disadvantage 
exists in loan markets and to determine the factors that contribute to rejection of 
loan applications. The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section 
provides brief information on the data and introduces the variables used in the 
empirical part. Section three gives descriptive statistics. We present the regression 
results in section four and section five concludes.  
4.2 Data and variables 
To address our research question we use firm-level data from The Business 
Environment and Enterprise Performance Surveys (BEEPS)68. BEEPS are joint 
projects of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and 
the World Bank which consist of firm-level data on 27 countries in Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia from 2005 to 200969 70.  The BEEPS database covers 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
67 As we used a standardized version of BEEPS along 2005-2009 the information set on firms 
differs from that of Muravyev et al. (2009).   
68 We used the standardized panel data along 2002-2009 waves of BEEPS as of April 30, 2010.   
69 Albania, Belarus, Georgia, Tajikistan, Turkey, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Russia, Poland, Romania, 
Serbia, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Bosnia, Azerbaijan, Macedonia, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, Estonia, 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Croatia, and 
Montenegro. Surveys are conducted in 2002, 2005, 2007, 2008 and 2009 and each year 6153, 10421, 
1952, 3375 and 7815 firms surveyed respectively. 
70 Refer to BEEPS Reports on methodology and observations for information on stratification on 
regions and for more details on sampling 
http://www.ebrd.com/pages/research/analysis/surveys/beeps.shtml . 
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firms of various legal types, i.e. shareholding companies (both listed and shares 
traded privately), sole proprietorship firms, partnership and limited partnership 
firms… For the purpose of our analysis, we are only interested in the firms that 
has only one owner, and in the firms that we have information on the gender of 
their sole owner. Accordingly our sample shrinks to 5025 enterprises.  
We have three binary dependent variables in this study. First we have 
REJECT which equals to one if the loan application of the firm is rejected, zero if 
the firm has an approved loan application. As we see in the summary statistics of 
the rejection rates are only slightly higher for female entrepreneurs. This direct 
comparison of rejection rates may underestimate the disadvantages of female 
entrepreneurs as previous studies address females to be more risk averse (Spigner 
et al., 1993; Powell and Ansic, 1997; Jianakoplos and Bernasek, 1998; Watson and 
Robinson, 2003; Harrant and Vaillant, 2008; Croson and Gneezy, 2009;) and 
overconfident as compared to their female counterparts (Barber and Odean, 2001; 
Beck et al. 2009). Accordingly female entrepreneurs may refrain from applying 
credit by thinking their loan application would be turned off. If this is the case, 
then using only REJECT, as the dependent variable may lead to underestimation 
of the disadvantages of female entrepreneurs in loan markets. The second 
dependent variable is DISCOURAGED,— conditional on the firm needs credit—
which equals to one if the firm is a discouraged borrower i.e. give up looking for a 
loan because credit conditions are not suitable for the firm and/or the firm didn’t 
think it would be approved. If the firm is a loan applicant (REJECT=1 or 
REJECT=0). DISCOURAGED equals to zero. Our third dependent variable is 
LOAN, which takes 1 if the firm gets credit, zero if is the firm is discouraged from 
borrowing or the loan application of the firm is rejected. 
Table 4.1 gives the definitions of these variables as well as the other variables. 
Our independent variable of interest is the FEMALE dummy, which equals to one 
if the firm owner is female, zero otherwise, we examine the effect of FEMALE on 
our dependent variables using the many control variables. 
! "#$!
 
Figure 4.1 Loan application process (taken from Muravyev et al. 2009) 
 
We employ the number of full–time employees as a measure of firm size 
(SIZE). AGE is the number of years that the firm has been operating. Older firms 
are more likely to have longer relationship with lenders, as shown by Berger and 
Udell (1995); accordingly, we expect these more established firms to get credit as 
compared to younger firms. QUALITY is a dummy variable that is set equal to 
one if the firm has an internationally recognized quality certification, such as ISO 
9000 or ISO 9002, and zero otherwise. As the firms that have quality certifications 
are more likely to perform better we expect to observe these firms to be less 
financially constrained as compared to the firms that do not have quality 
certifications. Additionally we consider innovative and exporter firms—as 
captured by binary variables of INNOV and EXPORT—to be less financially 
constrained and as we expect these firms to perform better. As proxies for firm 
level risk and firm level financial distress OVERDUE and CRIME are employed in 
the regressions. We expect lenders to be less willing to grant loans to the firms 
that have more than ninety days unpaid utility bills and/or if the firm is located 
in environments that feature intense criminal activity. CITY is a dummy variable, 
which equals to one if the firm is located in the capital or in a city that has over 
one million inhabitants. This variable controls for potential differences in 
availability of financial services in larger versus smaller cities. 
 
 
Need loan?  
Yes  
(Need Loan) 
Applied for a 
loan 
Approved loans 
Rejected loans 
Discouraged  
No  
(No need loan) 
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Table 4.1 Variable definitions 
Variable Definition Source 
REJECT Dummy=1 if the firm has a rejected loan application, 
zero if the firm has an approved loan application. 
BEEPS 
DISCOURAGED Dummy=1 if the firm is a discouraged borrower i.e. 
give up borrowing because credit conditions are not 
suitable for the firm and/or the firm didn’t think it 
would be approved, equals to zero if the firm is a loan 
applicant (REJECT=1 or REJECT=0).   
BEEPS 
LOAN Dummy=1 if the firm gets a loan, zero if 
DISCOURAGED=1 or REJECT=1.  
BEEPS 
FEMALE Dummy=1 if the owner is female, zero otherwise.  BEEPS 
SIZE The number of the fulltime employees. BEEPS 
AGE  The number of years that the firm has been 
operating. 
BEEPS 
QUALITY Dummy=1 if the firm has an internationally 
recognized quality certification such as ISO 9000, 
9002 or 14000, zero otherwise.  
BEEPS 
EXPORTER Dummy=1 if the firm is an exporter firm, zero 
otherwise.   
BEEPS 
INNOV Dummy=1 if the firm has introduced new products or 
services within the last three years, zero otherwise. 
BEEPS 
OVERDUE Dummy=1 if the firm has utilities payments overdue 
by more than 90 days, zero otherwise.   
BEEPS 
CRIME Dummy=1 if the firm has experienced losses due to 
theft, robbery, vandalism or arson in the previous 
year, zero otherwise.  
BEEPS 
CITY Dummy=1 if the firm is located in the capital or in a 
city with population over one million, zero otherwise.   
BEEPS 
CR  Asset share of the three largest banks within the 
commercial banks. 
Bankscope  
LNGDPPC  Natural logarithm of the GDP per capita.  EBRD 
 
As the lenders have market power, they may charge higher interest rates and 
lead to lower loan to GDP ratios in more concentrated lending markets. 
Accordingly higher concentration ratios can be associated with higher loan 
rejection probabilities. However this view is challenged by recent studies in 
relationship banking. In Petersen and Rajan’s (1995) seminal paper presents 
evidence on the strength of relationship banking to the degree of that banks’ 
market power. Accordingly, as the concentration rates in banking increases, banks 
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are more likely to built closer relationships with their borrowers that will results 
in lower loan rejection rates especially for young and small firms. Survey results 
show that private commercial banks are the biggest source of external finance to 
cover the fixed asset investments. They provide loans for 12.31% of the fixed 
asset, together with the state owned commercial banks and government agencies 
this share increases to 14.45%. Since banks are the primary lending institutions 
banking sector concentration measures can be considered as a good proxy for loan 
market concentration. In our study we use CR, the share of commercial bank 
assets that are owned by the three largest commercial banks, as a measure of 
banking concentration to control for differences in concentration in the lending 
markets of the examined countries.  Finally we use the natural logarithm of the 
GDP per capita to control for the macroeconomic environment in each country.  
4.3 Descriptive statistics 
Before presenting regression results, we examine the effects of gender on 
financing behaviours using descriptive statistics. First of all Table 4.2 shows that 
the share female owned enterprises on the total number of enterprises decrease as 
with the size of the enterprises. 34% and 26% of the micro and small sized 
enterprises are female owned respectively. This share gets smaller for the medium 
and large enterprises as female entrepreneurs own 22% of the both medium and 
large enterprises. This picture reveals that female entrepreneurs own smaller 
businesses as compared to male entrepreneurs. 
 
Table 4.2 Gender and firm size   
Size 
Number of 
male owned 
firms  
Number of 
female owned 
firms 
Total number 
of firms 
% of female 
owned firms 
Micro (smaller than 10) 1,730 896 2,626 0.34 
Small (10-49) 1,314 449 1,763 0.26 
Medium (50-249) 409 116 525 0.22 
Large (250 and over) 86 25 111 0.22 
Total 3,539 1,486 5,025 0.29 
 
 Secondly we use the available information on firms’ perception on difficulty of 
accessing finance. In BEEPS surveys firms are asked to report on a 1 (“no 
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obstacle”) to 5 (“very severe obstacle”) scale how difficult access to finance (which 
includes availability and cost, interest rates, fees and collateral requirements) is 
for the current operations of the firm. Table 4.3 presents the distribution of firms 
with respect to their perception on difficulty of accessing finance and gender. This 
rough picture shows that firms perception of suffering from access to finance do 
not vary extensively by gender categories. The percentage of the firms that 
perceive access to finance as a minor and no problem were 51 % both for male 
owned and female owned enterprises. The percentage of the firms that perceive 
access to finance as a major and very severe were 23% both for male owned and 
female owned enterprises. We also do not observe statistically significant 
differences by gender as the t-test results confirm in Table 4.5. Accordingly we 
can say that female and male owned enterprises have the same perception on 
difficulty of accessing finance.  
 
Table 4.3 Gender and perception on difficulty of accessing finance 
Access to finance 
Number of 
male owned 
firms 
% of male 
owned firms 
Number of 
female owned 
firms 
% of female 
owned firms Total 
No obstacle  1,016 29.96 447 31.81 1,463 
Minor obstacle 732 21.59 280 19.93 1,012 
Moderate obstacle  863 25.45 353 25.12 1,216 
Major obstacle 668 19.7 262 18.65 930 
Very severe obstacle 112 3.3 63 4.48 175 
Total 3,391 100 1,405 100 4,796 
 
Firms are asked several questions regarding their loan applications the most 
recent loans received (if any) in the BEEPS. BEEPS also collects information on 
the reasons of firms not having loan (in case of firms answered they had no loan). 
There can be several reasons for a firm of not having loan. First of all the firm 
may not need loan. Secondly the firm may have a loan application that is 
rejected. Finally the firm may be discouraged with loan application. In our study 
we define discouraged borrowers as the enterprises that need loans but do not 
apply loan for the following reasons: (1) application procedures for loans or lines 
of credit are complex, (2) interest rates are not favourable, (3) collateral 
requirements are too high, (4) size of loan and maturity are insufficient, (5) it is 
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necessary to make informal payments to get bank loans, (6) did not think it would 
be approved. In order to understand these sub-groups of firms, the graphical 
representation of the loan application process is given in Graph 1 in the previous 
section.  
Table 4.4 Loan applications and gender 
  
Number of 
male owned 
firms 
% of male 
owned 
firms 
Number of 
female owned 
firms 
% of female 
owned 
firms 
Total 
number of 
firms 
% of 
Total 
need loan 2,515 71 1,003 68 3,518 70 
no need loan 1,013 29 472 32 1,485 30 
Total 3,528 100 1,475 100 5,003 100 
       loan applicants 870 60 299 54 1,169 59 
discouraged 577 40 252 46 829 41 
Total 1,447 100 551 100 1,998 100 
       approved loans 740 85 247 82 987 84 
rejected loans 130 15 53 18 183 16 
Total 870 100 300 100 1,170 100 
 
Table 4.4 presents the data on loan application sub-groups by gender. In this 
table we grouped firms that need loan and did not need loan by gender of the 
owner as a first step of the loan application process. We have information on the 
firms that did not need loan71, and we can infer the sub group of the firms that 
need loan: we can consider the discouraged borrowers, and loan applicants (both 
resulted in rejected and approved loans) as the firms that need loan. 
In the second step of the loan application process, we have discouraged and 
non-discouraged firms (loan applicants). We define the discouraged borrowers as 
the enterprises that we understand that the firm needed loan but do not apply 
loan for the following reasons: (1) Application procedures for loans or lines of 
credit are complex, (2) Interest rates are not favourable, (3) Collateral 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
71 In BEEPS, the following question is asked to the enterprises: “What was the main reason why 
this establishment did not apply for any line of credit or loan in the previous fiscal year?” and firms 
are asked to choose one of the following eight options as an answer: (1) No need for a loan—
establishment has sufficient capital (2) Application procedures for loans or lines of credit are 
complex (3) Interest rates are not favourable (4) Collateral requirements are too high (5) Size of 
loan and maturity are insufficient (6) It is necessary to make informal payments to get bank loans 
(7) Did not think it would be approved (8) Other. 
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requirements are too high, (4) size of loan and maturity are insufficient, (5) it is 
necessary to make informal payments to get bank loans, (6) did not think it would 
be approved. We define a non-discouraged (loan applicant) firm as the firm that 
applied for loan.  To sum in a nutshell, we have a binary dummy variable that 
equals to one if the firm is a discouraged from applying for a loan, zero if the firm 
is a loan applicant conditional on the firm needs loan.  
Finally, in the third step of the loan application process we have rejected and 
approved loans, conditional on being applied for a loan. In our sample, 68% of 
female owned enterprises need loan, 71% of male owned enterprises need loan. 
This result shows that female entrepreneurs may be more likely to conduct 
businesses that do not require external financing72. This result also confirms the 
previous studies which show that females are more risk averse as compared to 
males accordingly they are more likely to use internal funds rather than applying 
for external finance.  
Second, the share of discouraged borrowers among female owned enterprises is 
higher than that of their male counterparts, 46% versus 40%. The loan rejection 
rates for female owned enterprises are only slightly higher than that of male 
owned enterprises. Conditional on applying a loan, are rejected in their loan 
applications, 18% of the female owned enterprises, while 15% of the male owned 
enterprises. These numbers may show that female entrepreneurs are 
disadvantaged in loan markets because they are more discouraged than male 
entrepreneurs.  
Table 4.5 reports the mean and standard deviations of the variables by gender 
of the entrepreneurs. The last column of the table reports the p-values for the t-
tests of the equality of means between the female and male owned enterprises. In 
line with tabulations presented in Table 4.2, the t-test for the equality of that 
female and male owned enterprises show that both groups have the same 
perception on difficulty of accessing finance as summary statistics of FINCONST 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
72 See Table 4.C in appendix for a picture of sectoral composition of the sample by gender of the 
owner. The average share of female entrepreneurs in the sectors is 25% and only in garments sector 
the share of female entrepreneurs exceed 50%.  
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indicate. Statistics in Table 4.4 reveal that the number of discouraged enterprises 
(DISCOURAGED) and the number of enterprises that have no demand for loan 
(NONEEDLOAN) is higher for female entrepreneurs group as shown in Table 4.5.  
We observe higher mean values of rejection rates for female firm owners but this 
difference is not statistically significant. 
Table 4.5 Selected characteristics of male and female owned firms 
 
Male owned firms Female owned firms Total 
 
 
mean std dev N mean std dev N mean std dev N p-value 
FINCONST 1.45 1.20 3391 1.44 1.24 1405 1.45 1.21 4796 0.85 
NONEEDLOAN 0.29 0.45 3528 0.32 0.47 1475 0.30 0.46 5003 0.02** 
REJECT 0.15 0.36 870 0.18 0.38 300 0.16 0.36 1170 0.26 
DISCOURAGED 0.40 0.49 1447 0.46 0.50 551 0.41 0.49 1998 0.02** 
LOAN 0.51 0.50 1447 0.45 0.50 551 0.49 0.50 1998 0.01** 
SIZE 31.0 76.7 3522 21.2 57.1 1475 28.1 71.6 4997 0.00*** 
AGE 11.9 9.99 3523 10.8 8.35 1473 11.6 9.5 4996 0.00*** 
OVERDUE 0.04 0.19 3168 0.03 0.16 1385 0.03 0.18 4553 0.01** 
QUALITY 0.11 0.31 3526 0.08 0.27 1483 0.10 0.30 5009 0.00*** 
CITY 0.30 0.46 3539 0.25 0.43 1486 0.28 0.45 5025 0.00*** 
CRIME 0.18 0.39 3535 0.18 0.38 1484 0.18 0.39 5019 0.52 
INNOV 0.38 0.49 3241 0.35 0.48 1394 0.37 0.48 4635 0.02** 
EXPORTER 0.18 0.39 3539 0.12 0.33 1486 0.17 0.37 5025 0.00*** 
LNGDPPC 8.34 0.94 56 8.41 0.87 56 8.36 0.92 56 0.02** 
CR 0.63 0.18 52 0.61 0.19 52 0.62 0.18 52 0.00*** 
Notes: The last column report p-values for t-tests of the equality of means between female and 
male owned enterprises. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively. N is the number of observations. 
 
On the other hand we observe that female owned enterprises tend to be smaller 
and younger as compared to male owned enterprises. Female owned enterprises 
are less innovative, less likely to have research and development expenditures, less 
likely to have an internationally recognized quality certification (such as ISO 
9000, 9002 or 14000). Moreover they experience higher ratios of losses due to 
theft, robbery vandalism or arson to the sales and they perceive crime, theft and 
disorder as a bigger obstacle to the operations of their enterprise as measured by 
CRIME73.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
73 BEEPS also collects information on firms’ perception on crime. Specifically, firms are asked to 
report on a 0 (“No obstacle”) to 4 (“Major obstacle”) scale “How much of an obstacle are crime, 
theft and disorder to their establishment”. Using this variable doesn’t make a significant change in 
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Table 4.6 Financial sources of fixed asset investments by gender 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
male mean 68.40 4.65 13.35 2.09 2.75 8.76 
owned firms std dev 40.34 18.36 28.60 11.98 13.29 23.71 
 
N 2,082 2,082 2,082 2,082 2,082 2,082 
        
female mean 72.01 6.12 9.74 2.39 2.67 7.07 
owned firms std dev 39.37 22.15 25.70 12.13 12.43 21.97 
 
N 795 795 795 795 795 795 
       
Total mean 69.40 5.06 12.36 2.17 2.73 8.29 
 
std dev 40.10 19.49 27.87 12.02 13.05 23.25 
 
N 2,877 2,877 2,877 2,877 2,877 2,877 
Notes: (1) Internal funds or retained earnings, (2) Owners’ contribution or issued new equity 
shares, (3) private banks, (4) state owned banks, (5) Purchases on credit from suppliers and 
advances from customers, i.e. trade credit (6) Other (moneylenders, friends, relatives, non-
banking financial institutions etc.), i.e. informal credit. N is the number of observations. 
 
In BEEPS firms are asked to report the financial source for the percentage of 
the fixed asset investments in the year preceding the survey. We summarize the 
answers of the enterprises in Table 4.6. Our findings are in line with Haines et al 
(1999) which indicate lower ratios of debt finance for female owned businesses. We 
see that on average the share of retained earnings and owners’ contribution or 
issued new equity shares in fixed asset investment is higher in female-owned firms, 
72.01% versus 68.40% and 6.12% versus 4.65% respectively. The female owned 
enterprises tend to have a smaller fraction of private bank credit as compared to 
men 9.74% versus 13.35%. However this gap is decreases in the fraction of state 
owned bank financing. Finally we see that the female owned enterprises have 
lower fractions of trade credit and informal credit usage.  
Before presenting results of the multivariate analysis we should emphasize that 
previous literature is critical about the omitted variables while testing the effect of 
gender on financial constraints as the presence of discrimination are vulnerable to 
omitted-variable bias. Accordingly we include as many as possible variables 
provided by BEEPS to account for the creditworthiness of the firms and country 
level differences.  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
the results.  
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4.4 Regression results  
Table 4.7 reports the results of probit models for the three dependent variables. 
We run two sets of regressions. The difference between them is the inclusion of 
interaction between CR and FEMALE. Market conditions in a country may be 
important in determining the severity of discrimination. In his seminal work 
Becker (1957) argues that discriminatory firms may forgo profits as they have a 
taste of discrimination. A firm that operates in a competitive environment gets 
lower profits and in order to survive in tough market conditions, is likely to leave 
its discriminatory behaviour. Accordingly the firms that operate under 
competitive pressure are less likely to discriminate against certain demographic 
groups. As the competition in lending markets gets tougher, lenders have much 
less incentives to discriminate against a certain group of borrowers. Following 
Berkovec et al. (1998), Cavalluzzo et al. (2002), Muravyev et al. (2009) the 
interaction between CR and FEMALE allows us to test whether the level of 
banking concentration affects the gap between male and female entrepreneurs in 
obtaining credit.  
As presented in descriptive statistics the results of univariate analysis indicate 
some evidence for disadvantage of female entrepreneurs, when the disadvantage is 
measured by DISCOURAGED. The coefficient estimate for FEMALE becomes 
only statistically significant at 10% when DISCOURAGED and LOAN are 
dependent variables! which indicate a disadvantage for female entrepreneurs in 
loan markets.   
However female ownership has no effect on loan rejections, as the coefficient 
estimate of FEMALE is statistically insignificant on REJECT. As seen in Table 
4.7, this disadvantage vanishes when the other factors are controlled in addition 
to country, year and industry dummies as we find no evidence in favour of 
presence of a discrimination or disadvantage against female entrepreneurs as 
measured by the coefficient estimate of FEMALE. The statistical insignificance of 
the coefficient estimate for FEMALE increases as we include the interaction term 
between CR and FEMALE which again indicate no evidence in favour of 
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discrimination for female entrepreneurs and the insignificance of discrimination 
gets stronger in the regressions where we include the interaction between CR and 
FEMALE.  
Table 4.7 Baseline Probit Results      
 
As for the control variables we see that larger, innovative, exporter firms and 
the firms that have internationally recognized quality certifications are less likely 
to be discouraged from applying credit as compared to smaller, non-innovative, 
non-exporter and to the firms that do not have internationally recognized quality 
certifications. Although coefficient estimate for LNGDPPC is statistically 
insignificant in the regressions where REJECT is the dependent variable, it yield 
 REJECT    DISCOURAGED LOAN REJECT    DISCOURAGED LOAN 
FEMALE 0.058 0.113 -0.109 -0.066 -0.081 0.063 
 
(0.132) (0.088) (0.089) (0.388) (0.264) (0.266) 
SIZE -0.004** -0.007*** 0.007*** -0.004**  -0.007*** 0.007*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
AGE -0.018* 0.000 0.007 -0.018*   0.000 0.007 
 
(0.007) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.004) (0.005) 
OVERDUE -0.270 -0.329 0.242 -0.267 -0.324 0.237 
 
(0.252) (0.220) (0.201) (0.252) (0.221) (0.201) 
QUALITY -0.130 -0.314* 0.268 -0.131 -0.313* 0.268 
 
(0.209) (0.151) (0.146) (0.209) (0.151) (0.146) 
CITY 0.099 -0.036 -0.028 0.098 -0.036 -0.027 
 (0.144) (0.095) (0.096) (0.144) (0.095) (0.096) 
CRIME 0.012 -0.219* 0.176 0.014 -0.220* 0.177 
 
(0.139) (0.100) (0.100) (0.139) (0.100) (0.100) 
INNOV -0.270* -0.442*** 0.462*** -0.272*  -0.446*** 0.465*** 
 
(0.121) (0.081) (0.081) (0.121) (0.081) (0.081) 
EXPORTER -0.219 -0.283* 0.336** -0.218 -0.285* 0.337** 
 
(0.165) (0.123) (0.117) (0.165) (0.123) (0.117) 
LNGDPPC -0.382 -1.800*** 1.435** -0.373 -1.802*** 1.434** 
 
(0.921) (0.480) (0.471) (0.923) (0.480) (0.472) 
CR -0.270 -0.371 0.432 -0.344 -0.494 0.536 
 
(0.755) (0.439) (0.436) (0.782) (0.466) (0.467) 
CRXFEMALE    0.191 0.300 -0.267 
    (0.569) (0.392) (0.396) 
Pseudo R2   0.16 0.23 0.24 0.16 0.22 0.23 
N 830 1432 1435 801 1399 1402 
Notes:  Moldova, Serbia, Montenegro and Tajikistan are excluded in the regressions due to lack of 
observation. All regressions include constant terms, country, industry and year fixed effects. 
Robust standard errors are clustered at firm level and reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels, respectively.  N is the number of 
observations. 
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significant estimates in the regressions where DISCOURAGED and LOAN are 
dependent variables. That is to say, the sole proprietorship firms are less likely to 
be discouraged from applying credit and more likely to get credit as LNGDPPC 
increases. This result suggests in favour of presence a reduction in financial 
constraints due to the possible occurrence of credit expansion. We observe that 
being an exporter firm doesn’t have a statistically significant effect on the 
probability of a loan being rejected. But having a rejected loan and being an 
innovative firm as captured by INNOV, are negatively related. Although we do 
not report in order to save space, all regressions in Table 4.7, include country, 
industry and year dummies and we have the 2005 as the base year. Regression in 
Table 4.7, yield significantly positive coefficient estimates for the 2008 and 2009 
dummies, which indicate a positive association between being a discouraged firm 
and financial crisis experienced after 2007. The coefficient estimate for 2009 is 
smaller than the coefficient estimate for 2008 year. This result shows that effect of 
the recent crisis on financial constraint is decreasing, as it is lower in 2009 as 
compared to 2008. 
4.4.1 Robustness checks 
Although a firm is solely owned by a female, its top manager can be another 
person, i.e. a male. In Table 4.8 in order to see the disadvantages in loan markets 
faced by female entrepreneurs that have female top managers 74  we employ 
FEMALE2, (FEMALE multiplied by a dummy variable, which equals to 1 if the 
top manager of the firm is female, zero if the top manager is male75) as our 
independent variable of interest. Along 2005-2009 waves of the BEEPS 1450 sole 
proprietorship firms provide an answer to the question: “Is the Top Manager 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
74 The owner herself can also be the manager. 
75 However in 2005 wave of the BEEPS firms are asked answer to the following question if the 
largest shareholder is an individual or family member, “Is this individual or family member also the 
manager/director of this firm?”. Following Muravyev et al. (2009), we multiply this dummy 
variable with FEMALE and obtain information on the gender of a sole owner who is also the top 
manager. As we add this relevant information in 2005 wave of the BEEPS, number of observations 
grows. However we choose not to report these results in the main text as Muravyev et al. (2009) 
presents a complete analysis of the issue for year 2005. Table 4.D in appendix presents the pooled 
regression results for the years 2005, 2008 and 2009. 
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female?” and these answers show that 24% of this firms have a female top 
manager while 29.6% of the firms have a female owner. We are interest in the sole 
proprietorship firms, and they tend to be small in size as compared to companies76. 
The correlation between having a female top manager and havig a female owner is 
calculated as 67% for the whole sample of sole proprietorship firms. This 
correlation increases to 78% for the micro sized firms that have less than 11 full 
time employees. Only 5% of the firms have more than 100 full time employees. 
SMEs are more likely to be have their owners as the top manager. This valuable 
information on the gender of the top manager is not available for firms surveyed 
in 2005 wave of the BEEPS (except in Turkey 32 firms provide an answer to this 
question) and the response rates for the gender of the top manager is not high. 
This is why we observe a huge fall in the number of observations in Table 4.8. 
Along regressions in Table 4.8, we observe the enterprises that have a sole 
female owner–who is also the top manager of the firm–are more likely to be 
disadvantaged than their male counterparts when the disadvantage is indicated by 
LOAN and DISCOURAGED as the coefficient estimates of FEMALE2 are at least 
statistically significant at 10%. Our results in Table 4.8 are in line with Muravyev 
et al. (2009) who uses 2005 BEEPS, the same variable (FEMALE2) to address 
female entrepreneurship and different control variables than ours. As we include 
observations from 2008 and 2009 waves of BEEPS we can say that the 
disadvantaged position of female entrepreneurs are not affected largely from the 
recent financial crisis. As for the control variables we see that the larger and 
innovative firms are less likely to be disadvantaged in loan markets where LOAN 
and DISCOURAGED are the dependent variables. When LOAN is the dependent 
variable, the coefficient estimate of CR77 is found to be negative. These results 
show that probability of getting credit for a sole proprietorship firm decreases as 
the banking industry become more concentrated. This result indicates more severe 
financial constraints for firms where the share of the three largest banks is higher. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
76
 See Figure 4.A in the Appendix for the distribution of sole proprietorship firms with respect to 
their size. 
77 Statistically significant at 10%.  
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However we fail to confirm this relationship in the rest of the regressions. 
Table 4.8 Probit regression results for female top managers 
 
REJECT DISCOURAGED LOAN REJECT DISCOURAGED LOAN 
FEMALE2 0.194 0.286 -0.281 0.676 0.756 -0.914* 
 
(0.226) (0.154) (0.152) (0.660) (0.432) (0.449) 
SIZE -0.002 -0.005** 0.005*** -0.002 -0.005** 0.005*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
AGE -0.023* -0.001 0.009 -0.023* -0.001 0.009 
 
(0.010) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.006) (0.007) 
OVERDUE  0.172 -0.620* 0.147 0.181 -0.620* 0.147 
 
(0.320) (0.314) (0.290) (0.316) (0.313) (0.287) 
QUALITY -0.007 -0.098 0.037 0.005 -0.108 0.042 
 
(0.269) (0.203) (0.194) (0.271) (0.202) (0.194) 
CITY -0.173 -0.143 0.209 -0.173 -0.142 0.208 
 
(0.228) (0.151) (0.149) (0.229) (0.152) (0.150) 
CRIME 0.194 -0.448** 0.243 0.198 -0.443** 0.234 
 
(0.207) (0.164) (0.158) (0.208) (0.164) (0.157) 
INNOV -0.286 -0.615*** 0.561*** -0.27 -0.601*** 0.544*** 
 
(0.191) (0.124) (0.122) (0.187) (0.125) (0.124) 
EXPORTER 0.264 -0.148 0.021 0.27 -0.137 0.009 
 
(0.236) (0.195) (0.190) (0.236) (0.194) (0.189) 
LNGDPPC -0.224 0.86 -1.843 -0.179 0.848 -1.893 
 
(1.839) (1.042) (1.792) (1.837) (1.047) (1.815) 
CR 0.598 5.561 -7.796 0.819 5.665 -8.105 
 
(4.730) (3.567) (4.713) (4.727) (3.592) (4.785) 
CRxFEMALE2 
   
-0.682 -0.662 0.887 
    
(0.895) (0.586) (0.597) 
Pseudo R2 0.15 0.24 0.23 0.15 0.24 0.24 
N 339 624 634 339 624 634 
Notes: Moldova, Serbia, Montenegro and Tajikistan are excluded in the regressions due to lack of 
observation. All regressions include constant term, country, industry and year dummies. Robust standard 
errors are clustered at firm level and reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels, respectively. N is the number of observations. 
 
Table 4.9 presents probit regression results for each year separately. Our 
variable of interest is FEMALE among the independent variables, as it is in Table 
4.7. We again have insignificant coefficient estimates for the effect of female 
ownership on financial constraints faced by sole proprietorship firms. We see the 
effect of firm size is statistically significant only in 2005 and 2008, while the age of 
the firm gains statistical significance in 2009. The coefficient estimates for these 
two variables are in line with our expectations. The effect of QUALITY is 
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strongest in year 2005, while this effect vanishes in 2008 and 2009. In line with the 
results presented in Table 4.7 and 4.8, we observe innovative firms to be more 
likely to get loans, and to be less likely to be discouraged from applying for a loan. 
 
! "#$!
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.9 Probit regressions by year 
    2005                 2008 2009 
 
REJECT DISCOURAGED LOAN REJECT DISCOURAGED LOAN REJECT    DISCOURAGED LOAN 
FEMALE 0.325 0.137 -0.157 -0.137 0.08 -0.003 0.027 0.096 -0.13 
 
(0.217) (0.130) (0.136) (0.327) (0.183) (0.190) (0.277) (0.182) (0.179) 
SIZE -0.011* -0.013*** 0.018*** -0.003 -0.011*** 0.008*** -0.002 -0.003 0.003 
 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
AGE -0.017 -0.003 0.006 -0.006 0.001 -0.001 -0.064**  -0.012 0.029** 
 
(0.011) (0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.023) (0.010) (0.011) 
OVERDUE -0.802 0.008 0.274 . 0.082 0.313 0.451 -0.915* 0.024 
 
(0.579) (0.306) (0.308) . (0.507) (0.528) (0.416) (0.389) (0.379) 
QUALITY -0.76 -0.984** 0.969** -0.47 0.013 0.155 0.083 -0.201 0.091 
 
(0.524) (0.299) (0.314) (0.451) (0.322) (0.308) (0.406) (0.274) (0.255) 
CITY 0.62** 0.215 -0.331* -0.543 -0.258 0.47* -0.131 -0.032 0.147 
 
(0.229) (0.139) (0.139) (0.369) (0.210) (0.207) (0.328) (0.220) (0.222) 
CRIME 0.001 -0.025 0.034 0.732* -0.289 -0.017 -0.091 -0.592** 0.403 
 
(0.213) (0.132) (0.135) (0.366) (0.264) (0.254) (0.280) (0.223) (0.211) 
INNOV -0.27 -0.297* 0.327** -0.261 -0.694*** 0.581** -0.385 -0.557** 0.492** 
 
(0.185) (0.116) (0.119) (0.365) (0.182) (0.184) (0.268) (0.174) (0.174) 
EXPORT -0.429 -0.228 0.263 0.909* 0.209 -0.403 -0.405 -0.219 0.294 
 
(0.257) (0.178) (0.172) (0.361) (0.280) (0.275) (0.368) (0.278) (0.271) 
LNGDPPC 0.285 -0.264 0.165 -0.893** -0.480** 0.736*** 0.468 0.859 -1.999 
 
(0.388) (0.325) (0.303) (0.344) (0.172) (0.176) (1.924) (1.085) (1.729) 
CR -0.176 -1.723 1.304 -0.786 -0.604 0.865 1.799 5.392 -7.755 
 
(1.464) (0.932) (0.928) (0.784) (0.449) (0.457) (4.890) (3.691) (4.541) 
Pseudo R2 0.32 0.28 0.33 0.29 0.27 0.26 0.23 0.25 0.27 
N 452 794 794 153 293 297 175 322 332 
Notes: Moldova, Serbia, Montenegro and Tajikistan are excluded in the regressions due to lack of observation. All regressions include constant term, 
industry and country dummy variables. Robust standard errors are clustered at firm level and reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels, respectively.  N is the number of observations. 
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Table 4.10 Regressions results with sample selection 
 
REJECT REJECT REJECT REJECT 
FEMALE 0.037 -0.047 
  
 
(0.143) (0.395) 
  FEMALE3 
  
0.111 0.139 
   
(0.176) (0.439) 
SIZE -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
AGE -0.019** -0.019** -0.019* -0.019* 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
OVERDUE -0.216 -0.196 -0.191 -0.185 
 
(0.313) (0.311) (0.315) (0.314) 
QUALITY -0.106 -0.093 -0.103 -0.098 
 
(0.255) (0.254) (0.250) (0.249) 
CITY 0.096 0.097 0.101 0.103 
 
(0.145) (0.146) (0.146) (0.146) 
INNOV -0.216 -0.198 -0.200 -0.191 
 
(0.239) (0.240) (0.242) (0.243) 
EXPORTER -0.159 -0.144 -0.148 -0.143 
 
(0.221) (0.222) (0.218) (0.218) 
LNGDPPC -0.458 -0.375 -0.489 -0.462 
 
(1.184) (1.184) (1.158) (1.159) 
CR2 -0.396 -0.418 -0.367 -0.343 
 
(0.771) (0.807) (0.773) (0.798) 
CRXFEMALE(3) 
 
0.122 
 
-0.049 
  
(0.595) 
 
(0.667) 
INVMILLS -0.161 -0.224 -0.194 -0.217 
 
(0.680) (0.680) (0.670) (0.670) 
Pseudo R2 0.158 0.158 0.156 0.156 
N 820 820 818 818 
Notes: Moldova, Serbia, Montenegro and Tajikistan are excluded in the 
regressions due to lack of observation. All regressions include constant term, 
industry and country dummy variables. Robust standard errors are clustered 
at firm level and reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels, respectively. N is the number of 
observations. 
!
We check if our estimations are affected by the sample selection in Table 4.10. 
As the discouraged firms do not apply for loans we can’t know what would be the 
potential result of their loan application. We see that CRIME doesn’t have a 
statistically significant effect on REJECT, but has statistically significant effect 
on the DISCOURAGED as presented the baseline regression results in Table 4.7. 
Based on these results we included CRIME in the selection equation where 
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DISCOURAGED is the dependent variable. Our dependent variable in the main 
equation is REJECT. In the first two columns of Table 4.10, our variable of 
interest is FEMALE, i.e. gender of the owner. In the third and fourth columns our 
variable of interest is FEMALE3, i.e. gender of the top manager. As we compare 
the results in Table 4.7 and Table 4.D in the appendix with Table 4.10, we see 
that neither gender of the owner nor gender of the top manager affects the 
probability of having a rejected loan application.    
Table 11 Regressions by size of the firms 
 
micro sized firms other sizes 
 loan discouraged reject loan discouraged reject    
FEMALE 0.031 0.026 -0.072 -0.063 0.040 -0.063 
 
(0.117) (0.113) (0.193) (0.156) (0.156) (0.219) 
SIZE 0.115*** -0.125*** -0.037 0.005*** -0.005*** -0.002 
 
(0.022) (0.021) (0.033) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
AGE -0.004 0.007 -0.005 0.016* -0.006 -0.030**  
 
(0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.012) 
OVERDUE 0.057 -0.226 -0.116 0.348 -0.454 -0.331 
 
(0.276) (0.286) (0.415) (0.325) (0.322) (0.444) 
QUALITY 0.020 0.088 -0.148 0.371 -0.461* -0.255 
 
(0.260) (0.252) (0.424) (0.202) (0.222) (0.285) 
CITY -0.146 -0.029 0.360 0.121 -0.032 -0.112 
 
(0.138) (0.131) (0.212) (0.156) (0.163) (0.245) 
CRIME 0.242 -0.230 -0.096 0.102 -0.300 0.316 
 
(0.135) (0.129) (0.203) (0.173) (0.185) (0.240) 
INNOV 0.539*** -0.397*** -0.552** 0.440** -0.594*** -0.100 
 
(0.112) (0.109) (0.174) (0.138) (0.142) (0.215) 
EXPORTER 0.091 -0.002 -0.142 0.306 -0.278 -0.213 
 
(0.191) (0.196) (0.292) (0.170) (0.181) (0.250) 
LNGDPPC 0.579 -0.885 0.292 2.122** -2.628*** -1.659 
 
(0.625) (0.679) (1.419) (0.724) (0.712) (1.341) 
CR -0.119 0.190 0.114 0.158 -0.144 -0.280 
 
(0.543) (0.533) (0.919) (0.899) (0.991) (1.254) 
N 770 770 367 648 619 320 
Notes: All regressions include constant term, industry and country dummy variables. Robust standard 
errors are clustered at firm level and reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels, respectively. N is the number of observations. 
 
In order to evaluate the effect of female ownership on the financial constraints 
for different sizes of firms we run separate regressions for micro and firms of other 
sizes. We define the firms with less than 11 full time employees as micro firms and 
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observe that the non-effect of the female ownership on financial constraints is 
valid for both micro and other sized firms as presented in Table 11. 
4.5 Conclusion 
The aim of this paper is to examine the financial constraints faced by female 
owned sole proprietorship firms in loan markets. We address this question by 
using a firm-level data on 27 countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia from 
2005 to 2009 and examining the issue for sole proprietorship firms i.e. the firms 
that have female owner versus the firms that have male owner. We define 
financial constraints via probability of a firm getting loan. We also take into 
account the firms those are discouraged from borrowing and the available 
information on firms’ perception on difficulty degree of access to finance. Female 
and male owned enterprises have the same perception on difficulty of accessing 
finance as the descriptive statistics show that firms suffering from access to 
finance do not vary extensively with respect to gender categories.  
In our sample the percentage of discouraged enterprises and the percentage of 
enterprises that have no demand for loan is slightly higher for female 
entrepreneurs as compared to their male counterparts. Although we observe 
higher mean values of rejection rates for female firm owners, this difference is not 
statistically significant. As we control for the firm and country level differences in 
the multivariate analysis, the significance of financial constraints for female owned 
firms mostly disappears. We also take into account the effect of top manager’s 
gender in order to examine the existence of financial constraints in loan markets 
faced by sole proprietorship firms that have female top managers. We have some 
evidence in favour of the fact that the enterprises that have a female top manager 
are more likely to be discouraged from loan application than their male 
counterparts. Encouraging policies for female entrepreneurs in lending markets 
should be implemented in order to facilitate higher firm growth rates and 
accordingly economic growth in less-developed countries. To this end less-
developed countries will be able to catch up with the developed economies.  
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Before closing we should mention about the limitations of our study. First 
BEEPS doesn’t provide all necessary information that lenders may require to 
evaluate the creditworthiness of borrowers. In order reduce concerns of omitted 
variables bias we take into account all available information provided in BEEPS. 
Second the structure of BEEPS doesn’t allow us to know the share of female 
owners. So it would be a more complete analysis of financial constraints by 
gender, if we had available information to compare three groups of firms: firms 
that only have female entrepreneurs, only have male entrepreneurs, and firms that 
have both male and female owners. A comparison between these groups of firms in 
other countries can be a direction future research topic as well as comparisons 
between developed, less-developed, developing, and/or transition economies.   
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4.7 Appendix 
Table 4.A Female entrepreneurship by countries 
Country 
Number of 
male 
owned 
firms 
Number of 
female 
owned 
firms Total 
% of 
female 
owned 
firms 
Number of 
firms with 
male top 
manager 
Number of 
firms with 
female top 
manager Total 
% of 
female 
managed 
firms 
Georgia 51 45 96 46.9 34 14 48 29.2 
Ukraine 191 164 355 46.2 147 68 215 31.6 
Romania 14 12 26 46.2 2 1 3 33.3 
Kazakhstan 127 109 236 46.2 13 11 24 45.8 
Latvia 46 39 85 45.9 5 4 9 44.4 
Hungary 71 46 117 39.3 1 2 3 66.7 
Belarus 100 63 163 38.7 53 20 73 27.4 
Moldova 80 47 127 37 31 10 41 24.4 
Poland 378 206 584 35.3 96 37 133 27.8 
Bulgaria 226 118 344 34.3 52 18 70 25.7 
Kyrgyzstan 61 30 91 33 11 3 14 21.4 
Bosnia 113 55 168 32.7 45 12 57 21.1 
Russia 145 70 215 32.6 3 6 9 66.7 
Lithuania 70 33 103 32 36 12 48 25 
Slovakia 62 27 89 30.3 23 8 31 25.8 
Estonia 8 3 11 27.3 1 0 1 0 
Czech 
Republic 
154 54 208 26 49 14 63 22.2 
Slovenia 42 14 56 25 10 1 11 9.1 
Tajikistan 103 34 137 24.8 17 5 22 22.7 
Uzbekistan 176 58 234 24.8 90 14 104 13.5 
Montenegro 65 17 82 20.7 61 9 70 12.9 
Serbia 200 48 248 19.4 107 12 119 10.1 
Croatia 275 62 337 18.4 14 3 17 17.6 
FYROM 102 22 124 17.7 20 0 20 0 
Turkey 98 18 116 15.5 106 10 116 8.6 
Azerbaijan 252 44 296 14.9 97 5 102 4.9 
Armenia 214 34 248 13.7 13 6 19 31.6 
Albania 115 14 129 10.9 7 1 8 12.5 
Total 3,539 1,486 5,025 29.6 1,144 306 1,450 21.1 
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Table 4.B Female entrepreneurship by country groups 
 
Number 
of male 
owned 
firms 
Number  
of female 
owned 
firms Total 
% of 
female 
owned 
firms 
Number of 
firms with 
male top 
manager 
Number of 
firms with 
female top 
manager Total 
% of 
female 
managed 
firms 
European Union  1,071 552 1,623 34 275 97 372 26.1 
Southeastern Europe 870 218 1,088 20 254 37 291 12.7 
Middle income CIS 563 406 969 41.9 216 105 321 32.7 
Low income CIS 937 292 1,229 23.8 293 57 350 16.3 
Turkey 98 18 116 15.5 106 10 116 8.6 
Total 3,539 1,486 5,025 29.6 1,144 306 1,450 21.1 
Notes: European Union countries included in the sample are Poland, Hungary, Romania, Lithuania, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria; Southeastern Europe countries are Bosnia, FYROM, Croatia, Montenegro, 
Albania, Serbia; Middle income CIS countries are Belarus, Ukraine, Russia, Kazakhstan; Low income CIS 
countries are Georgia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan. 
 
 
 
Table 4.C Sectoral composition by gender 
 
number of 
male owned 
firms 
number of 
female 
owned firms Total 
% of male 
owned 
firms 
% of female 
owned 
firms 
% of female 
owned firms in 
the sector 
Other manufacturing 246 61 307 7.01 4.11 19.87 
Food 433 138 571 12.34 9.31 24.17 
Textiles 77 26 103 2.19 1.75 25.24 
Garments 154 196 350 4.39 13.22 56.00 
Chemicals 28 9 37 0.80 0.61 24.32 
Plastics and rubber 44 6 50 1.25 0.40 12.00 
Non metallic mineral 56 23 79 1.60 1.55 29.11 
Basic metals 23 5 28 0.66 0.34 17.86 
Fabricate metal 
production 
247 37 284 7.04 2.49 
13.03 
Machinery and 
equipment 
101 26 127 2.88 1.75 
20.47 
Electronics   12 3 15 0.34 0.20 20.00 
Construction  308 52 360 8.77 3.51 14.44 
Other services 355 207 562 10.11 13.96 36.83 
Wholesale 279 81 360 7.95 5.46 22.50 
Retail 705 477 1182 20.09 32.16 40.36 
Hotel and restaurants 210 85 295 5.98 5.73 28.81 
Transportation 200 37 237 5.70 2.49 15.61 
IT 32 14 46 0.91 0.94 30.43 
Total 3,510 1,483 4,993 100 100  
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Table 4.D Probit regression results for female top managers 
 
REJECT DISCOURAGED LOAN REJECT DISCOURAGED LOAN 
FEMALE3 0.142 0.204* -0.213* 0.133 0.08 -0.133 
 
(0.148) (0.096) (0.095) (0.431) (0.284) (0.288) 
SIZE -0.004** -0.007*** 0.007*** -0.004**  -0.007*** 0.007*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
AGE -0.018* 0.000 0.007 -0.018*  0.000 0.007 
 
(0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) 
OVERDUE -0.257 -0.336 0.235 -0.257 -0.335 0.234 
 
(0.251) (0.222) (0.200) (0.251) (0.222) (0.200) 
QUALITY -0.132 -0.305* 0.263 -0.132 -0.302* 0.262 
 
(0.210) (0.151) (0.146) (0.210) (0.151) (0.146) 
CITY 0.102 -0.042 -0.027 0.102 -0.043 -0.026 
 
(0.144) (0.095) (0.096) (0.144) (0.095) (0.096) 
CRIME 0.009 -0.224* 0.181 0.009 -0.224* 0.181 
 
(0.138) (0.100) (0.100) (0.139) (0.100) (0.100) 
INNOV -0.265* -0.451*** 0.464*** -0.265* -0.455*** 0.466*** 
 
(0.122) (0.081) (0.081) (0.121) (0.082) (0.082) 
EXPORTER -0.213 -0.274* 0.329** -0.213 -0.276* 0.330** 
 
(0.165) (0.123) (0.118) (0.165) (0.123) (0.117) 
LNGDPPC -0.444 -1.712*** 1.418** -0.444 -1.718*** 1.421** 
 
(0.926) (0.484) (0.472) (0.925) (0.484) (0.473) 
CR -0.251 -0.346 0.411 -0.255 -0.411 0.45 
 
(0.758) (0.441) (0.439) (0.778) (0.461) (0.461) 
CRXFEMALE3 
   
0.014 0.199 -0.128 
    
(0.641) (0.436) (0.441) 
Pseudo R2 0.16 0.23 0.24 0.16 0.23 0.24 
N 827 1429 1432 827 1429 1432 
Notes: Probit regression results for years 2005, 2008 and 2009 include constant term, year, country 
and industry dummy variables. Robust standard errors are clustered at firm level and reported in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels, 
respectively. N is the number of observations.  
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Figure 4.A Distribution of sole proprietorship firms with respect to their size. 
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Chapter 5 
Market Power and Riskness in the Turkish Banking System78 
 
 
5.1 Introduction  
Demirguc-Kunt and Kane (2002) report that banking crises are most costly for 
developing countries’ economies and 93 different countries had systematic banking 
crises in 25 years between 1975 and 2000. Overall, output losses to GDP 
associated with 43 banking crises from 1977 to 1998 was 16.9% and average fiscal 
cost of banking resolution to GDP was 18% from 1997 to 2003 (Carstens et al., 
2004).  
The U.S. had two systemic banking crises over the last 3 decades, the first 
1988, and the second 2007. Profitability of U.S. banks declined by 83.5% from 
$35.2 in 2006 to 5.8 billion in 2007 (Laeven and Valencia, 2008) and many big 
financial institutions failed. Frame and White (2004, 2007) highlight the effect of 
increased competition for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. They argue that this 
competition increased risk-taking behaviours by both enterprises, and reduced 
their charter value. Both enterprises were taken over by the U.S. Treasury in 
September 2008 and were placed under control of the Federal Housing Finance 
Agency (Lockhart, 2009). Leuvensteijn et al. (2007) indicate that between 1994 
and 2004 the U.S. had the most competitive loan market compared to the 
Eurozone countries and UK.  
Turkey has also experienced two systemic banking crises over the last 3 
decades. In 1982 the fiscal cost of the crisis was 2.4% of GDP and the 2000 crisis 
had an extremely high fiscal cost (32% of GDP), which caused a 37% output loss 
in GDP (Laeven and Valencia, 2008). The recent crisis in US and Europe was 
longer than the crisis in Turkey. The source of the crisis in Turkey was political 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
78 This paper is coauthored with Flavio Bazzana. An earlier version of this paper was presented at 
2010 Barcelona Empirical Banking Summer School and at Finance and Growth in Central and 
Eastern Europe Conference 2010 in Zagreb. Another version is published in Elmas Yaldiz and 
Flavio Bazzana, 2010. Financial Theory and Practice, 34(3) with the title “The effect of market 
power on bank risk taking in Turkey". 
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then turned to a financial crisis. The burden of the crises was highest in Iceland, 
Ireland and Turkey relatively as we compare the fiscal costs of the crises. On the 
other hand, fiscal cost of the crisis in Turkey was higher than that of the US as 
can be seen in Table 5.A in the appendix.  
Given these high costs of banking crises and the role of competition in the U.S. 
subprime crisis, it is important to examine the role of banking competition on 
financial stability. There are two main hypotheses in the banking literature about 
the relationship between competition and stability: competition-fragility and 
competition-stability. The competition-fragility hypothesis argues that profits 
provide a buffer against fragility and provide incentives against excessive risk 
taking. Competition on the other hand causes banks to be more risky. Thus more 
concentrated and less competitive banking systems considered to be more stable. 
In more competitive environments, on the other hand, banks have higher 
incentives to take more excessive risks, resulting in higher fragility. Moreover 
Mishkin (1999) underlines that bigger banks that hold market power are more 
likely to have diversified loan portfolios in different locations thanks to their wider 
branch network, and this makes bank failures less likely79. 
In contrast, Boyd and De Nicolo’s (2005) competition-stability hypothesis 
suggests that less competitive banking environments cause financial fragility. Since 
less competitive banking environments allow banks to increase interest rates for 
loans, it follows that borrowers are more likely to have difficulties in repaying 
their loans, resulting in a higher nonperforming loans; competitive environments 
are considered to result in greater stability in banking80. Moreover, Mishkin (1999) 
argues that under the shelter of regulators’ “too big to fail” policies, bigger banks 
are more likely to take excessive risks. Consequently, they threaten the stability 
because failure of a large institution exposes the financial system to systemic risk. 
Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) assume that the default risk of borrowers (firms) is 
highly correlated with bank failures. On the other hand, Martinez-Miera and 
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79 See also Keeley (1990), Matutes and Vives (2000), Caminal and Matutes (2002), Martinez-Miera 
and Repullo (2008). 
80 See Boyd et al. (2009) for further discussion.  
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Repullo (2008) questions the relationship between firm and bank failures and 
argue that Boyd and De Nicolo’s (2005) results may not necessarily be true. 
This topic is particularly important for the Turkish banking system for several 
reasons. (i) Although many banks in developed economies were affected negatively 
in the recent global financial crisis, Turkish banks were not affected to a great 
extent. (ii) Turkey has experienced intensive regulation processes that have led to 
a decline in the number of banks and, possibly, to changes in the competitive 
structure, especially after the crisis 2000, which was an important turning point 
for Turkish banking. (iii) Turkey has a bank-based financial structure accordingly 
banks have important role in achieving financial stability in Turkey81. Although 
there has been a recent increase in the number and size of non-bank financial 
institutions, the system is still dominated by commercial banks. (iv) The 
relationship between competition and stability in banking has been investigated in 
many studies for the U.S. and other advanced economies. However, only little 
empirical evidence exist in this issue for emerging economies. 
To the best of our knowledge, there have only been two studies for Turkey. 
Tunay (2009) uses non-performing loans and crisis year dummy as measures of 
fragility, while the three-bank concentration ratio, the ratio of privately owned 
bank assets to total assets of the system, and the ratio of foreign bank assets to 
total assets of the system as measures of competition for Turkish banking. 
Employing fixed and random effects models, he estimates the relationship between 
competition and fragility for the years between 1988 and 2007. Tunay (2009) 
argues that Turkish banks are operating in a non-competitive environment and 
finds that there is no statistically significant relationship between concentration 
and fragility measures. Moreover, foreign banks are found to decrease fragility and 
domestic banks are found to increase fragility.  Employing static and dynamic 
panel data techniques, Yald!z and Bazzana (2010) obtain the similar results with 
Tunay (2009). They also argue that banks in Turkey are operating in a non-
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
81 Total assets of the banking system account for nearly 90% of total assets of the financial sector 
and commercial banks held 97% of the total banking system assets in 2008 (Banks Association of 
Turkey, 2008). 
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competitive environment and show that the effect of the market power on the 
risk-taking behaviours of banks is not crystal clear in Turkey after 2000.  
In order to understand the effect of banks’ market power on loan risk and 
overall soundness of commercial banks in Turkey, this paper modifies Yald!z and 
Bazzana (2010) in several ways82 and adds new observations83. This paper employs 
two different dependent measures to account for financial fragility and soundness: 
loan risk and Z-index respectively. As proxies for the market power of individual 
banks from 2001 to 2011, we employ the Lerner index and the ratio of the 
difference between the total revenues and total cost to the total revenues.  
Rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the 
methodology. The third section summarizes the data and sample used in the 
study. The fourth section reports the empirical results. The last section discusses 
the implications of these results.  
5.2 Methodology 
In order to test whether the competiton-stability or competition fragility 
hypotheses are valid for Turkish banks, proper measures for fragility and 
competition are needed. Empirical studies have considered the fragility from 
different points of views. Some studies examine it from a macro perspective and 
take into account systemic banking crises (e.g., Beck et al., 2006 and Schaeck et 
al., 2006). Other studies consider bank fragility from a micro or managerial 
perspective. These studies define fragility as the failure of an individual bank (e.g., 
Bordo et al., 1993 and Fungacova and Weill, 2009) and/or relate it to riskiness of 
banks using Z-index and/or non-performing loans ratios to measure risk (e.g., 
Boyd et al., 2006, Jiménez et al., 2008 and Berger et al., 2009) to account for 
financial fragility.  
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82 We separated gross nonperforming loans into two parts as net nonperforming loans and loan loss 
provisions. We also include one-lagged values of market power proxies as instrumental variables. 
Year fixed effects are also added in the regressions. For the cost function, the price of labour 
calculated by the dividing the personnel expenses by the number of personnel, rather than dividing 
it by the total assets. Finally total assets considered as total output measure of banks in these 
regressions.  
83 We add years 2010 and 2011.  
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There is also no consensus about the methods for measuring competition. The 
structure-conduct performance paradigm explains competitive behaviours of banks 
via the structural characteristics of the industry and measure competition by the 
concentration ratios and Herfindahl-Hirshman Index (HHI). Accordingly in more 
concentrated markets, banks are more likely to behave less competitive, which 
results in higher price and profit levels. (Claessens and Laeven, 2003; Abbasoglu et 
al., 2007; Carbo´ et al., 2009). On the other hand the non-structural paradigm 
focuses on bank behaviour by measuring competition indicators such as Lerner 
Index, Panzar and Rosse H-stat, net interest margin, etc…    
Market power can be defined as the ability to sell products above the marginal 
cost. The Lerner index is one of the earliest and most popular indices for 
measuring market power, which it does by calculating the difference between the 
price and marginal cost over the price84. The value of the index ranges from zero 
to one: in cases of perfect competition, the price equals marginal cost and the 
value of the index is zero, and as the price is set by the firm above its marginal 
cost, the value of the Lerner index increases. In other words, the more market 
power a firm has, the higher is Lerner index. In this study, the Lerner index for 
bank i in year t is calculated as:   
 
 .                                                            (5.1)                       
where  is the price of bank production, and  is the marginal cost of bank 
production. In this study  is calculated as the ratio of total revenues to the 
total assets following the previous studies85. The disadvantage of the Lerner index 
is that the marginal cost function needs to be derived from an estimated total cost 
function. In this chapter, the total cost function is calculated by using translog 
functional form:  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
84 See Jiménez et al. (2008), Hainz et al. (2008), Berger et al. (2009), Fungacova and Weill (2009) 
for use of the Lerner index in banking.  
85 Namely Jiménez et al. (2008), Berger et al. (2009), Carbo´ et al. (2009), and Fungacova and 
Weill (2009). 
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Cost share equations are derived as: 
 
                                            (5.3)                 
 
where  is the total cost,  is the output,   input price, and  is the cost 
share of jth input for bank i in year t. In order to estimate the above translog cost 
function, we need to specify input and output measures. Berger and Humphrey 
(1997) state that there is no consensus on input and output measures in banking. 
Nonetheless, there are two dominant approaches: intermediation and production. 
The production approach evaluates banks as production units that produce 
services for depositors and borrowers. According to this approach, production 
factors such as land, labour, and capital are used as inputs to produce banking 
services and production is measured by the number of transactions or documents 
processed over a given time period. However, since this information is not easy to 
obtain, the number of accounts or total assets have often been used as a proxy for 
bank production in the literature. The intermediation approach on the other hand, 
considers commercial banks as intermediaries between borrowers and lenders; they 
collect deposits from depositors and make loans to borrowers, this approach 
assumes that banks use labour, physical capital and deposits as production 
factors.  
 Following Berger et al. (2009), Carbo´ et al. (2009), Turk-Ariss (2010) we use 
total assets to approximate for total output by banks, while labour, physical 
capital, and deposits plus borrowed funds are used as inputs. The price of labour 
is the unit price of labour and it is approximated by the ratio of personnel 
expenses (including severance payments) to the number of personnel. The price of 
physical capital is the ratio of other noninterest expenses (excluding personnel 
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expenses and severance payments) to fixed assets. Finally, the price of funds is the 
unit price of funds, and it is constructed as the ratio of interest expenses to the 
total deposit plus borrowed funds. 
In order to ensure homogeneity of degree one in factor prices and symmetry 
properties, the cost function is estimated together with the following restrictions.  
 
                                    
 
 
 
In a nutshell, the total cost function (equation 5.2) is estimated together with 
the cost share equations (equation 5.3) as a system of equations by introducing 
the homogeneity of degree one and symmetry restrictions as seemingly unrelated 
regressions. The marginal cost is derived from the total cost function as 
 
.                                    (5.4)                  
 
Calculating a Lerner index as a proxy for market power is complex and possibly 
subject to many misspecification biases. First, it requires many assumptions about 
inputs and outputs, and second, it requires many assumptions about the 
calculation methods of input prices, output and price. Moreover it requires 
assumptions on the functional form of the cost function. Beyond these 
assumptions, the number of parameters to be estimated is large86. Thus, in order 
to calculate the market power of each bank in Turkey, we use another measure of 
market power (MP) that does not specify any inputs and outputs, as well as a 
functional form that is simply the difference between total revenues and total cost 
to the total revenues. Since, the aim of this paper is to understand whether 
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86 See Ray (1982).  
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competition causes higher risk-taking in Turkish banks, the general empirical 
model to be estimated is: 
Fragility measures of banks = f(market power, control variables) 
In order to account for fragility of banks, nonperforming loans over total loans 
(NPLN), provisions over total loans (PROV) are employed as ex-post and ex-ante 
measures of loan risk respectively. We also use Z-index (Z) as a measure of bank-
level stability. The Z is computed as Z = (NPA+EA)/!(NPA), where NPA is the 
net profit to the assets, EA is the equity to assets ratio and !(NPA) is the 
standard deviation of the NPA. Z increases with higher profitability and 
capitalization levels, and it decreases with unstable earnings that are reflected by 
a higher standard deviation of net profits to assets. Thus, there is a trade-off 
between the Z and the bank’s probability of failure (Berger et al., 2009; Turk-
Ariss, 2010). In other words, the Z is a proxy of a bank’s soundness and inverse 
measure of risk as it accounts for overall stability at the bank level.  
As a first step to estimate the relationship between market power and risk-
taking behaviours of banks we run OLS regressions. However, previous studies 
show that there is a possible endogeneity problem in modelling market power and 
risk relationship (Shaeck and "ihák, 2007; Berger et al., 2009). That is to say, 
causality may go both ways and market power may actually be a function of the 
level of risk. In case of endogeneity, OLS estimates will be biased. To mitigate 
concerns of bias due to endogeneity, instrumental variables (IV) for endogenous 
regressors are used. However Baum and Schaffer (2003) argue that 
heteroscedasticity cause inefficiency in the 2SLS estimate and suggest generalized 
method of moments (GMM) instead of the 2SLS87 . To this end we use an 
instrumental variable technique with a GMM estimator to address the possible 
endogeneity problems. Finally NPLN and PROV can not have negative values 
and their maximum value can not exceed 100. This bounded nature of our 
dependent variables leads to some predicted values exceeding these boundaries 
when using OLS, which is analogous to the drawbacks of the linear probability 
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87  Results of the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg heteroscedasticity test indicate presence of 
heteroscedasticity in our regressions accordingly GMM is more suitable than the 2SLS.   
!!
"#$!
model for binary data as discussed by Papke and Wooldridge (1996). To estimate 
regreesions for NPLN and PROV, we use a generalised linear model (GLM) with a 
logit link and the binomial family, as suggested by Papke and Wooldridge (1996). 
5.3  Data and descriptive statistics  
The years from 1999 to 2001 were years of problems for Turkish economy and 
banking. During these years the Turkish economy was hit by two severe economic 
crises and by a destructive earthquake in the most industrialized region of the 
country. For banking, the parliament approved the new Banking Law no. 4389 in 
1999. In this new law, the Government guarantee on deposits, which had been set 
at 100% for the year 1994 was restricted to 100,000 Turkish liras in 2000 and was 
further restricted to 50,000 Turkish liras in 2001.  
The Turkish Banking Restructuring Program was started in 2001. To build a 
stronger banking system after the two severe crises, this program was conducted 
under the auspices of the IMF. The aim of these actions was to create a more 
efficient banking system. However, the restructuring program has turned out to be 
one of the most costly restructuring programs in the world (Banks Association of 
Turkey, 2005). 
In Turkey, there were 81 banks operating in 1999. Over the following decade 
this number fell drastically because of bank failures and acquisitions of weaker 
banks by healthier and stronger ones. As of December 2012, there were only 44 
banks operating in Turkey. Of these, 31 are commercial banks and 13 are 
development and investment banks. Of the commercial banks, 3 are state owned, 
11 are privately-owned domestic banks 88 , 11 are foreign banks founded in 
Turkey89, 6 are foreign banks having branches in Turkey90, and one operates under 
the control of Saving and Deposit Insurance Fund (SDIF)91. Moreover 5 banks 
control 61% of the total assets of the system on average, while the top ten banks 
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88 They hold 50 % of the commercial banks’ total assets in 2011.  
89 They hold 13 % of the commercial banks’ total assets in 2011. 
90 They hold 0.8 % of the commercial banks’ total assets in 2011. 
91  SDIF is a state institution administered by Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency 
(BRSA). Main duties of SDIF are insuring saving deposits and resolving insolvent banks.!
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control 87% of total assets on average. Of the top 5 banks 3 are state-owned, and 
together they hold 1/3 of the total assets on average. Overall the total assets of 
banking system account for nearly 90% of the total assets in the financial sector 
and commercial banks held 97% of total banking system assets in 2009 (Banks 
Association of Turkey, 2010). Consequently banking has a distinctive place in the 
Turkish financial system and plays an important role in achieving financial 
stability in Turkey. Although there has been a recent increase in the number and 
size of non-banking financial institutions, the system is still dominated by 
commercial banks.  
This study uses manually collected data from the banks’ balance sheets and 
income statements as reported to the Banks Association of Turkey (BAT) on the 
website of BAT92. We have a sample of 30 commercial banks that have been 
active from 2001 to 2011. We exclude the Birlesik Fon Bankasi which operates 
under the control of Saving and Deposit Insurance Fund (SDIF). Table 5.1 
presents the definitions and summary statistics for the variables used in the 
empirical analysis.    
 
Table 5.1 Summary statistics 
Variable Definition N Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
NPLN 
Non-performing Loans (net of provisions)/ 
Total Loans (%). 330 2.722 9.966 0 100 
PROV Loan Loss Provisions /Total Loans (%). 330 65.238 33.606 0 100 
Z (NPA+EA) /std dev (NPA). 330 1.192 1.038 -1.295 6.004 
LERNER 
Lerner index (price of output-marginal 
Cost)/Price of output (%). 329 99.054 0.307 96.08 99.65 
MP 
(Total Revenues-Total Cost)/Total 
Revenues (%). 330 22.162 23.623 -188.73 71.0 
ASSETSHARE Asset share in the sector (%). 330 3.054 4.644 0.004 18.68 
FOREIGN 
Dummy=1 if the bank is a foreign owned 
bank, zero otherwise. 330 0.533 0.500 0 1 
STATE 
Dummy=1 if the bank is a state owned 
bank, zero otherwise.  330 0.100 0.300 0 1 
 
The average Lerner index is 0.9905 for the 2001-2011 period. These results show 
that the banks in Turkey highly enjoy monopoly rents and they do not operate in 
a competitive environment. These results are consistent with Abbasoglu et al. 
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92 http://www.tbb.org.tr/eng/Banka_ve_Sektor_Bilgileri/Tum_Raporlar.aspx  
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(2007) that provide evidences for a monopolistic competitive structure in the 
Turkish banking system from 2001 to 2005. ASSETSHARE indicates that nearly 
20% of the total banking system assets are hold by Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Ziraat 
Bankası which is a state-owned bank and 50% of the total banking system assets 
are hold by the three largest banks.  
Table 5.2 gives the average values of the variables by year. In this table we 
report the concentration measures in addition to our variables. In this table CR3 
is the total asset share of the three largest banks while CR5 is the total asset 
share of the five largest banks in the banking sector. HHI refers to Herfindahl-
Hirshman Index. This table reveals that both concentration variables and market 
power proxies increased from 2001 to 2011, which indicates decreasing competition 
among banks from 2001 to 2011. On the other hand the average NPLN kept 
decreasing by year, while banks had higher PROV and Z over years. These values 
show that commercial banks in Turkey behaved more disciplined from 2001 to 
2011, as they gain higher market power, which means less competition among 
them.  
Table 5.2 Average values of the variables by year 
YEAR NPLN PROV Z LERNER MP 
ASSET 
SHARE 
CR3 CR5 HHI 
2001 10.414 51.097 0.812 98.985 12.518 2.754  36.549 55.684 0.08 
2002 3.148 61.427 1.159 99.087 23.446 2.848  38.078 58.428 0.086 
2003 4.072 68.497 1.414 99.011 19.083 2.926  40.084 60.27 0.092 
2004 4.905 68.31 1.077 99.029 21.645 2.994  39.737 59.165 0.093 
2005 1.932 68.36 1.086 99.005 19.078 3.028  41.623 60.831 0.096 
2006 0.332 70.787 1.068 99.017 17.678 3.160  40.712 62.607 0.095 
2007 0.426 68.657 1.377 99.066 22.946 3.157  40.754 61.881 0.094 
2008 0.953 62.283 1.317 99.069 23.297 3.165  41.212 62.375 0.094 
2009 1.721 66.463 1.476 99.148 31.948 3.170  42.981 63.001 0.098 
2010 1.077 67.023 1.215 99.091 27.366 3.181  42.305 62.885 0.097 
2011 0.961 64.72 1.105 99.081 24.774 3.212  40.406 61.225 0.093 
Total 2.722 65.238 1.192 99.054 22.162 3.054  40.404 60.759 0.093 
 
5.4 Regression results  
Two variables are employed in the study to approximate the market power of 
Turkish banks. LERNER is derived from the marginal cost function and the price 
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of the bank’s production; MP is calculated as the difference between the total 
revenue and total cost divided by the total revenue. Higher values of market 
power correspond to lower degrees of competition. Thus, a positive (negative) 
coefficient is expected between market power proxies and Z (NPLN and PROV) 
according to the competition-fragility hypothesis, while the competition-stability 
hypothesis expects a negative (positive) relationship between market power 
proxies and Z (NPLN and PROV). 
Tables 5.3 and 5.4 present the results of the empirical models. For each 
dependent variable the first columns in these tables give the OLS estimation 
results. For each dependent variable the second columns present the results of 
instrumental variable (IV) estimations. Finally the third columns give the GLM 
regression results for NPLN and PROV variables 93 . Table 5.3 reports the 
estimation results when MP approximates market power. 
 
Table 5.3 Estimation results when MP is the market power proxy 
 Dep. Var. NPLN Dep. Var. PROV Dep. Var: Z 
 OLS IV GLM OLS IV GLM OLS IV  
MP -0.151* -0.073 -0.041*** -0.072 -0.289 -0.005 0.0156*** 0.0176*   
 (0.066) (0.075) (0.010) (0.094) (0.317) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) 
ASSETSHARE 0.398 0.350 0.050 5.228*** 4.521** 0.355*** -0.0755** -0.0750*   
 (0.822) (0.458) (0.182) (1.464) (1.622) (0.079) (0.028) (0.033) 
FOREIGN -9.910 -16.670 -7.977*** -34.03* -18.680 -3.686** -3.597*** -3.053*** 
 (10.13) (11.27) (0.988) (15.07) (9.960) (1.261) (0.503) (0.458) 
STATE -16.040 -18.63 -1.111 -99.23*** -27.46 -3.048* -2.273*** -3.111*** 
 (17.980) (12.65) (1.403) (24.800) (14.67) (1.315) (0.669) (0.512) 
N 330 300 330 330 300 330 330 300 
R2/Pseudo R2  0.289 0.288 0.77 0.633 0.935 0.795 0.684 0.864 
Endogeneity  0.705   0.726   0.611 
Notes: Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. In each model year and bank dummies are 
included in order to account for macro level and bank level heterogeneity. Each model contains constant 
term. In OLS regressions adjusted R2 is reported. In GLM regressions the Pseudo R2 is calculated as the 
correlation between the actual and the predicted values of the dependent variables. The endogeneity test 
reports p-value of the null hypothesis that the specified MP can be treated as exogenous. *, **, and *** 
indicate statistical significance at 5%, 1% and 0.1%, respectively. N is the number of observations. 
 
As for the relationship between NPLN and MP, the OLS and GLM regressions 
in Table 5.3 indicate a negative and statistically significant association; and the 
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relationship between MP and PROV is also negative but statistically insignificant. 
These findings suggest that as market power increases, the financial fragility 
approximated by the ex-post loan risk (NPLN) decreases. This is interpreted, as 
the banks gain market power become more able to manage their loan risk. 
Moreover, our OLS results indicate a positive relationship between MP and the 
soundness of banks (Z). This finding indicates that the soundness of banks 
increases with higher degrees of market power. Accordingly these two findings are 
consistent with the predictions of competition-fragility hypothesis, which suggests 
a negative association between competition and stability. However this 
relationship is ambiguous for the models where PROV is the dependent variable.   
    
Table 5.4 Estimation results when LERNER is the market power proxy 
 
Dep. Var.: NPLN Dep. Var.: PROV Dep. Var.: Z 
 OLS IV GLM OLS IV GLM OLS IV  
LERNER -11.430 1.052 -2.928*** -10.270 -47.530 -0.677* 0.962** 0.329 
 
(6.048) (6.708) (0.776) (6.212) (26.180) (0.322) (0.342) (0.559) 
ASSETSHARE 0.392 0.077 0.003 5.464*** 5.410** 0.369*** -0.0660* -0.037 
 
(0.812) (0.443) (0.166) (1.494) (1.732) (0.082) (0.030) (0.037) 
FOREIGN -8.506 -19.58 -7.568*** -29.74 -52.25* -3.517** -3.577*** -3.146*** 
 
(10.36) (13.01) (1.152) (15.34) (20.60) (1.268) (0.555) (0.597) 
STATE -11.27 -18.71 -0.353 -39.81** -16.430 -2.975* -3.124*** -3.182*** 
 
(12.68) (13.58) (1.329) (14.82) (17.92) (1.334) (0.564) (0.615) 
N 329 299 329 329 299 329 329 299 
R2/Pseudo R2 0.276 0.242 0.770 0.635 0.932 0.796 0.661 0.870 
Endogeneity  0.354   0.301   0.605 
Notes: Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. In each model year and bank dummies are 
included in order to account for macro level and bank level heterogeneity. Each model contains constant 
term. In OLS regressions adjusted R2 is reported. In GLM regressions Pseudo R2 is calculated as the 
correlation between the actual and the fitted values of the dependent variable. The endogeneity test 
reports p-value of the null hypothesis that the specified LERNER can be treated as exogenous. *, **, 
and *** indicate statistical significance at 5%, 1%, and 0.1% levels, respectively. N is the number of 
observations. 
 
Table 5.4 presents the regression results where LERNER is employed as a 
proxy for market power of banks. These results are similar to that of Table 5.3 in 
terms of the direction of relationship and statistical significance. In addition 
significantly negative coefficient estimates of LERNER in the regressions where 
the NPLN is the dependent variable; we get significantly negative coefficient 
estimates of LERNER in the regressions where the dependent variable is PROV. 
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These results indicate that as market power increases (competition decreases), the 
financial fragility approximated by both the ex-post loan risk (NPLN) and ex-ante 
loan risk (PROV) decreases. The last two columns of Table 5.4 yield positive 
coefficient estimates for LERNER. The OLS coefficient estimate for the LERNER 
show that as market power of a bank increases that bank stability as measured by 
Z increases. This is interpreted as the banks with a higher degree of market power 
have less overall risk exposure. These findings also provide evidence in favour of 
the traditional competition-fragility hypothesis for Turkish Banks after the 
financial crisis and banking regulations in 2000.  
As for the effects of bank ownership structure on loan risk and overall stability 
of banks, foreign banks were found to have less loan risk compared to the 
domestic banks in the first six columns of both Table 5.2 and 5.3. Moreover 
foreign ownership (FOREIGN) has a statistically significant and negative effect on 
overall stability as measured by Z, which is in line with Tunay’s (2009) findings. 
These results indicate that foreign banks take less loan risk as compared to 
domestic banks but their overall risk is higher as compared to domestic banks.  
The same results are also valid for the three state owned banks in Turkey as they 
have less loan risk but have higher overall risk.  
As for the endogeneity between market power proxies and risk measures, the 
IV regression results—where market power proxies are treated as endogeneous—
are broadly in line with OLS and GLM regressions. Following Schaeck and !ihák 
(2008), we use the one-year lagged value of the market power variables as 
instruments for the market power variables to address concerns that bank level 
market power and bank level risk/soundness are jointly determined 94 . The 
relevance of these instruments are tested in the first stage regressions by an F-
statistic of a joint test whether all excluded instruments are significant. As a rule 
of thumb, the F statistic should be bigger than 10 in order have a relevant 
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94 Because a longer lag will reduce any correlation between the instrument and the disturbances in 
the error term of the original ordinary least squares regression, the longer lags are considered to be 
better instruments by Murray (2006). Accordingly we re-estimated the IV regressions using the 
four-year lag and reported the results in Table 5.D in the Appendix. It seems that our results 
remained unchanged. However this lag is not found to be relevant as it has an F-statistic of 7.63. 
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instrument. In our regressions we calculated the F-statistic as 15.38 and 11.77 for 
the regressions where MP and LERNER reflect the market power respectively. 
Moreover our instruments are statistically significant in all regressions at least 5% 
in the first stage regressions in order to support relevance of our instruments. 
Although our instruments are relevant, the endogeneity test95 results indicate that 
endogeneity is not a significant problem as reported in Table 5.3 and 5.4. 
Acccordingly, we can infer that our results are robust to using solely the 
exogenous variation in the market power proxies i.e. results reflected the true 
effect of market power on risk or soundness measures.   
    
5.5 Conclusion 
The aim of this paper is to examine the relationship between the market power 
and risk-taking behaviours of banks in Turkey between 2001 and 2011. To account 
for loan and overall risk, nonperforming loans over total loans, provisions over 
total loans and Z-index are employed respectively. In order to account for market 
power Lerner index is calculated. However, calculation of the Lerner index is 
subject to many misspecification biases in banking where the output and input 
measures are not obvious and especially when information about price of output 
and input are extracted from financial account data, as we did in this study. 
Consequently, a second measure—which does not specify any restriction on inputs 
and outputs or a cost function to estimate the marginal cost—is also used: the 
difference between the total revenues and total cost over the total revenues. 
Some evidence is found to support competition-fragility hypothesis in the 
empirical part. Both market power proxies are found to have a positive (negative) 
and significant effect on the (non-performing loan ratios) Z-index. This finding 
suggests that market power increases banks’ soundness, which is consistent with 
the competition-fragility hypothesis.  
Regarding the ownership structure and risk-taking behaviours of banks, there is 
evidence supporting the idea that foreign banks have less loan risk than the 
domestic banks supporting Tunay’s (2009) findings. On the other hand their 
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95 We use Hausman test statistic as explained in Baum et al. (2003). 
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overall risk is higher as compared to domestic banks. The financial soundness as 
measured by Z-index is higher for the state owned banks. 
Some policy suggestions can be derived from the empirical part of the study. 
First of all, as market power of individual banks increases, the loan risk of banks 
decrease and overall soundness of banks increase. Thus it is important to have 
banks to have a less competitive environment in order to have a more stable 
banking system. Although many banks in developed economies was affected 
negatively in the recent global financial crisis, Turkish banking were not affected 
due to its strong structure after the establishment of Banking Regulation and 
Supervision Agency which lead to an intensive regulation processes as 
Bredenkamp et al. (2009), BRSA (2009), and Afsar (2011) reports. On the other 
hand, since banks in Turkey operate nearly in a non-competitive environment, the 
disadvantages of having less competition for higher investment levels, 
macroeconomic growth goals, and “too big to fail” policies in banking are 
especially important for an emerging economy like Turkey.   
This paper can be extended in several ways. First of all this paper employs 
non-performing loans, provisions and the Z-index to approximate for bank level 
fragility and soundness. However individual bank failures can be considered as a 
more direct indicator of individual bank distress. Turkish banking sector 
experienced nine bank failures just before the 2000 crisis, after this year only one 
bank96 failed. Accordingly bank failures can be a better measure of fragility for 
other countries that experience more frequent bank failures. Secondly this paper 
employs proxies of market power that varies both in bank and in time dimensions. 
Other competition measures such as the Panzar and Rosse’s H-stat, Boone (2008) 
index, and HHI can also be used in line with Structure Conduct hypothesis. 
However employment of these measures as competition indicators requires a wider 
data set. Because these measures are not both time and bank varying, that is to 
say they either reflect competitive structure of the market that is same for each 
banks in the system or reflect the market power of an individual bank during a 
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time period. An alternative approach to measure market power can be to use 
Tobin’s q, which can only be calculated for the banks that have market values, 
i.e. have publicly traded stocks. Of the 45 banks in Turkey, 13 publicly traded 
stocks in Istanbul Stock Exchange market, these stocks account for 20% of the 
total banking system assets. 
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5.7 Appendix 
Table 5.A Comparison of the Recent Crises in Turkey, Europe, and US. 
Country Start End 
Output 
loss 
Fiscal 
costs 
Peak 
liquidity 
liquidity 
support 
peak 
NPLs 
Increase in 
public debt 
Turkey 2000 2001 37 32 20.5 15.2 27.6 15.3 
United States 2007 … 31 4.5 4.7 4.7 5 23.6 
Greece 2008 … 43 27.3 44.3 42.3 14.7 44.5 
Germany 2008 … 11 1.8 11.5 3.6 3.7 17.8 
Italy 2008 … 32 0.3 7.7 5.7 11 8.6 
Ireland 2008 … 106 40.7 20 16.3 12.9 72.8 
Denmark 2008 … 36 3.1 20.1 11.4 4.5 24.9 
Belgium 2008 … 19 6 19.7 14.1 3.1 18.7 
Austria 2008 … 14 4.9 11.7 7.7 2.8 14.8 
Iceland 2008 … 43 44.2 21.2 16.8 61.2 72.2 
Hungary 2008 … 40 2.7 1.4 1.3 13.3 -0.3 
Netherlands 2008 … 23 12.7 5.9 3.7 3.2 26.8 
UK 2007 … 25 8.8 9 5.6 4 24.4 
Sweden 2008 … 25 0.7 13.2 13 2 11.1 
Switzerland 2008 … 0 1.1 4.6 3 0.5 -0.2 
Source: Leaven and Valencia (2012) 
Notes: 1) Output loss is expressed as percent of GDP and is computed as the cumulative sum of 
the differences between actual and trend real GDP over the period [T, T+3], expressed as a 
percentage of trend real GDP, with T the starting year of the crisis.  
2) Fiscal cost is expressed as percent of GDP. Fiscal costs are defined as the component of gross 
fiscal outlays related to the restructuring of the financial sector. They include fiscal costs 
associated with bank recapitalizations but exclude asset purchases and direct liquidity assistance 
from the treasury. 
3) Peak Liquidity is measured as the ratio of central bank claims on deposit money banks and 
liquidity support from the Treasury to total deposits and liabilities to non-residents.  
4) Peak NPLs is expressed as percentage of total loans. NPLs data come from IMF Staff reports 
and Financial Soundness Indicators.  
5) Increase in public debt is expressed as percentage of GDP. The increase in public debt is 
measured over [T-1, T+3], where T is the starting year of the crisis. For the 2007-2009 crises, it 
is computed as the difference between pre- and post-crisis debt projections.  
 
 
Table 5.B Average values by banks  
Bank name NPLN PROV Z LERNER MP 
ASSET 
FOREIGN STATE 
SHARE 
Adabank  17.366 93.609 3.815 98.636 2.011 0.03 0 0 
Akbank  0.012 99.327 1.037 99.287 36.517 11.751 0 0 
Alternatif Bank   4.834 55.127 0.474 98.98 12.809 0.483 0 0 
Anadolubank   0.603 84.464 0.754 99.028 19.544 0.537 0 0 
Arap Türk Bankası   1.234 96.827 1.477 99.002 31.665 0.12 1 0 
Bank Mellat 0.223 56.382 0.963 99.394 50.202 0.084 1 0 
Citibank   2.272 63.418 1.099 99.12 28.349 0.719 1 0 
Denizbank   1.816 74.391 0.774 99.075 23.132 2.326 1 0 
Deutsche Bank   0 3.245 2.542 99.224 31.745 0.144 1 0 
Eurobank Tekfen   1.95 72.718 0.765 98.963 13.874 0.332 1 0 
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Table 5.B continued 
Fibabanka   0.696 42.364 1.139 98.33 -28.65 0.122 1 0 
Finans Bank   1.334 87.955 0.823 99.139 26.49 3.214 1 0 
Habib Bank Limited 8.027 55.673 2.718 99.346 50.037 0.01 1 0 
HSBC Bank   0.995 80.964 1.208 99.148 31.04 1.847 1 0 
ING Bank   0.907 44.945 0.777 98.991 15.164 1.993 1 0 
JPMorgan Chase Bank  0 0 3.152 99.323 43.61 0.074 1 0 
!ekerbank 4.689 71.745 0.651 99.027 20.252 1.048 0 0 
Société Générale (SA) 0.658 19.945 0.906 98.898 11.701 0.085 1 0 
Tekstil Bankası   1.348 48.709 0.741 98.891 9.382 0.454 0 0 
The Royal Bank of 
Scotland   
2.919 87.382 1.674 99.137 31.885 0.153 1 0 
Türk Ekonomi Bankası   1.029 58.964 0.674 99.018 19.129 1.707 0 0 
Turkish Bank   0.839 82.664 1.011 98.963 14.875 0.125 0 0 
Türkiye Cumhuriyeti 
Ziraat Bankası   
4.02 76.991 0.709 99.168 26.783 16.173 0 1 
Türkiye Garanti 
Bankası   
1.926 62.882 0.77 99.136 24.535 10.837 0 0 
Türkiye Halk Bankası   0.628 92.7 0.742 99.154 25.864 7.711 0 1 
Türkiye "# Bankası   3.421 88.155 0.969 99.126 27.542 13.394 0 0 
Türkiye Vakıflar 
Bankası  
3.499 88.718 0.668 99.113 22.767 7.317 0 1 
Turkland Bank   4.964 68.909 1 98.887 11.132 0.117 1 0 
WestLB AG 0.003 27.145 0.991 99.064 19.434 0.11 1 0 
Yapı ve Kredi Bankası   9.446 70.836 0.723 98.979 12.036 8.604 0 0 
Total 2.722 65.238 1.192 99.054 22.162 3.054 0.533 0.1 
 
   
 
 Table 5.C Translog cost function estimation results  
Coefficients Estimates (std. errors) 
 1.020*** 
(0.023) 
 -0.001 (0.008) 
 -0.020 (0.017) 
 0.027*  (0.011) 
 -0.007 (0.016) 
 -0.126*** (0.036) 
 -0.062**  (0.024) 
 -0.061 (0.064) 
 0.062 (0.049) 
 0.064*  (0.030) 
 -0.001 (0.031) 
 0.312*** (0.057) 
 0.648*** (0.046) 
 0.041 (0.050) 
 8.281*** (0.088) 
N 329 
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Table 5.C continued 
Notes: Dependent variable is the logarithm of total costs. *, 
**, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 
1% respectively. Robust standard errors are reported in 
pharantheses. N is the number of observations. 
 
 
Table 5.D Correlation matrix 
 
NPLN PROV Z LERNER MP 
ASSET 
SHARE FOREIGN STATE CR3 CR5 
PROV -0.099 1.000 
        Z -0.061 -0.095 1.000 
       LERNER -0.288 -0.061 0.197 1.000 
      MP -0.280 -0.001 0.323 0.969 1.000 
     ASSETSHARE 0.006 0.307 -0.231 0.183 0.102 1.000 
    FOREIGN -0.104 -0.318 0.188 0.054 0.106 -0.538 1.000 
   STATE -0.001 0.207 -0.156 0.100 0.041 0.528 -0.356 1.000 
  CR3 -0.225 0.099 0.122 0.081 0.142 0.023 0.006 -0.002 1.000 
 CR5 -0.261 0.101 0.124 0.082 0.132 0.025 0.007 -0.002 0.928 1.000 
HHI -0.239 0.117 0.115 0.066 0.127 0.023 0.007 -0.003 0.972 0.932 
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Table 5.E IV estimation results when four-year lag is the instrumental variable 
 Dep.Var.: 
NPLN 
Dep. Var.: 
PROV 
Dep. Var.: 
Z 
Dep. Var.: 
NPLN 
Dep. Var.: 
PROV 
Dep. Var.:  
Z 
MP -0.059 0.502 0.004    
 (0.087) (0.383) (0.011)    
LERNER    -5.733 23.02 0.422 
    (7.912) (29.53) (0.895) 
ASSETSHARE 0.347 -3.546 0.003 0.388 -2.376 -0.003 
 (0.550) (2.948) (0.072) (0.573) (2.357) (0.068) 
FOREIGN 0.710 -106.0*** -3.945*** 2.419 -109.6*** -4.080*** 
 (1.371) (7.640) (0.305) (3.515) (12.85) (0.436) 
STATE -1.652 17.170 -4.313*** -0.279 5.375 -4.399*** 
 (3.174) (20.160) (0.497) (2.061) (12.620) (0.396) 
N 210 210 210 209 209 209 
Uncentered R2 0.372 0.865 0.921 0.363   0.970 0.922 
Endogeneity 0.796 0.217 0.338 0.669 0.372 0.561 
Notes: Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. In each model year and bank 
dummies are included in order to account for macro level and bank level heterogeneity. The 
endogeneity test reports p-value of the null hypothesis that the specified MP or LERNER 
can be treated as exogenous, the test statistic is distributed as chi-squared with degrees of 
freedom equal to the number of regressors tested. The joint F-statistics for the significance of 
the excluded instruments 7.63 and 5.00 for the regressions where MP and LERNER 
approximate the market power of banks. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 5%, 
1% and 0.1% levels, respectively. N is the number of observations. 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusions 
As this thesis consists of four papers in different but somehow related topics, 
each chapter has its own conclusion, policy implications, and future research 
directions. This part of the thesis underlines the general conclusions of its chapters 
in addition to policy implications and future research directions. In each chapter 
our empirical analyses are mainly based on non-developed economies from Central 
/Eastern Europe and Central Asia. These countries are generally transition and 
non-OECD countries except Turkey. Financial systems in these economies are 
generally characterized as bank-based financial systems as equity markets and 
other financial markets are not well developed. In these types of countries, firms 
rely on bank credit if they are eligible for credit and the credit conditions are not 
stringent. Information asymmetries between banks and borrowers constitutes one 
of the most important problems especially for SMEs in transition economies as 
banks are more likely to have difficulty in assessing the credibility of the firms and 
firm level information.  
This thesis starts with introduction chapter. In the second chapter we examine 
the collateral requirements in loans extended to SMEs in less-developed countries. 
In contrast to previous empirical research on collateral, we not only focus on the 
presence of collateral in loan contracts but also on the degree of collateral in these 
contracts as measured by collateral to loan value ratios. Our analysis assesses both 
borrower characteristics, which have typically been the major focus of previous 
investigations, and the country–specific factors that affect collateral requirements. 
In general, our results indicate that country–specific variables rather are more 
important than firm–specific variables for determining both the presence and the 
degree of collateral in loan contracts of SMEs. We find that in countries in which 
lenders have better information about borrowers’ repayment history and unpaid 
debts through public and private credit bureaus, both the probability for the 
presence of collateral and the degree of that collateral decrease in loan contracts. 
!!
"#$!
Thus, collateral requirements serve as a tool for resolving the problem of 
asymmetric information about the borrower’s quality. In contrast to previous 
studies we also distinguish between small, medium, and micro enterprises. We 
present evidence that the determinants of collateral requirements differ for firms 
of different sizes. 
To improve the abilities of SMEs to access finance it appears to be crucial to 
improve the process of collecting information about the borrower. In this context, 
lending activity may benefit from entities that are dedicated to the information 
collecting process, such as mutual guarantee societies (MGSs). By improving the 
risk analysis and the information sharing level of a country, MGSs can help ensure 
that scarce public resources are used more effectively by providing an indication of 
the adequate level of guarantees for various enterprises. 
In the third chapter we examine the determinants of borrowing from informal 
credit sources, i.e. moneylenders, family/friends, and trade credit for SMEs. One 
four of the SMEs in our sample used informal credit to finance part of their fixed 
asset investments and/or working capital purchases. However, our results show 
that these credits correspond only to relatively small fractions of the working 
capital/fixed asset purchases, and the SMEs in our samples mostly use informal 
credit to finance their working capital expenses; only a very small fraction of the 
fixed asset investments are financed by informal credit sources. We observe higher 
percentages of working capital financed by informal sources compared with the 
percentage of fixed assets financed via informal sources. This result is consistent 
with the characteristics of informal credit, which primarily includes small and 
short-term loans. We find that credit-constrained SMEs rely more on informal 
credit of any type. We find some evidence suggesting that SMEs with female 
owners use less informal credit from moneylenders. An explanation for this result 
is the different risk preferences of female entrepreneurs (i.e., females are more risk 
averse than males). Another explanation is that female entrepreneurs are 
addressed as better borrowers with lower default rates in the previous literature. 
This situation may affect women’s ability to easily access formal finance.  
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Our regression results mostly indicate a positive relationship between the legal 
non-quality and informal credit use, which suggests that informal credit usage in 
the form of borrowing from family friends and moneylenders is higher in countries 
where legal procedures take longer. On the other hand the length of legal 
procedures are found to decrease trade credit use of SMEs. So the obvious policy 
suggestion of this chapter can be the importance of legal efficiency in limiting the 
illegal moneylender activities. 
In countries with more developed financial markets, firms have many options 
for financing their projects; thus, they are less likely to use informal credit in the 
form of family/friends and moneylenders. We find some evidence supporting this 
hypothesis, i.e., concentrated banking systems lead SMEs to use these forms of 
informal credit more intensively. This result can be linked to market power, 
suggesting that more concentrated banking environments result in reduced credit 
availability, especially for small businesses. The overall results of this study 
indicate financing obstacles as the cause of informal credit use and indicate that 
informal creditors meet the financing requirements of SMEs in less-developed 
countries. Moreover financially distressed SMEs (as approximated by utility 
arrears) use informal credit in any form more intensively. Accordingly, informal 
credit plays an important role in alleviating problems of firms regarding credit 
constraints. 
There are several directions for future researches related to this chapter. First, 
informal credit use has potential effects on a firm’s performance and growth, 
especially for start-up firms. Therefore, “how does informal credit help to establish 
new businesses?” can be an interesting research question. Another interesting 
topic of future research is the interaction between the expansion of new banking 
technologies (e.g., internet banking) and the informal credit choice of firms, 
especially in smaller cities. Because there is no registration of the transactions in 
informal financial markets, finding accurate data is the biggest obstacle for future 
research.  
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In the fourth chapter we investigate the financial constraints faced by female 
entrepreneurs. The results of univariate analysis indicate that female 
entrepreneurs are more likely to be discouraged from applying loan as compared 
to their male counterparts. As we take into other factors to account for 
creditworthiness of loan applicants in the regression analysis, the coefficient 
estimate of the female ownership dummy becomes statistically significant only at 
ten percent when the dummy variable of being discouraged from applying loan is 
the dependent variable in the probit regressions. However our results show that 
female ownership has no effect on loan approvals. These results remained same 
when we take into account the effect of the top manager’s gender.  
BEEPS provide information on firms’ perception on difficulty of accessing 
finance. In BEEPS surveys firms are asked to report on a 1 (“no obstacle”) to 5 
(“very severe obstacle”) scale how difficult access to finance (which includes 
availability and cost, interest rates, fees and collateral requirements) is for the 
current operations of the firm.  The descriptive analysis shows that firms 
perception of suffering from access to finance do not vary extensively by gender 
categories. The percentage of the firms that perceive access to finance as a minor 
and no problem were 51% both for male owned and female owned enterprises. The 
percentage of the firms that perceive access to finance as a major and very severe 
were 23% both for male owned and female owned enterprises. We also do not 
observe statistically significant differences by gender as the t-test results confirm. 
The results of our study indicate that encouraging policies for female 
entrepreneurs in lending markets should be implemented in order to facilitate 
higher firm growth rates and resultantly economic growth in less-developed 
countries. To this end less-developed countries will be able to catch up with the 
developed economies.  
The structure of BEEPS doesn’t allow us to examine the firms that have many 
female owners. However, future researches can be conducted to compare three 
groups of firms: firms that only have female entrepreneurs, only have male 
entrepreneurs, and firms that have both male and female owners. A comparison 
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between these groups of firms in other countries can be a direction future research 
topic as well as comparisons between developed, less-developed, developing, or 
transition economies. 
In chapter five, we aim to examine the relationship between market power and 
risk taking behaviours of banks from Turkey between 2001 and 2011. We 
employed two measures of loan risk, i.e. nonperforming loans over total loans, 
provisions over total loans, and an overall stability index, i.e. Z-index. We 
measured the market power by Lerner index. We used a second measure that does 
not specify any restriction on inputs and outputs or a cost function to estimate 
the marginal cost: the difference between the total revenues and total cost over 
the total revenues. Some evidence is found to support competition-fragility 
hypothesis in the empirical part, which suggests that market power increases 
banks’ soundness. Our results show that it is important to have banks with higher 
market power is associated with lower risk and resultantly a more stable banking 
system. Although many banks in developed economies was affected negatively in 
the recent global financial crisis, Turkish banking were not affected due to its 
strong structure after the establishment of Banking Regulation and Supervision 
Agency which lead to an intensive regulation processes. On the other hand, since 
banks in Turkey operate nearly in a non-competitive environment, the 
disadvantages of having less competition for higher investment levels and “too big 
to fail” policies in banking are especially important for an emerging economy like 
Turkey.   
Chapter five can be extended in several ways. First of all individual bank 
failures can be considered as a more direct indicator of individual bank distress. 
Turkish banking sector experienced nine bank failures just before the 2000 crisis, 
after this year only one bank97 failed. Accordingly bank failures can be a better 
measure of fragility not for Turkey for 2001-2011 period but for other countries 
that experience more frequent bank failures. Secondly other proxies of market 
power that varies both in bank and in time dimensions can be used. Other 
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97 ImarBank failed in 2003.  
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competition measures such as the Panzar and Rosse’s H-stat, Boone index, and 
Herfindahl-Hirshman index can also be used. However using these measures as 
competition indicators requires a wider data set. Because these measures are not 
both time and bank varying, that is to say they either reflect competitive 
structure of the market that is same for each banks in the system or reflect the 
market power of an individual bank during a time period. An alternative approach 
to measure market power can be to use Tobin’s q, which can only be calculated 
for the banks that have market values, i.e. have publicly traded stocks. Of the 45 
banks in Turkey, 13 have publicly traded stocks in Istanbul Stock Exchange 
market, these stocks account for 20% of the total banking system assets.  
Our study contributes to the limited empirical evidence for less–developed and 
transition economies and therefore yields important policy implications for SMEs, 
financial institutions and policy makers. Along the second, third and the fourth 
chapters in this thesis, we tried to draw attention to the importance of financial 
constraints. Collateral requirements are more stringent in the less-developed 
countries as compared to developed economies. We also find that informal credit 
usage in the form of moneylender and borrowing from family/friends decreases 
with the development level of the country. As we analyse the effect of firm 
owners’ gender on financial constraints, we see that female entrepreneurs are not 
discriminated in their loan applications, however they are more likely to be 
discouraged from applying loans as compared to their male counterparts. These 
discouragements of female entrepreneurs together with the financial constraints 
are more important in less-developed and developing economies in order to catch 
up with the developed economies. To this end, the general policy implication of 
these three chapters is that in order to foster business activities and resultantly to 
achieve higher macroeconomic growth rates in less-developed economies, lower 
collateral requirements together with policies that increase access to finance 
especially for female entrepreneurs should be implemented. Our results address 
information sharing as one of the important policy tools to reduce the collateral 
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requirements for all size of SMEs. In this sense encouraging information sharing 
among lenders will lead to less stringent collateral requirements.  
The policy implication of the fifth chapter seems to favour less competition in 
banking in order to achieve financial stability in Turkey as a non-developed 
economy. However in the second and third chapters, we show the disadvantages of 
having a concentrated banking sector for financial constraints especially for the 
smallest firms and in non-developed economies98 . To this end, policy makers 
should consider the complex associations between banking competition-financial 
stability and financial constraints simultaneously and balance the degree of 
competition in banking accordingly. Balancing the level of banking competition is 
especially important in less-developed economies, as the SMEs in these countries 
do not have many options of external financing. 
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98 As for the effect of banking concentration, we observe a positive association between banking concentration 
and collateral requirements only for micro sized firms. We also observe that the positive effect of banking 
concentration on the informal credit use in the form of borrowing from family/friends is valid only in middle 
income countries as it is not valid for high income countries. These results suggest that the positive effect of 
banking concentration on financial constraints is important for smallest firms and in non-developed 
economies. 
